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CHAPTER ONE 
NATURE OF THE STUDY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It has ·often been said that the one constant in human life is change. 
Human beings and their societies - their political, economic, social 
and religious institutions - are continually changing. The changes 
in the recent past have been so numerous that they have significantly 
undermined traditional ways of thinking and behaving, resulting in 
drastic shifts in attitudes, opinions and values (King and McGinnies, 
1972 : 2). Conventional understandings of the realities of social 
life, including social institutions, are also challenged regularly. 
The contemporary rapidity of change thus makes the task of 
influencing change complex and demanding. Organisations and groups 
have to act in a context that is already changing and must carefully 
and skilfully utilise particular strategies. 
In a plea to Chinese youth in 1915, Ch'en Tu hsiu said: "The progress 
of the world is like that of a fleet horse, galloping and galloping 
onward. Whatever cannot skilfully change itself and progress along 
with the world will find itself eliminated by natural selection" 
(Lauer, 1982 : 335). Decades later, suggesting that the world was 
soon to be out of control, Alvin Toffler (1970 : 402), maintained 
that: "If it were technology alone that had broken loose, our 
problems would be serious enough. The deadly fact is, however, 
that many other social processes have also begun to run free, 
oscillating wildly, resisting our best efforts to guide them". It 
is Tu hsiu's assertions related to the inevitability o~ progress 
as well as To~fler's urge to guide change that serve as the central 
emphases within this study. 
The science of sociology began in philosophical reasoning about 
social change (Vago, 1980 : 2). The origins of this new science 
marked the beginning of a long and difficult process towards making 
"sense" of such change. In early Greek philosophy Heraclitus and 
Ephesus asserted that eve~ything in the universe was in a state of 
2. 
flux and that the world came into being by means of upward and 
downward motion. Opposing this view, the philosopher Parmenides 
of Elea claimed that the world consisted of indivisible and 
motionless plenum, which was there, is there, and will always be 
there. This diversity and polarisation in thought finds its modern 
versions in the functionalist and conflict schools as well as the 
numerous adaptations and innovations that have emerged (Edari, . 
1976 : 1; Denisoff, 1974 : 3). 
In spite of the considerable number of efforts at explaining the 
nature of social change, sociology has not yet satisfactorily 
indicated how society changes, including how rapidly and in what 
direction it changes, and why and by whom these changes are caused. 
Considering the fact that social change has often been conceived 
of as being the result of conflict, of new modes of thinking, of 
external forces, of individual motivation to achieve and of 
popular spontaneity, there is still a great deal to learn about 
its nature and scope. 
From a sociological point of view, the problem of change involves 
the task of uncovering generalisations, and ultimately, theories 
on the operation of variables which contribute to the change in 
social arrangements. Thus, generalisations have had to be 
established by looking at the variables which contribute to stability 
and change (Edari, 1976 3). Theorists' personal conceptions of 
change have necessarily affected their interpretations of observed 
data and occurrences. Social change theory has also served as 
justification for particular types of social action, both passive 
and active. Whilst scientific objectivity itself is often attained 
in the social sciences, neutrality is never or rarely maintained. 
This particular study will continue the tradition of being objective 
but not neutral. 
Allardt (Ishwaran, 1966 : 2) maintains that it: . "is reasonable to 
assume that the crucial political reactions !n a society are 
related to the legitimacy of the poli tic,al systeht and to the 
solidarity citizens feel towards their society. By legitimacy is 
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meant that citizens feel that the social and political system of 
their nation is acceptable. Solidarity with the social and political 
system of a nation may be defined through the concept of legitimacy. 
Solidarity prevails as long as people believe that the social and 
political system is legitimate, or do not act in order to change 
the system through non-institutionalised means. If solidarity is 
defined in this fashion, then, of course, legitimacy conflicts are 
simply the obverse of solidarity". 
In South Africa, new levels of conflict have been reached, with new 
strategies being developed both by extra-parliamentary groups and 
institutions. It may be asked which particular sectors of the 
population are considering the political system illegitimate? 
Mthombothi (Meer, 1985 : 3) maintains that: "Not a single South 
African has been left unaffected, directly or indirectly by the 
unrest as the country's African townships explode in a way 
unprecedented in the country's history". Whilst the unrest has 
been contained largely within the African townships, do other Black 
race groups, that is, the Indian and Coloured race groups, subscribe 
to similar socio-political attitudes? These questions are of 
extreme importance to the country and the answers are of particular 
relevance in clarifying the contemporary attitudes that are being 
formed towards the different social change strategies. 
Attitudes themselves are frequently viewed as disposing the individual 
to feel, think and act in certain ways. They are inferred from 
these three sources and a number of theories have proposed that 
attitudes consist of three components: a cognitive (thought) 
component, an affective , (feeling) component and a behavioural 
(action) component. This component approach to attitudes was 
developed most systematically in 1959 by Katz and Scotland 
(Himmelfarb and Eagly, 1974 : 6). They saw an attitude as having 
both a cognitive and an affective component only if a person is 
engaged in action vis-a-vis the attitude object. Whilst attitudinal 
change may reflect or give rise to changes, in some cases the value 
system itself may possess built-in resistance to any ~hange. ~s 
an illustration, economic development will lag unless people 
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acquire attitudes of co-operation or the desire for advancement. 
Hence, a major motivator for this particular study has been that 
attitudes, implicit in the thinking of many individuals, social 
scientists and laypersons alike, are among the "causes" of social 
behaviour. Whilst it may not lead to or reflect changes in inter-
personal relationships, organisations or institutions - if the 
attitude change is positive, it does suggest the real potential for 
instituting change. 
A further contention of the research is to examine attitudes of the 
. Black population towards social change strategies initiated by the 
formal state structure itself. Hence, it must be pointed out that 
wh~lst this study is primarily an academic work, it is not conducted 
solely for academic purposes. It is envisaged that the research 
will supplement existing knowledge about social change in South 
Africa. , It is hoped that it will add new insights to contemporary 
research that is being conducted by research institutes and 
individuals associated with various academic or community based 
organisations. Perhaps its results could be used by organisations 
involved in the active processes of initiating change. 
Social researchers engaged in the field of social change, particularly 
with respect to the type of social change preferred, have often been 
more concerned with supporting vested interests than with building 
up an empirical and general body of knowledge. Thus, as soon as 
situations of complex and turbulent proportions are faced, it 
becomes clear that little is known and little is understood about 
the nature and responses of our communities. The necessary knowledge 
can only be achieved by trying to understand the theory of social 
change and by basing studies upon objective, empirical research, and 
not upon any particularistic biased approach. A unified system of 
knowledge about the nature and methods of social change and Black 
attitudes is possible through a convergent effort to devise more 
reliable research in this field. The present study aims at contri-
buting to this. ~ 
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2. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
Compared to the abundance of literature available on social change, 
particularly as pertains to industrialised and industrialising 
western countries, studies focusing on social change strategies in 
South Africa are lacking. Specifically, empirical, academic studies, 
focusing comparatively on the attitudes of the disenfranchised 
Black population groups are absent. 
The necessity for an understanding of socia-political beliefs and 
attitudes has become urgent, not only in the light of the growing 
unrest, but ~lso · with the increase in international condemnation of 
South Africa's racial policies. The extent to which the "internal 
condemnation" exists also needs scientific rather than intuitive 
analysis. 
·In Southern Africa as a whole, the contemporary scene was set with 
the coup in Lisbon in April in 1974. The Portuguese empire 
subsequently collapsed bringing to an end about five hundred years 
of colonialism with the independence of Angola and Mozambique. The 
boundary lines of the supposedly solid "white south" became 
dramatically reduced. The Angolan ci vii war in part.icular had 
introduced an unexpected degree of internationalisationj South 
Africa and the west on the side that lost, and Cuba and the USSR 
on the side that won. The momentum generated by the demise of the 
Portuguese regime produced a new sense of urgency about the need to 
solve the outstanding colonial problems of Zimbabwe (then known as 
Rhodesia), Namibia (then known as South West Africa) and South Africa. 
1n Rhodesia and South West Africa the armed struggle intensified. 
Independent Black Africa, especially the key "frontline" states, 
became more militant and supportive. The West, in response to 
fears of "another Angola" stepped up its efforts to promote 
negotiations between the contesting parties . South Africa, as a 
supplier and supporter of Rhodesia and the colonial administrator 
of South West Africa became involved in shaping the fates of those 
/ 
two countries. However, for the first time since the Sharpeville 
/ 
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shootings of 1960 and the period of political and economic 
instability that followed, South Africa's own future began to look 
uncertain (Hare, 1983 : 10). 
With Zimbabwean independence in 1980 and the inauguration of Robert 
Mugabe as Prime Minister, South Africa's isolation increased. The 
students I revolt which started with the Soweto demonstrat"ions in 
June 1976, revealed the strength and determination of the Black 
student movement and the more organised re-emergence of the broader 
social movements. The current unrest which surfaced during 1984 
and which is continuing during 1988, indicate a sustained stirring 
and a form of organisation of the Black masses unparalleled in 
South African history. It will undoubtedly have consequences for 
the future. 
Contemporary responses suggest that the township uprisings are a 
necessary outcome of deep-rooted frustrations which have resulted 
because of the structure and violence of the apartheid social 
system. Other responses differ. The recognition that government 
officials believe that the world is becoming increasingly hostile 
to South Africa, a world whose attitude towards South Africa has 
been called a "total onslaught" is central to an understanding of 
the rise of the security establishment in this country. Total 
onslaught suggests that the USSR is regarded as the root cause of 
discontent and instability in the region. They are seen as 
diabolically using ~lyindependent Black states for their expansionist 
designs. "The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies," 
reads the government's White paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 
1982, "is to overthrow the present body politic in the RSA and to 
replace it with a Marxist-orientated form of government to further 
the objectives of the USSR, therefore, all possible methods and 
means are used to attain this objective. This includes instigating 
social and labour unrest, civilian resistance, terrorist attacks 
against the infrastructure of the RSA and the intimidation of Black 
leaders and members of the Security Forces. This onslaught is 
supported by a world-wide propaganda campaign and the involvement 
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of various front organisations, such as trade unions and even 
certain church organisations and leaders" (Grundy, 1983 : 4). 
Thus the following express the rationale for this study: 
2.1 "We may disagree concerning our long-term goals as such. 
Fundamentally different kinds of societies or political systems may 
be proposed as eventual objectives. Which of these are acceptable, 
and why? Obviously this is of crucial importance to the whole 
question of "alternatives", but even so it rarely amounts to a 
straight line choice between different future goals. A prior 
problem is that we may be uncertain of the very nature and meaning 
of ,any given goal, or disagree about its relation to our ethical 
norms. Our first task must accordingly be to clarify the full 
implications of the various relevant political strategies, and only 
then can we sensibly commit ourselves to the pursuit of one or the 
other of these" (A Spro-Cas Report, 1973 : 63). 
2.2 "In South Africa, thousands of white people and millions of Black 
people loathe the apartheid system. Are they the agents or tools 
of the Kremlin? Not today. But they will be if they are continually 
harassed by the authorities and accused of complicity in a foreign-
based violent revolution. The effect of domestic security policy 
based on a perception of total onslaught is to alienate still further 
well-meaning non-violent critics who wish to reform what even some 
members of the Government recognise as an antiquated system that 
needs to be changed" (Grundy, 1983 : 4). 
The rationale expressed in this form highlights the basic considerations 
that surround a study of social attitudes toward strategies for 
social change. 
In the first instance, it must be emphasised that intellectual 
debates as to which strategy for change is most feasible and 
applicabie within the context of the South African situation will 
/ 
persist within academic circles. However, there is a need for an 
empirical study that encompasses a representative sample of the 
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socio-political attitudes that exist at grass-roots level, now 
that the ~ommunities have been exposed to years of political 
oration, strategies and tactics. In the second instance, what 
needs to be clearly ascertained is the degree of commitment to 
socio-political beliefs that Black (African, Indian and Coloured) 
people supposedly have and express - and the extent to which they 
serve or believe that they serve, as "tools of the Kremlin". 
3. FIELD AND PURPOSE 
Whilst the study relates to the field of social change, its purpose 
is not to be either eclectic or definitive. The intention is to 
contribute towards a systematic theory of social change which helps 
to clarify the fundamental nature of strategies supported by Blacks 
within the context of contemporary South African society. 
Political sociology is concerned with power in its social context. 
By "power" is meant the ability of an individual or a social group 
to pursue a course of action (to make and implement decisions, and 
more broadly to determine the agenda for decision making) if 
necessary against the interests, and even against the opposition, 
of other individuals and groups (Bottomore, 1979 : 7). This 
statement is not intended as a full and adequate definition of the 
concept of power, but only as a preliminary delineation of a field 
of inquiry. Certainly, many SOCiologists have contributed to this 
field of political sociology. Many have treated this theme somewhat 
differently. Constant references to the main writers who have 
contributed to this field of study will be made. However, many 
aspects will be treated in a manner considered as original in order 
to keep the research consistent with the researcher's own mode of 
thought. 
In the field of political SOCiology, the concept "social change" 
has been subjected to varying definitions. Edari (1976 : 2) 
maintains that social change at least involves two things: 
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(a) the change in the constitution of social entities over time; 
and 
(b) the change in the relations among entities over time. 
If this definition appears to cover the whole of social life, 
it is because the whole of social life is continually changing. 
Social change is an inclusive concept that refers to alterations 
in social phenomena at various levels of human life from the 
individual to the global. The various levels, some representative 
areas of analysis within each level, and some representative units 
of analysis are given in Table 1. 
In this particular study, whilst all levels are important, the 
emphasis will be placed on the societal and individual level of 
analysis. A final operational definition will be included at the 
end of this chapter. 
4. OBJECTIVES . OF THE STUDY 
The above discussion points to four objectives for the study: 
4.1 To analyse the dynamics of social change processes and strategies 
within a South African historical context. 
4.2 To utilise a particular evolutionary perspective, integrating the 
concept of social change, as a framework for analysis. 
4.3 To make a comparative study of attitudes of urban Black communities 
in selected areas of metropolitan Durban towards evolutionist 
strategies for social change in South Africa, within the context of 
working hypotheses. 
4.4 To make recommendations, after examining the results emanating from 
theoretical and field research, which may be utilised in attempts 
to provide constructive solutions to identifiable problems. 
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TABLE 1 
UNITS OF ANALYSIS 
LEVEL OF SOME REPRESENTATIVE SOME REPRESENTATIVE 
ANALYSIS AREAS OF STUDY UNITS OF STUDY 
Global International organisation; GNP; trade data; 
International inequality poli tical alliances 
Civilisation Life cycle of civilisations Artistic; scientific 
or other patterns of change and other innovations; 
eg o evolutionary or social institutions 
dialectical 
Culture Material culture, non- Technology, ideology; 
material culture values 
Society Stratification system; Income; power and 
structure; demography; prestige; votes; 
crime population growth 
Institutions Economy; polity; religion; Family income; voting 
marriage and family; patterns; church 
education attendance; divorce 
rate 
Organisations Structure; interaction Roles; friendship 
patterns; authority cliques; adminis-
structure; productivity tration/production 
ratio; output per . 
worker 
Interaction Types of interaction; Amount of conflict; 
communication competition, or 
consensus 
Individual Attitudes Beliefs about various 
matters; aspirations 




5. WORKING HYPOTHESES 
Three working hypotheses are derived from the objectives of the 
study: 
5.1 Black urban communities prefer extra-parliamentary strategies for 
evolutionary social change. 
5.2 African urban communities prefer extra-parliamentary revolutionary 
strategies for social change. 
5.3 Indian and Coloured urban communities prefer extra-parliamentary 
ev~lutionary strategies as compared to revolutionary social change. 
6. METHOD 
A detailed description of the empirical data gathering methods 
used, is , given in Chapter Four. This is done because a description 
of ' the construction of the interview schedule becomes clear only 
aft~r the analYsis of the theoretical sources and the construction 
" 
of a theoretical frame of reference is completed in Chapter Three. 
The method used, that is the logical aspects of the study, is 
'outlined here in general terms only: 
6.1 In Chapter Two an overview of the structure of South African society 
'is undertaken by means of an examination of history, of current 
literature and of models presented by different theorists as well 
6.~ 
6.3 ' 
as the researcher. 
In , Chapter Three a presentation of the independent indicators of 
, social attitudes is undertaken. A critical presentation of Lenski's 
evolutionary theory supplemented with other theories is undertaken 
resulting in the construction of a theoretical framework for the 
analysis of empirical data. 
' ~ 
' In Chapter Four a representative selection of nine areas (African, 
Indian ~nd Coloured) in metropolitan Durban for the purposes of 
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comparison and analysis is done. The basis for this selection is 
the accessibility of the areas as well as particular socio-economic 
indexes. 
A representative sample of residents is drawn and serve as the 
basis of surveys conducted by means of a systematically constructed 
interview schedule and controlled interview methods. 
6.4 In Chapter Five a systematic manipulation and analysis of data 
following the accepted methods of sociological research is done. 
6.5 In ,Chapter Six an interpretation of data is undertaken leading to 
conclusions which may have both theoretical and practical 
significance and may result in proposals for further research. 
7. THE USE OF THE EVOLUTIONIST' THEORETICAL MODEL 
The evolutionist theoretical model which incorporates structuralist 
and conflict assumptions is being utilised as this is considered 
to be the most appropriate model for empirical analysis. 
The evolutionist model is appropriate at a theoretical level because: 
7.1 It depicts clearly diverse forms of social life. 
7.2 It shows the increasing complexity of structure forms and 
organisations in time. 
7.3 It also shows the adaptive capacity of societies and the significant 
role of factors such as culture and affluence (Hoogvelt, 1978 : 11). 
An evolutionary theoretical model as a guiding frame of reference 
was seen as constructive at the fieldwork stage because it allowed 
respondents greater freedom to respond to the relevant questions. 
~ A r evolutionary model would have cultivated apprehension on the 
part of respondents. 
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Aspects of the conflict model are seen as appropriate at a theoretical 
level because: 
7.4 It refers to tension and conflict between g~oups and individuals. 
7.5 It suggests that society is an arena in which struggles over 
scarce commodities take place (Vago, 1980 : 39). 
Hence, this synthesis of relevant aspects of contradictory theories is 
seen as best addressing our complex social structure - one which 
incorporates elements of conflict and stability. In the final analysis, 
however, it is essentially reference to cumulative change, the gradual 
addition of new elements to a continuing base in South Africa that is 
seen as more appropriate to capture the essence of data extracted in the 
"snapshot" of society afforded by the empirical research project. 
8. DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS 
8.1 Social change 
This comprises modifications in social systems or sUb-systems in 
structure, function or process over some period of time. Thus, 
by social change is meant any such alterations as occur in social 
organisation (Davis, 1959 : 22). It may occur as a result of the 
contradiction between forces and relations of production. It may 
emerge as the need to reduce tensions between institutions, groups 
and roles. Non-periodical tensions have a lasting aspect since 
they result from oscillations which exceed structural limits. The 
system therefore has no capacity fo~ their absorption because its 
structure does not react, or reacts poorly, to the stimuli. The 
lasting dysfunctionality of the system will disorganise it if 
society does not eliminate or change its obsolete structures. Such 
changes are often violent because of the accidental tensions 
(Ferrinho, 1981 : 21). 
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8.2 Evolutionist/Evolutionary 
These terms are used interchangeably. In evolutionist terms, 
society is portrayed as developing through definite steps on an 
evolutionary ladder. This evolutionary schema, similar to that 
in biology, sees social life as progressing from a relatively 
simple state to one with a higher degree of complexity (Denisoff, 
1974 181). Earlier, evolutionary theory held that the change 
from one state to another meant a unilinear cumulative process 
through which societies changed from "lower" to "higher" stages 
of development. More recently, evolution has been defined as a 
multi-linear phenomenon. Many evolutionists maintain that social' 
change has not been unilinear, with all past and present societies 
capable of being ,placed on the continuum of development. Rather, 
human culture has evolved along a number of different lines which 
suggest that change is multi-linear rather than unilinear (Edari, 
1976 : 9). The notion of gradual and progressive development is 
central to a definition of evolution. Finally, the belief in 
social evolution or progress implies an inevitable movement in a 
particular, desirable direction. 
8.3 Revolutionary 
Revolutions constitute the greatest challenge to the modes of 
social control (Moore, 1974 : 84). The revolution, which is violent, 
usually engages a considerable portion of a population, and 
results in a change in the structure of government, the legal 
codes relating to other major social functions, and the grounds 
on which officials base their right to govern. Two other forms 
of violent (short-term) changes can be distinguished. First, the 
rebellion may in fact be an abortive revolution. 
, 
Leach (Moore, 
1974 : 86), has argued that most violent political activity in 
human societies are rebellious rather than revolutionary, because 
of the general absence of a highly centralised government which 
can be overthrown. Second, the "coup d' etat" although 
representing an illegal usurpation of power that may be accompanied 
by some violence, does not necessarily result in major changes 
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in the structure of government or in the legal bases of other 
social institutions. 
8.4 Social movement 
Social movements are forms of collective behaviour in which members 
tend to be unified by an ideology in their efforts to bring about 
or prevent change. Some social movements attempt to change the 
social structure, either completely (transformative movements) or 
partially (reformative movements). Others attempt to change the 
individual either completely (redemptive movements) or partially 
(alternative movements). With respect to the way social movements 
originate, adherents of the strain and deprivation theory hold 
that social movements arise in response to structural strain, 
which often takes the form of deprivation, either objective or 
relative. According to the resource - mobilisation theory, many 
sociai movements begin not merely when societal strain exists, 
but when leaders are present to organise adherents and mobilise 
resources (Goodman and Marx, 1978 : 528-529). A movement is not 
simply a response to drastic social change, but rather is a 
mechanism through which that change is shaped and directed (Gerlach 
and Hine, 1970 : 14). 
8.5 Strategy 
A strategy refers to a concerted campaign to institute a particular 
type of social order. It refers to an overall plan of action 
which may be evolutionist or revolutionary in nature. Thus, 
strategies may be of a long term or short term duration. An . 
evolutionist strategy would refer to programmes or campaigns 
to urge change in a gradual, progressive and non-violent manner. 
A revolutionary strategy would refer to methods that initiate 




AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND 
PROCESSES OF SOUTH AFRICA 
PART ONE 
STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE 
Polarisations existing within South Africa are not simply between Black and 
White. There are also those between homeland leaders and urban leaders, 
for example·, between Inkatha and the United Democratic Front (UDF); those 
between different factions in the Afrikaner group; those between the 
proponents of black consciousness and the non-racial African National 
Congress (ANC); as well as many tribal and personal rivalries. These in 
turn, reflect contradictions at the level of class and sex, for instance, 
between the organised working class and private (white) capital as well as 
between patriarchal domination and the trend towards equality between the 
sexes. 
In considering the structure of South African society, Lever (1978 : 33) 
recalled Gordon Allport's description of South Africa as "an anthropologist's 
dream and a sociologist's nightmare". This is in line with Allport's and 
Lever's analyses of the South African society as that of a structure 
stratified by cross-cutting divisions based on race, ethnic, language, tribal 
and religious differences. The differences pertaining to class and sex do 
not playa significant role in Lever'S analysis. He maintains further that 
very often South African society is conceived of in terms of a simple 
division or polarity between Whites and Blacks. Certain rights and 
privileges flow from this distinction and there are attendant group 
interests. However, he contends that the view that there is an undifferentiated 
mass of Whites opposed to an undifferentiated mass of Blacks is misleading. 
There are important social differentiations including varying cultural 
orientations within the two main divisions which have a bearing on the 
pattern of inter-group relations and group identities in this country / 
(Lever, 1978 : 14). 
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Whilst Lever suggests that a voluntary alignment of ethnic groups exists, 
Moodley (1986 : 190) maintains that self-identification is not acceptable. 
She contends that the imposition of an identity on subordinates by 
superordinate groups inevitably leads to its rejection, even if equal 
rights are guaranteed. An imposed identity is not a source of pride, but 
a stigma. If the formation of the group is itself considered an affront 
to its alleged members, the principle of their rights becomes meaningless. 
She contends that there is little evidence that the peoples of South 
Africa have internalised their official labels, apart from the ruling 
sector and perhaps some ruling segments of the Black population. In 
addition, the official policy of collectively denationalising those South 
African citizens who are deemed to belong to a separate state clearly 




At present South Africa's apartheid (separate development) system 
divides the country's peoples into so-called population groups. 
The largest population group is the African or black group followed 
by the White, Coloured (including Malays) and the Asian (Indian 
and Chinese) groups. 
Within the black group, ethnic categorisation has led to the 
creation by the system of so-called "homelands" or "national 
states" which the government claims are the territorial entities to 
which many Africans belong. The four so-called "independent 
republics" are Transkei, Ciskei, Boputhatswana and Venda. 'rhe 
"national states" are Kwazulu, Gazankulu, Lebowa, Qwaqwa, Ndebele 
and KaNgwane. These have been referred to as "bantustans" and this 
is how they are still often referred to internationally . and by many 
nationally. Therefore, unless there is a need to draw a specific 
distinction, the 10 areas will be referred to as "bantustans" 
(MacShane et aI, 1984 : 7). 
COMPOSITION 
The Khoi Khoi and the San were the original black inhabitants of 
South Africa. From the 17th century onwards the Whites arrived in 
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two waves mainly from the Netherlands and Great Britain. The 
Coloureds are the descendants of mixed marriages and African-White 
relat i onships, whilst the Asian population, largely Indian, are 
mainly descendants of those brought to South Africa as cheap 
contract labour by the British in the 19th century. 
In the further discussions in this report, the term "Black" shall 
be used to refer to the people of colour living in South Africa -
the Africans, Indians and Coloureds. The common link among all 
three races is their exclusion from direct political decision 
making on the basis of colour. Where it is necessary to draw 
finer distinctions the report uses "African" to refer to the 
dominant black grouping; "Coloured" in accordance with the 
definition outlined above and the term "Indian" is used where 
appropriate. 
3. EARLY HISTORY 
This overview is not intended to be an exhaustive one, but is a 
general indication of the complex historical processes which 
resulted in the complicated social condition existing at present. 
The first White (Dutch, French and German) settlers did not found 
the "new" Cape Colony in an empty land. In 1652, the territories 
to the north and east had been occupied for centuries by the Khoi 
Khoi (Hottentots) and for millenia by the San (Bushmen) who were 
the hunter - gatherers. It was the Khoi Khoi together with the 
imported slaves that became an available labour force for the 
colonists whilst the San were the early resisters (De Kock, 1970 
11) • 
When Britain came to rule the colony some hundred and fifty years 
later, they found the most pressing problem to be the Fish River 
frontier. The clash between White and Xhosa cattle-owners in the 
area of the Fish River, at the eastern extremity ·of the European 
settlement, gave rise to no less than nine "wars" in the C0urse 
of a century, the first encounter occarring in 1779/80. Frontier 
/ 
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history between 1770 and 1812 has traditionally been seen as a 
stark conflict between distinct and hostile races. More recently, 
some liberal , historians have moved away from the "conflict-
between-races" interpretation. Instead of emphasising conflict, 
they have had as their central themes co-operation and peaceful 
interaction between frontier peoples. Revisionist historians 
while continuing to see conflict as primary, have paid increasing 
attention to the non-conflictual aspects of the frontier, such as 
cross-racial alliances or the coalescence of classes across racial 
lines (De Kock, 1970 : 10-21; Sagay, 1980 : 271). 
Relationships were formed in a system embracing various peoples 
and held together by the goods and services they exchanged with 
one another. Different groups found it in their interest to 
establish and maintain a balance of "no-war-no peace" which allowed 
this system to survive. However, such co-operation and voluntary 
interaction did not result in the biological, cultural, political 
or economic integration of separate peoples. Especially on the 
closing frontier, the prevailing characteristics were withdrawal, 
exclusion and strife (Giliomee, 1982 : 326-328). 
What was also evident was the emergence of new patterns of 
domination and exploitation. In the case. of ~ Xhosa, they fought 
bitterly to retain the larger part of their land, but the inequality 
in arms (most Xhosa fought with spears and all Whites with firearms), 
the fact that the Whites were mounted, whereas the Xhosa fought 
mainly on foot, and above all the power of an organised state as 
opposed to fragmentary chiefdoms, outweighed superiority of 
numbers (Wilson and Thompson, 1969 : 252). 'Increasingly, dominance 
was falling to those who could, directly or indirectly, muster 
the support of the colonial government and to those with firearms 
- as in the case of the Bambata Rebellion later in 1906 which 
marked the end of large-scale military confrontation between Blacks 
organised on tribal lines and Whites, and saw the reduction of 
blacks to the "status of an internal proletariat" (Roux, 1964 : 87). 
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Leggasick maintains that whatever the forms of differential " 
distribution of property in African-speaking societies, the impact 
of the frontier was beginning to sharpen and transform those 
differences. On the one hand, there were the owners of land, of 
cattle, of instruments of production; on the other hand there 
were dependants, servants, even wage labourers (Elphick and 
Giliomee, 1978 : 274-276). 
Though there was considerable acculturation particularly between 
Europeans and Khoikhoi, it did not lead to the removal of ethnic 
distinctions. Each group borrowed little from the other. An 
analysis of class rather than race relations can show important 
aspects of intergroup contact. In a loose sense one might see the 
colonists not so much as a race, but as a class clustering around 
a core of landholders who controlled an immobile, servile class. 
The colonist's resistance to government interference in their 
labour relations may be understood as an expression of specific 
economic interests. Similarly, colonist-Xhosa conflict may be 
seen as a struggle between rival classes of cattle-owners with 
different political systems and differential access to European 
technology. However, even if emphasis is given to these views, 
the fact remains that Xhosa and colonists distinguished themselves 
from others mainly by their perception of racial and ethnic 
differences. They had come to see each other more as racial 
adversaries than as economic competitors, and conflict occurred 
mainly along racial lines. This is not to suggest that prejudice 
and fantasies about race and culture in themselves gave rise to 
the struggle on the Eastern Frontier. Conflicts arising from the 
struggle to control land, cattle and labour or put more simply, 
class cleavages greatly reinforced the racial cleavage and made 
the conflict more intense. To cope with the continuing problem 
of labour supply that these confl i cts gave rise to, it was further 
resolved to import African and Malayan slaves: the former mostly 
from eastern Africa and the latter from Indonesia (Denoon, 1972 : 9). 
/ 
Although stable relations and various forms of co-operation existed 
at times between various peoples, conflict was pervasive. Even in 
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the early 19th century, there was great fear that the Khoikhoi 
and the Coloured people would ally themselves with the Xhosa in 
the frontier wars. Between 1798 and 1802 they did so, and the 
combined force destroyed houses on the Gamtoos River and down the 
Long Kloof (Wilson and Thompson, 1969 : 247). Since it had both 
a racial and class dimension, negotiations were less effective in 
resolving disputes than is often the case in purely economic 
conflicts. To realise their objectives, the colonists turned 
increasingly to forceful means, such as labour repressive devices, 
extraction of ransom, raiding and war (Elphick and Giliomee, 1978 
326-328). Furthermore, the weakness of White authority on the 
frontier, which failed to enforce the law prohibiting private 
trade, itself contributed to the rivalries of Xhosa chiefs who 
competed with each other for private trade. Trade at this stage 
was not controlled. Effectively, this led to a situation where 
stronger chiefs increased their power bases in relation to other 
chiefs, by increasing their trading of such valuables as ivory and 
cattle. This competition led to a fair degree of disunity. The 
disunity that existed at this level prevented the chiefs from 
combining in an effective military alliance against the authorities 
(Wilson and Thompson, 1969 : 251). 
After 1835, the focal point which since the arri¥al of the Whites 
had been the Cape Colony, suddenly shifted to the norther interior 
when Whites crossed the Orange River and the highveld plateau 
south and north of the Vaal River, northwards up to the Limpopo 
River, westwards to the Kalahari semi-desert and eastwards to sub-
tropical Natal where in 1824, a small group of pioneer English 
traders had settled at the port which is now called Durban. This 
migration, the Great Trek of 1835-1837, a dramatic break-away by 
Boer frontier farmers, became a turning point in South African 
history. The Voortrekkers soon fought against the Matabele, led 
I 
by Mzilikazi and the Zulu, led by Dingaan. By 1839 the Voortrekkers 
had subdued both, and proceeded to establish Boer states in the 
land they had occupied. The events set in motion by the Great Trek 
led to the formation of two independant Boer Republics, onj north 
and one south of the Vaal River, as well as two British colonies, 
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the Cape and Natal, part of which was a Voortrekker Republic. 
After 1850, Natal was converted,through immigration from Britain, 
into a predominantly English-speaking colony with a limited White 
and very large African population. Furthermore, Natal introduced 
indentured Indian labour for its plantations in 1860, without 
making proper provision for their repatriation and thus adding in 
this period a fourth element to South Africa's racial pattern of 
Whites, Africans and Coloureds (De Kock, "1970 : 16). All groups 
are represented in Natal today. The significance of Natal's early 
history will be addressed again in this overview. 
4. INDUSTRIALISATION AND URBANISATION 
Urbanisation, that is, the process of concentration of population 
in cities, is a world-wide phenomenon, which generally occurs 
with the development of industrialisation. As industrial development 
creates the need for a plentiful and increasing supply of labour 
in the cities, more jobs are created in the cities relative to the 
countryside. This supply usually comes from two sources. Firstly, 
from the natural increase in population and, secondly, from changes 
in agricultural production (such as mechanisation) which forces 
many people off the land and into the cities (Van der Merwe, 1983 
1). With the discovery of minerals in South Africa in 1886, two 
extra-economic methods were used to secure the supply of labour to 
the mines and the economic and political superiority of the White 
population over the Blacks. The central laws in this process of 
forced proletarianisation as described by Webster (1983 : 10), 
are threefold: 
4.1 The Pass Laws 
The passport laws for the Khoikhoi (which were later abolished in 
1828) were introduced by the British in 1809. Passes for Africans 
were first introduced in the Cape in 1817, but these were more in 
the nature of international passports in that they were made 
available to Africans living on the other side of the frontier who 
wished to seeW work in the colony. Pass laws eventually began to 
play a more direct role in terms of controlling migrant labour 
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(Roux, 1964 : 113-114). By means of the pass law an African 
man could be tracked down, punished and returned to his employer 
when necessary. Jennings (Webster, 1983 : 10) argued that: "We 
have a most excellent law, namely the pass law, which should enable 
us to obtain complete control over the Kaffirs. As at present 
administered, the pass law gives us no such protection we 
import Africans who sign a contract to serve us for twelve months; 
many leave after a couple of weeks, and it is impossible to 
recover them". 
4.2 The Glen Grey Act 
The Glen Grey Act introduced a labour tax that according to Cecil John 
Rhodes (Webster, 1983 : 10), was: " ..• not slavery but a gentle stimulus. 
think it will prove an inducement to men to go out and work. Those 
who do will be better off under the Act than they were before." 
Rhodes further maintained that the taxation was for the benefit 
of the blacks and colonists, contributing to their joint prosperity. 
Criticising those who appealed to the missionaries for assistance 
in inducing Africans to take up work in the mines, the newspaper: 
Standard, declared: " ••• mission work begins at the wrong end -
by clothing, feeding and pampering an already lazy animal, and 
straight-away removing hunger, that singular incentive which alone 
successfully compels a man to labour ••. it is in the direction of 
taxation that the ultimate solution of the labour question lies" 
(Webster, 1983 : 10). 
4.3 The Land Act of 1913 
The Land Act of 1913 which restricted African land ownership to 
13% of the total land area and so forced Africans into overcrowded 
reserves. This Act had the twin effect of suppressing the 
emerging African peasantry, which was proving an effective counter-
class to the White farmer, and creating a pool of cheap labour in 
the reserves (Webster, 1983 : 10-12). 
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5. THE COINCIDENCE OF RACE AND CLASS 
Lever maintains that: "the differentiation of individuals into 
racial categories is not simply an exercise in neat categorisation" 
(Lever, 1978 : 6). The "race" of the individual affects virtually 
every aspect of his social life. It dictates where he may live; 
where he may work; who he mayor may not marry; whether he may 
own freehold property; the amount he will pay in taxation; the 
probability of his surviving the age of one year; his life 
expectancy; the probability of his contracting particular diseases; 
the medical treatment he will receive; the places of entertainment 
he may visit; the buses he rides on; the public toilets he may 
use; the amount the state will spend on his education; the 
universities he may enter; the occupations or trades that may be 
closed to him; his earnings; his right to elect representatives 
to a central government; his right of free movement into towns and 
provinces. Lever contends that the list can be extended considerably. 
\llhilst this is true, it is also true that s'ome aspects of "petty 
apartheid" have been eroded, ego the removal of the Immorality Act, 
the Mixed Marriages Act and recently, the influx control measures. 
However, without the removal of the Group Areas Act the implications 
of race continue to extend into almost every component of South 
African society. Race, more than any other single characteristic, 
is the most important social differentiating factor in South Africa. 
"It is woven into the fabric of everyday lives" says Kuper (Lever, 
1978 : 6). 
Kuper (Bekker, 1974 : 97-98) maintains that priority cannot exclusively 
be granted to class or material interests. At work and while 
interacting with Whites, Africans evolve new patterns of behaviour; 
whilst at home they will interact more in line with their tribal 
custom. Race and economic position cannot, in general, be causally 
linked with each other. He maintains further that since ethnic 
and racial groups (rather than classes) are differentially 
incorporated into the policy, it follows that race rather than class 
will be the cleavage along which confrontation over power resources 
will take place - under the assumption that the two do not coincide 
exactly. However, the implications of the pass laws, the Glen Grey 
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Act and the Land Act of 1913, suggest that since Blacks were 
transformed into the labour force that spearheaded the development 
of capitalism, race and class do coincide to a large extent in 
South Africa. 
6. MODELS OF STRATIFICATION APPLICABLE TO SOUTH AFRICA 
The (slightly adapted) MacCrone model, cited in Lever, is a model 
depicting crudely the racist nature of the social structure in 
South Africa (Lever, 1978 : 31): 
I r-''--




























The more solid the line, the greater is the impermeability of the 
boundaries between groups. Most studies on stratification show 
that highly industrialised, bureaucratic societies tend towards a 
class structure (Popenoe, 1977 : 29). The significant features of 
the above illustrated model are: 
(a) that the colour bar separates the White group from the Black 
(African, Indian and Coloured); 
(b) that mobility takes place with greater ease between classes 
within the White and Black racial groups (the horizontal 
broken lines depict the three class structure), ie., within 
the respective racial groups themselves, rather than among 
the race groups in general; and 
(c) that no matter how high an African, Indian or Coloured person 
may rise in the social system, he still retains an inferior 
position to a White person. In 1949, MacCrone wrote: "There 
appears to be at present no evidence to support the view that 
this line (the colour bar), although remaining impermeable 
has begun to tilt" (Lever, 1978 : 32). 
Davenport (1977 : 33), contends, however, that the war years had 
made the colour bar difficult to retain, particularly at a time 
when the creation of a variety of semi-skilled jobs involving 
machine-minding of " various kinds rendered the old categories of 
"skilled" and "unskilled" increasingly obsolete. With increased 
competition for artisans, the government was compelled to 
authorise dilution of labour, allowing unqualified workers to do 
skilled work under supervision, above all in the engineering 
industry, but also in textiles, furniture, leatherwork and other 
fields, in all of which the employment of Coloured and African 
workers greatly increased. Hence, an alternative (slightly 
adapted) model presented by West (Lever, 1978 : 33) may be seen 
as more applicable. 
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Skewed rather than straight lines indicate how, for example , a / ~ 
Black person of high status can attain the status higher than ~hat 











ADAPTED WEST MODEL 
• 
The oval shaped figure in the White section of the pyramid 
represents the Protestant and Catholic groups. The oval shaped 
figure in the Hindu section of the model represents the caste 
system. The tilting of the colour-bar is significant because it 
represents the poss i bility of a change in the status of a Black 
person and depicts what i n contemporary terms may be viewed in 





these models bear some relevance to racial/ethnic stratification 
in South Africa - ethnic distinctions themselves can be seen to 
have become severely undermined by the implications of class 
distinctions and the consequent racial-class bars that these 
project. 
Societies can be arranged be~ween two polar extremities according 
to their vertical mobility. An ideal-typical class structure 
depicts society as an entirely open stratification system where 
vertical mobility occurs without any resistance. An ideal-
typical caste structure, on the other hand, portrays society as 
an entirely closed stratification system where vertical mobility 
is absent. It would be difficult to describe a society at the 
midpoint of the continuum. Its stratification system could be 
perceived as either a class or caste structure or it could be 
termed a class/caste structure. 
Caste structures differ from class structures in the following ways: 
The concept "caste" implies a group of people (born into the group) 
who are prevented from improving their social status or from 
marrying outside the group. Regulations govern social intercourse 
among members of different castes and a person will 'remain within 
the caste of this birth throughout his life. Caste ' implies social 
distancing between groups in a multi-racial society such as that 
of South Africa, and no longer applies only to a country like India. 
A person's position is determined by his birth; neither personal 
ability nor affluence are sufficient to warrant admission into a 
higher group; group relationships are governed and fixed by 
tradition or even by law. 
In a caste system we deal specifically with ascribed status. A 
person will possess certain characteristics due to his birth. 
Society thus forces a status upon him. 
6.1.3 
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There is no vertical mobility, but horizontal mobility. This is 
ideal-typical .. BrOOfTl and Selznick (1977 : 82) point out: "Such 
ascriptive societies are often termed caste-like, but there may be 
no clear case of a true caste system in the sense of absolutely 
closed social categories with no ~ocial mobility between them". 
6.2 "Social class" generally speaking, indicates the classification of 
society into groups on the strength of status acquired through 
wealth, education, occupation or any other such achieved qualities 
used for evaluating status. In a structural sense, the concept 
is used to refer to a group of people who are related in a 
particular way to the means of production and labour power. Broom 
and Selznick (1977 : 182), maintain that a class structure is 
characterised by acquired (achieved) status, and a class-structured 
society is prestige orientated. A high degree of social mobility 
occurs in a class structure. In societies with an almost pure 
class structure, class divisions tend to become blurred. There is 
no clear line of demarcation to indicate where one class begins 
and the other ends, the differences between them being so slight. 
Class consciousness among the various classes, too, is not very 
strong, although the relative positions of the strata are 












A social structure based on class constitutes a hierachic 
classification of status groups as the above graphic model shows. 
6.3 Caste/Class Structure 
It can be suggested that in South Africa we have a White caste and 
a Black caste. Within the respective castes, provision is still 
made for class structures, each caste having its own class structure. 
The highest stratum of the entire stratification system contains 
relatively few positions filled by Blacks. The presence of both 
principles, caste and class may be noted in the graphic model 
given below. Kinlock (1974 : 48-50), maintains that: "Looking at 
South Africa, for instance, the stratification structure consists 
of a number of racial castes, within which limited class systems 
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operate ... Also in a society as complex and plural as South Africa, 
the possibility of a number of stratification systems, racially-




WHITES (caste boundary) 
COLOUREDS AND ASIANS 
(caste boundary) 
AFRICANS (caste boundary) 
TOTAL STRATIFICATION STRUCTURE 
In terms of this model, the caste boundary maintains that Whites 
only constitute the upper class, whilst the lower and middle class 
constitute Coloureds and Asians. Africans constitute the lower 
class with a small proportion recognised as middle class. 
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Unlike the MacCrone and West models that were stratified in terms 
of race, and contain an arbitrary barrier that restricted mobility 
of the races, Kinloch's model provides an explanation for the 
immobility by drawing more clearly the relationship between race 
and class. 
Thus, the White population approximates if not equals the upper 
class; 
the Coloured/Asian population approximates the middle class; and 
the African populat i on approximates the lower and working class. 
The relationship between race and class in South Africa is not 
accidental, it is an evolutionary result of the dispossession of 
the· land of Blacks and the exploitation of their labour power 
early on as slaves, and later on the gold mines and on the sugar-
cane fields. 
Various measures of racial discrimination serve to maintain Blacks 
in a subordinate position. These measures are shown to operate at 
five levels: political rights, property and residential rights, 
employment, education and income (Cock, 1980 : 8). However, while 
racial and class exploitation have been distinguishing characteristics 
of the society, not much emphasis is placed on gender discrimination 
that serves to maintain women in a position of dependence. These 
measures are shown to operate at four critical levels: legal status, 
employment, education and reproduction. The capitalist system of 
production and the consequent class structure that has emerged 
operate to produce a complex pattern of inequality. Whilst all 
women in South African society are subject ,to sexual discrimination 
and domination, the system of racial domination provides White 
women with important mechanisms of escape from this structure of 
constraints. The employment of cheap, black domestic labour is 










VII White men 
WW White women 
I/e M - Indian/Coloured 
men 
I/e W - Indian/Coloured 
women 
AM African men 
AW African women 
EXTENDED KINLOCH MODEL 
The Kinloch model could thus be extended and adapted somewhat, as 
the above graphic illustration shows . In addition to including 
the sexual component, represented by the longer broken line(s) , the 
caste boundaries have been changed . The boundary for the lower 
caste White has been raised significantly. This is because the White 
working class or White lower class has significantly diminished 
according to Webster (1983 : 16) . Some argue that the White worker 
produces less value than he receives and is, therefore, not exploited. 
Whether he is to be defined ",as a separate non-productive class, or 
whether the White worker is simply to be seen as the privileged 
stratum of the working class, suffer.ing a rather prolonged bout of 
"false consciousness" is a matter of considerable debate (Webster, 
1983 : 16). . / 
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Since 1922 White workers have seen their economic positions 
improve and because of their access to political power, have 
defined their position in antagonistic terms to that of the African 
worker. Whilst Coloured and, in particular, Indian people have 
moved higher up on the status hierarchy, a large proportion still 
live in lower socio-economic conditions. According to research 
conducted by the Built Environment Study Group of the University 
of Natal (Daily News, 12 November 1986 : 1), 50,00% of people in 
surrounding Coloured and Indian townships are existing below 
subsistence level. This gives some indication of the class 
distinctions that exist within the individual race groups. 
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PART TWO 
DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RESISTANCE 
Thus far, the structure of the society has been depicted in a relatively 
static fashion. What follows now is an examination of intra-parliamentary 
and extra-parliamentary responses to the changing South African situation. 
1. Ifft'RA-PARLIAMENTARY RESPONSES 
During the years 1910 to 1948 different interest groups within the 
White community vied with each other for positions within the 
privileged sector of the society (Denoon, 1972 : 148). The outbreak 
of World War II in particular saw tremendous activity in White 
political circles. Smuts took over the government after Hertzog's 
proposal that South Africa should remain neutral in the war had been 
rejected by parliament. During the period within which South African 
soldiers were winning fame in North Africa and Smut's reign was 
coming to a close, Afrikaners on the whole were divided and confused. 
However, Malan gradually rebuilt their unity and led Afrikanerdom 
to the unexpected electoral triumph of 1948. Although it is true to 
say that the Nationalist Government in South Africa from 1948 
onwards has carried previous lines of policy to their logical 
conclusion, the year 1948 does represent a break in the continuity 
of White South African politics. For the first time an exclusively 
Afrikaner cabinet representing exclusively Afrikaner interests had 
a monopoly of political power in the country (Gordon and Talbot, 
1977 : 64; Denoon, 1972 : 174). The National Party went from 
strength to strength until Dr HF Verwoerd took the initiative in 
'pr?claiming a republic and so achieved Afrikanerdom's great ideal 
from the time of the AnglO-Boer War onwards. 
On the basis of historical data, 9ne may extract four underlying 
factors that determined the path of racial segregation and domination 
which led to the rise of the "security establishment" (Grundy, 
1982 : 1) in South Africa after 1948. Davenport (1977 : 313-343), 
cites the following: / 
/ 
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1.1 Cultural diversity is the first factor. White South Africans 
perceive(d) differences among the cultural heritage, views of life 
and customs of Whites and Blacks. It was this perception that 
persuaded the White electorate that the policy of segregation as 
embodied in apartheid is the only way in which their culture can 
be preserved, and that in the Bantustans Blacks are given the 
opportunity to realise their own cultures. Black resistance in 
this regard reflects the belief that this view is designed to 
perpetuate a sense of superiority of White culture, since it can 
flourish unhindered with the resources at its disposal, while 
Black culture which dates from a pre---industrial era, is being kept 
alive artificially by the apartheid policy. 
• 1.2 Skin colour is a second factor which could underlie people s 
attitudes. Colour can act as an independent variable in that it 
highlights manifest physical differences which can then be used as 
a classificatory principle in a society. It could be said that the 
"colour uniform" in South Africa has helped to reinforce those 
cultural differences on which racial relations are based. 
1.3 It is important to cite the factor of fear. Fear of the Blacks' 
numerical superiority, fear of losing rights and privileges; or of 
1.4 
a repetition of the violence which has occurred in the rest of Africa. 
The apartheid policy is supposed to exorcise such fears. The May 6, 
1987 election saw the Nationalist Party exploiting these fears as 
well as the belief that South Africa is facing a Communist threat 
(Paton: Sunday Times, May 15, 1987 : 28). There are, however, 
those who maintain that the presence of this emotional fear component 
is precisely what makes apartheid an irrational policy and that 
apartheid in fact heightens these very fears, since it engenders 
strong anti-White feelings among the Blacks. Hence, apartheid 
could well make White fears into self-fulfillihg prophecies. 
Certain economic-related principles are also important. Since 1922, 
when White workers went on strike to reinforce privileges, legislation 
including the Industrial Conciliation Act mai~tained Jhite worker 
/ 
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superiori ty over Black workers. Racial segregation is se.en. as a 
social attitude propagated by the exploiting class to justify and 
camouflage the exploitation of other racial groups. The Black 
becomes primarily and structurally a worker rather than a member 
of an ethnic group, whereas the White is a member of a dominant 
capitalist class. 
This particular realisation led to the early translation of Black 
political power which can be reaped through development of the 
Black trade unions. Although this view allows for the possibility 
that race may develop a dynamic of its own, on the whole it is 
regarded as subordinate to the broader issue of capitalism. Over 
th~ past ten years this view has gained ground among historians and 
general academic authors (Hanf, 1982 : 206-209; Davenport, 1977 : 
313-343) . 
By 1948, when the Nationalist Party came into power, the fact that 
South Africa was recognised as the home of various races could not 
be altered. In order to maintain the privileged economic position 
White voters were becoming accustomed to, it was necessary to bridge 
the differences and to find means of co-existence. 
2. CONFLICTING SCHOOLS '. OF THOUGHT 
Two conflicting schools of thought were emerging in the National 
Party during BJ Vorster's term as Prime Minister. On the one hand, 
there was the conservative or right-wing school, which was in favour 
of a narrow, closed and intolerant Afrikaner nationalism. On the 
other hand, there was a more liberal wing which favoured a broad, 
open and tolerant Afrikaner nationalism. It was Prof Willem de 
Klerk of Potchefstroom that referred to the protagonists of these 
two schools of thought as, respectively, "verkramptes" and "verligtes". 
Since then, these terms have been generally used in South African 
politics . . 
The verk~ampte wing wanted to limit to an absolute minimum the 
Afrikaner's contact with those who thought otherwise, those who spoke 
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a different language and those of a different colour. Verligtes 
favoured large scale immigration, co-operation with English speakers, 
the forging of diplomatic links with Black states, and the 
exploration of avenues intended to free South Africa from her 
isolation and to improve foreign relations (Muller, 1981 : 512-513). 
However, both wings wish to maintain White supremacy in the country. 
Critics and supporters of the South African government have both 
been impressed by the extent to which the South African government 
has used a programme of laws to further its aims. Hare (1983 : 3) 
maintains that the government has been able to avoid the local and 
international dangers of open and direct domination by enacting and 
app~ying a programme of laws which regulate the lives of the Black 
people (especially the African people) to a degree never surpassed 
by any other administration in history. The administration of these 
laws is facilitated by an elaborate bureaucracy which controls all 
the important aspects of an African's life. This close and intensive 
system of control, which may be styled legal-bureaucratic domination, 
makes it possible to keep coercion in the background. He maintains, 
moreover, that a domination expressed through the laws and applied 
by an efficient administration, is less obviously oppression since 
it is concealed behind legal forms and bureaucratic practices. 
Crucial to the maintenance of the present South African political 
system is the necessity to devise a co-ordinated, holistic, 
counter-revolutionary strategy. It is the mark of the present 
government, although it by no means stems directly from the time 
when PW Botha replaced BJ Vorster as Prime Minister, that "A more 
conscious, concerted and systematic effort is being made to 
integrate various mechanisms of White control to produce a counter-
revolutionary package more rationalised and efficient than at any 
time before" (Grundy, 1983 : 5). PW Botha and Magnus Malan had 
sought to fashion such a strategy during Botha's tenure as Minister 
of Defence in the Vorster Government. However, other political forces 
and personalities purs~ed 1 ifferent though not necessarily conflicting 
agendas. 
39. 
One vital aspect of the counter-revolutionary strategy is to 
introduce proposals for modulated change, to blur the lines between 
formal segregation and integration, to experiment, to disarm 
critics by revising the trappings of apartheid without tampering 
with essentials. At the same time, a deep involvement of the 
defence establishment in civilians' lives can be seen. This process 
still enables those in charge to control the pace and nature of 
change or so it would seem. Whether it will unleash unexpected 
forces moving in surprising directions (as the Conservative Party 
contends) is another matter altogether (Grundy, 1983 : 5). 
Yun~s Carrim (Sunday Tribune, 26 April 1987 : 29) pointed out that 
effective power does not lie in parliament. ,Rather that it is 
located in the State Security Council and the elaborate management 
network that has developed throughout the country. 
Carrim contends that at the top is the National Security 'Management 
System (NSMS) which co-ordinates regional Joint Management Centres 
(JMCs). There are at least nine JMCs coinciding with each of the 
major economic development areas. There are about 60 sub-JMCs 
which roughly correspond to the areas covered by the newly established 
Regional Services Councils (RSCs). There are also a further 500 or 
so mini-JMCs at the local level. 
According to Carrim's assertions it is this elaborate structure made 
up of unknown military personnel, civil servants, politicians and 
businessmen, that effectively manages and governs the country. This 
is the hidden core government of the country. Through its formal 
and informal links with the overt structures of power, it'has all-
pervasive influence in almost every aspect of the political, economic, 
social and cultural life of the country. 
The most striking feature of this enormous structure is that it is 
not accountable to even the White community. It is the new 
tricameral constitution, with its drastic reduction of the power 
of parliament and its marked elevation of the power of the State 







structure. Researchers, Carrim contends, have increasingly 
referred to the bloodless coup that has taken place in the country. 
The military, they point 'out, plays a decisive albeit hidden role 
in the affairs of the state. 
On 5 June, 1987, Helen Suzman (PFP spokesman for Law and Order) 
said that the National Security Management System was a sinister 
development by way of which democratic procedures were being 
circumvented (Daily News, 5 June 1987 : 8). She reiterated Carrim's 
point that: "the NSMS, being primarily the creation of the police 
and security forces, is a sort of creeping coup d' etat by consent, 
in which accountable politicans have abrogated their power to non-
accountable members of the security forces. The security forces 
we~e accountable only to the State President - and the State 
President only to himselr'. 
However, Black people are not responding passively to increasing 
restrictions on their movements implemented by a White government; 
Black resistance during the period of Nationalist rule needs to be 
emphasised. 
Earlier, the difficulty the government faced in the implementation 
of the apartheid policy was that it took place amid intensified 
Black political awareness and growing international hostility to 
White rule. The emancipation of Asian and African peoples; socialist 
transformations of post-colonial societies and the struggle between 
capitalist and communist imperialist states and their rivalry for 
influence in African states, were all factors that made South Africa 
the focus of world opinion. The United Nations Organisation (UNO) 
tackled South African policy under the banner of human rights calling 
apartheid a crime against humanity. The numerical preponderance of 
the Afro-Asians in the UNO and the state of world politics suggested 
that they were destined to play an increasing part in this body. It 
was under these conditions that the National party had to find its 
way after 1948. 
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Three different types of Black responses to the government are 
evident at present (Connor, 1983 : 7): 
Self-interested collaboration, 
where people, in order to secure power or profits, openly collaborate 
with the government. The government is naturally enough trying to 
increase this particular sector of people by co-opting them into a 
Black middle class with a stake in the status quo, because they 
have a share in its privileges. 
Th& success of this governmental programme which holds a certain 
measure of economic advancement for some, depends upon splitting 
Black solidarity and encouraging people to have an attitude of 
possessive individuali~m towards life. This policy is also 
implemented by a number of firms seeking to draw academically 
advanced or promising Africans, even those who have had difficulties 
with the authorities, into their companies. 
Collaborative opposition 
where peop,le are using the structures provided by the government 
itself as means towards combating apartheid. This has been dubbed 
the "Buthelezi strategy", and works to some extent (Connor, 1983 : 
8). Leaders in this position must be enough of an opposition to 
be seen as representative of that constituency and collaborative 
enough not to be put out of power by the government. Hence, it is , 
a tight-rope position . • However, the Buthelezi strategy was used by 
a number of political organisations active during the early twentieth 
century. The SANNC (South African Native National Congress) which 
changed its name to the ANC (African National Congress), was the 
first nationwide umbrella Black South African political 
organisation. The Black elite of whom this organisation was \ 
representative chose to improve their general situation by appealing 
, ~ 
to the British Administration. A deputation went to Britain t o . . 
protest against the colour bar built into the 1910 Union Con~titution. 
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The SANNC, with the outbreak of the first world war, pledged its 
loyal ty to Britain and South Africa, hoping that this would' increase 
their bargaining powers once the war was over. However, this did 
not happen. With the Hertzog legislation in 1936, which removed 
Africans from the common roll, a new set of segregated political 
institutions, including white "Native representatives" in parliament 
and the elected advisory Native Representative Council (NRC) were 
set up. The AAC (All African Convention) was then set up with the 
purpose of opposing the Hertzog legislation (Lodge, 1983 : 10). 
However, some AAC members, including the ANC served on the Council 
instead of boycotting it - this undermined the AAC as an independent 
organisation. The Coloured people, left on the Common role in 1936 
participated until 1969 when their representation was then abolished 
and they were given instead a CRC (Coloured Person's Representative 
Council). The Indian population was afforded representation in 
Parliament under the Indian Repr.~sentation Act of 1946; but this 
legislation was removed from the Statute Book as soon as the Malan 
Government took over in 1948. The Indian community had previously 
decided to reject the concession (Davenport, 1977 : 334). By 1943, 
the AAC disbanded its organisation and the NRC, frustrated by 
ineffectual participation, was eventually abolished by the 
Nationalists. 
Although between the twenties and 1939 the ANC had lost much of its 
influence and was overcome by organisational problems, it survived 
whereas other Black organisations, such as the ICU disintegrated 
(Grest, 1982 : 4ff). In the twenty-odd years between the First 
and Second World Wars the ANC wa~ basically a moderate body seeking 
to obtain a foothold for Blacks in a White system rather than 
fighting the system itself. This approach derived from the 
perspective on life of the Black elite who formed the core of trye 
ANC. They were mainly products of English-medium mission schools, 
and the British and Christian environment profoundly influenced 
their political views. Although not completely divorced from their 
traditional communities, the values and norms of these communities ~ / 
had ceased to have any significance for the elite. Characteristic 
2.1.4 
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of this group's political approach was a liberal optimistic belief 
in progress - a belief that Whites would accept them as fellow 
Christians and that they would be assimilated into South African 
society on those terms. Even their disillusionment over the nature 
of White legislation from 1910 to 1939 did not destroy their belief 
as liberals, that justice would eventually be done. As a result, 
ANC political strategy showed no dramatic change during these 
years; essentially, the ANC pursued a policy of non-confrontation 
and tried to fight non-liberal legislation by liberal methods. 
Similar liberal methods are currently being used by parliamentarians 
working within the structures of the tricameral parliament. As in 
the case of the NRC, which had no legislative powers and viewed 
in retrospect was merely a buffer between the dominant Whites and 
the Black masses, the tricameral parliament has, the extraparliamentary 
forces argue, been ineffectual since its implementation. The NRC 
was created to permit better control of the Blacks and in this sense 
was partially successful. The implementation of 'the tricameral 
parliament, which excludes Africans from the central decision-making 
processes has coincided with the worst, sustained unrest South 
Africa has ever experienced. 
Non-collaboration 
In this case civil actions are taken such as boycotting of schools, 
strikes, etc. The more militant form of non-collaboration is armed 
resistance. 
It was within a framework of the socio-economic and political change 
which accompanied the Second World War (1939-1945) that the ANC 
experienced a revival. The manufacturing industry had expanded 
rapidly in the post-war years and by 1943 it had outstripped the 
mining industry as the single most important source of income. At 
I 
the same time there was a corresponding increase in the labour force. 
I 
This was to have three important implications for Black . resistance 
movements. In the first place, the bargaining power of the semi-
skilled Black workers was enhanced due to~irnumerical preponderance 
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while some White workers were away on active service. In the 
second place. more and more Black women were entering the labour 
force. and active attempts were being made to organise them 
politically. In the third place. the pace of urbanisation created 
• 
new job opportunities in the cities and developed the potential for 
contact and organisation among Blacks from different ethnic groups 
(Van der Merwe. 1983 : 5-6; Cock. 1980 : 11-16). 
Whereas previously the ANC had worked for the assimilation of Blacks 
into a White political system. the accent during the war years was 
increasingly on eventual Black power and Black majority government. 
This new trend in Black politics was clearly manifested in the 
ANC's acceptance in 1943 of a general policy statement in which 
Black demands were set out. This document. known as "African 
Claims" included demands for full citizenship; unqualified franchise 
for all Black men and women; the abolition of the NRC in its existing 
form because it was based on discrimination; unrestricted land 
'ownership for all Blacks; abolition of the pass laws; free compulsory 
education; and absolute equality under the law. 
From 1943 onwards. the ANC came to the conclusion that the only 
way in which Blacks could hope to reform the South African societal 
order was by overt political confrontation. This approach was 
strongly supported and influenced by a new generation of ANC members 
who constituted a major pressure group within the ANC itself - the 
Congress Youth League (CYL) (Lodge. 1983 : 23-25). 
The ANC revival continued after the Second World War. and the 
policies adopted by the Nationalist government in 1948. under Dr 
OK Malan. provided a further impetus. Under the Smuts government 
there had been marginal improvement in Black welfare services and 
a slight increase in the financial allocation to Black education, 
but even these limited improvements were swept away by the new 
administration. From the onset. the Africans in particular. were 
to be drastically affected by further legislation on the part of 
the Nationalist government. The 38 years /'from 1910 to 1948 produced 






National government, in the twelve year period from 1948 to 1969, 
an additional 53 such measures were to appear on the statute book. 
During the the next 10 years (up to 1979) no fewer than 98 
additional measures were passed. Thus from 1910 to 1970, a total 
of 200 laws were passed discriminating against Blacks and regulating 
their lives (Muller, 1981 : 520-525). 
Thus the wave of discriminatory legislation brought on a response 
from the ANC. In 1952, the ANC requested that the Prime Minister, 
OF Malan improve the legal position of Blacks. ~hen Malan dismissed 
this plea, the' ANC informed him that they would be launching a 
programme of passive resistance. Non-violent methods of protest 
such as passive resistance or civil disobedience became reassessed 
once the ANC, PAC (Pan Africanist Congress) and 42 leaders had 
been banned. Furthermore, the protest campaign led initially by 
the PAC which resulted in the deaths of more than 69 people in 
Sharpeville in 1960, heralded the end of peaceful protest. The 
declaring of the ANC and PAC as illegal organisations saw them 
continuing their activities underground. The military wings of the 
ANC (Umkonto We Sizwe) and PAC (Poqo) were responsible for a 
number of sabotage attacks on power stations, railway lines, 
telecommunication installations and symbols of apartheid such as 
the Department of Bantu Affairs (Lodge, 1983 : 188) . 
According to Cal1inicos ( 1985 : 5-7) the ANC's policy of violent 
confrontation since the late seventies has once again been manifest. 
After the Soweto riots of 1976 many young Blacks left the country to 
join the ranks of the ANC and undergo military training in such 
places as Angola and Tanzania. After that they would re-enter 
South Africa to carry out sabotage attacks . Between January 1977 
and October 1982, 150 such attacks were carried out. Although 
attacks on the civilian population were not officially part of ANC 
guerilla strategy there was always an inherent danger to human life, 
as in all forms of violence. Some ANC fighters referred to their 
strategy as "armed propaganda" a counterweight. to government 
propaganda and structural violence. Lodge (1983 : 340) writes: 
"With the exception of the assassination of informers and other 
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people regarded as collaborators (African security policemen, 
for example), the campaign's strategy had been guided by the 
principle that civilian casualties should be avoided". 
By August 1981 the ANC announced that civilian casualties should 
be expected. Since 1983 in particular civilians have been 
deliberate casualties as in the case of the Amanzimtoti bombing 
and the Magoos Bar bombing which killed five people. The South 
African Government has responded by destroying suspected ANC bases. 
Many armed infiltrators and saboteurs have been arrested, sentenced 
to death and imprisonment (Sunday Tribune, 26 July 1987 : 1). 
3. TRADE UNIONS · AS . EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY· RESPONSES 
Viewing the development of the trade unions in South Africa, it is 
necessary to briefly describe the ICU (Industrial and Commercial 
Workers Union), which was the first Black trade union in South 
Africa in 1919. Unlike the SANNC, the ICU did not officially 
petition the authorities but adopted a more militant approach with 
a view to obtaining better working conditions and higher wages for 
its members. As a result its membership increased rapidly, mainly 
because the ICU held out hope for immediate change within the 
existing socio-economic system, not only for industrial workers but 
also for those in rural areas. In spite of its large membership, 
it was beset by poor organisation, financial maladministration and 
internal dissension which led to its early demise (Webster, 1983 : 
116-117) • 
The collapse of the ICU did not spell out the end for Black 
unionisation. Its demise was partly due to conflicts over the role 
of the Communist Party (MacShane, 1984 : · 27). For the CPSA 
(Communist Party of South Africa), racism, nationalism and 
~ imperialism were false ideologies symptomatic of a vanishing order. 
The primary struggle in South Africa they believed would be fought 
I 
betwe~n capital and labour. Although the CPSA's specific inter-
pretation of class in the South African context was not always 
~ 
popuLar amongst Black workers and led to severe conflicts, the 
/ 
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Party itself did important work (Callinicos, 1985 : 31). In 
the thirties, the CPSA managed to organise a number of trade 
unions on the Witwatersrand and this led to the formation in 1942 
of the Congress of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU). But, again 
any hopes of betterment the Black trade unions might have cherished 
soon faded when the Nationalist government opposed legal recognition 
of Black trade unions. In the years that followed, it passed 
legislation which greatly reduced the Black workers' bargaining 
power. In 1950, parliament passed the suppression of Communism 
Act which was directed primarily at the trade unions, and by 1960 
almost two-thirds of all trade union leaders on the Witwatersrand 
had been restricted. According to big business and the State, 
Black workers did not have the judgement necessary to use trade 
unions in a responsible manner (Webster, 1983 : 9-20). This 
approach was eventually embodied in the Bantu Labour Act of 1953, 
which rendered black strike action illegal and th~ Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1956, which not only prohibited non-racial 
trade unions, but also contained a job reservation clause in terms 
of which certain kinds of work were reserved for Whites. 
It was in these circumstances that SACTU was founded in 1955. By 
1963, it had acquired a membership of 500 000. But it was difficult 
to keep aloof from political involvement because, for instance, 
many members were directly affected by apartheid legislation such 
as that which regulated resettlement. However, the fact that SACTU 
engaged openly in political activities instead of confining itself 
to conventional and more circumscribed trade union action made it 
an easy target for the authorities. In the wake 0: Sharpeville and 
other clashes with the authorities, many trade union leaders 
suffered imprisonment, banning or restrictions. This was a blow 
from which SACTU never recovered and by 1965 the organisation lost 
its presence in the country (though it still exists in exile) 
(MacShane, 1984 : 33). 
With SACTU's disappearance, the late 1960's and early 1970's saw 
Black trade unionism in the doldrums, but by 1973 the pattern in 
labour relations was changing drastically. In the preceding period, 
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the wage gap between White and Black had steadily widened, and 
any increases given to the Blacks were soon swallowed by inflation. 
In 1973, 60 000 workers went on strike. The success of this strike 
acted as a spur on Black trade unionism and between 1973 and 1975 
new trade unions were established. In Durban, individual trade 
unions came together to form the Trade Union Advisory Co-ordinating 
Council (TUACC), branches of which also spread to the Transvaal, 
while the Western Province General Workers Union (WPGWU) was formed 
in the Western Cape. By 1981, the following trade union groups 
were representing Black workers - FOSATU (Federation of South 
African Trade Unions), CUSA (Council of Unions of South Africa) 
and TUCSA (Trade Union Council of South Africa). There were also 
a significant number of independent unaffiliated unions (Financial 
Mail, ,1983 : 41-42). 
The seventies also saw a change in the organisational methods of 
trade unions, the emphasis now being on greater efficiency. Less 
time was spent on extensive recruitment of members, which tended 
to make an organisation unwieldy, and more on educating workers on 
the factory floor to commit themselves to the objectives of trade 
unions and to develop union leadership necessary to maintain the 
unions as ongoing concerns. 
In reaction to the 1973 strikes, the government passed the Bantu 
Labour Relations Act in the same year. A central labour council 
was set up for Blacks, and a provision was made for the creation 
of work committees and liaison committees to represent workers' 
interests. By 1977 there were several such committees but owing 
to their severely limited powers, the scheme never really gained 
acceptance among Black workers, who were not prepared to accept 
these committees as substitutes for independent action by trade 
unions. 
I 
By 1979, Prof N: Wiehahn was appointed chairperson of a commission 
which was to study and restructure South Africa's labour relations. 
The Wiehahn commission recommended that Bla7k trade unions be 
legalised and that certain forms of ' job reservation be abolished. 
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However, trade unions would have to be registered, and registration 
would be subject to various official stipulations. The existing 
legal definitions regarding strike action, would be maintained, and 
the final arbiter in industrial disputes would be a labour court. 
Clearly, the Wiehahn Commission's aim of exercising control over 
trade unionism by allowing it to function within a fixed framework 
has not been fully achieved. Still, the commission has introduced 
a new dispensation in labour relations, one which officially affords 
scope for the development of trade unionism. 
In 1985, COSATU was launched. Ideologically, it is linked to the 
ANC, but it comprises a broad spectrum of trade unions including 
the previous unions of FOSATU. In 1986, UWUSA was launched, 
ideologically linked to Inkatha with a much more conservative bias 
being introduced into South African trade union politics. In 1986 
as well, TUCSA disbanded as a trade union federation leaving its 
previous affiliates with the choice of joining other federations. 
Against this background of resistance and change, the following 
perceptions can be extracted. 
4. NEEDS AND STRATEGIES 
4.1 
4.1.1 
What needs to change 
Race discrimination needs to end but the free enterprise system 
must be retained. (PFP, Capital) 
4.1.2 Racial dominatio~ as exhibited by capitalist class relations must 
be substituted by a socialist system. (COSATU, AZAPO) 
4.1.3 Sexual exploitation by racial, class and ideological forces needs 
to end. (FEDSAW, UDF) 





4.2.1 Evolutionary and initiated by the formal State structure 
4.2.1.1 Granting self government to Bantustans to develop the respective 
groups within the context of their own communities. (CP, NP) 
4.2.1.2 The devolution of power at central government level by including 
Indians and Coloureds, whilst Whites remain the majority. (NP) 
4.2.1.3 The continuation of the processes of consociational democracy by 
negotiating and consulting with Black personalities who are 
prepared to negotiate for civil rights in a way 'that is not seen 
as radical or violent. (PFP, NDM, IP) 
4.2.1.4 An acceptance of talks with banned organisations such as the ANC 
on condition that they denounce violence. (NP) 
4.2.1.5 The use of repressive state machinery to quell further mobilisation 
and unrest. (NP, CP) 
4.2.2 Evolutionary and initiated by reformist and extraparliamentary 
forces 
4.2.2.1 The decentralisation of power/decision-making structures by 
developing a policy of regionalisation (This will be addressed 
again with reference to developments in Natal). (Kwa Natal Indaba) 
4.2.2.2 Civil action involving strikes, boycotts, passive resistance 
campaigns to destabilise power structures, resulting in gradual 
qualitative change. (UDF) 
4.2.2.3 Trade union action involving types of strike action to win higher 
economic gains/improve working conditions. (COSATU) 
~ I 
4.2.2.4 Callin~ for international pressure, such as disinvestment to 
overcome apartheid. (SACC) 
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4.2.2.5 Calling for the liberation and equali ty of women at a po,li tical 
and legal level. (FEDSAW) 
4.2.3 Revolutionary and initiated by radical/revolutionary £orces 
4.2.3.1 Armed struggle aimed at overthrowing the State. (ANC) 
4.2.3.2 Political action mobilising the communities to resist apartheid 
and make the country ungovernable in order to transform it into 
a socialist society. (ANC, CPSA) 
4.2.3.3 Trade union action involving mobilisation of workers to eventually 
overthrow capitalism. (CPSA, COSATU) 
5. SOUTH AFRICA THE QUEST FOR REGIONAL SOLUTIONS 
The crisis in South Africa is said to be both structural and 
conjunctural. At its roots is the struggle by the Black working 
class against the racial hierarchical state in an unevenly developed 
economy, unable to create the conditions for stable and social 
relations of production. The essential weakness of the economy, 
despite attempts to advance its technological base, lies in social 
relations of production which have not created a "disciplined" and 
"responsible" labour force (Moodley, 1986 : 219-220). 
Recessions in the 1970's and 1980's have led to further conflicts, 
both in the places of production and in the urban areas, between 
the state and the working class. The state's original attempt to 
lessen this worsening crisis was to adopt· a dual-tract approach 
which combined internal repression with techniques designed to 
isolate Black workers in order to make them easier to rule. The 
limited 1979 concessions of Wiehahn and Riekert, the political 
"independence" of the "homelands", the encouragement of a Black 
bourgeoisie, the promotion of local government in the townships, 
and the establishmeny of a tricameral parliament, were all part 
of this strategy. Even whilst the reforms announced by the State 
President in January 1986, 1987 and 1988 are in some part being 
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implemented, three key features of grand apartheid are explicitly 
to remain: separate residential areas, separate schools, and 
political "participation" on a group basis, thereby continuing 
to deny the Black majority any meaningful role in the management 
of the State. 
Yet even as the State and oppositional groups do battle on a 
"tactical" field of conjunctural action at the moment, elements 
within the ruling groups; both inside and outside the State, are 
attempting to map out a longer term strategic terrain of action 
within which they hope to confine future battles. These more 
advanced reformers are looking to solutions that go well beyond 
those associated with the Wiehahn/Riekert Reports, the "Koornhof 
Bills", the new constitution and the confederation of ethnic states; 
that go beyond, in other words, the package of ruling group 
initiatives commonly referred to as "Total Strategy" . (Moodley, 
1986 : 220; Cobbett et aI, 1985 : 87). 
Slabbert (Jacobs, 1986 : 161) maintains that the only process that 
could lead to a more acceptable constitution is the process of 
negotiation and the language of this process is compromise. South 
Africa is not ready for negotiation or else it would be happening. 
He contends that negotiation is not consultation; it is not the 
Government making constitutional changes of its own design and 
co-opting excluded interest groups into it, nor is it all or 
nothing demands for the immediate transfer of power. It is 
essentially a process whereby all the main actors accept that they 
will have to settle for less than they would like in order to be 
better off than they would be if they did not. 
Schlemmer, supporting these contentions (Jacobs, 1986 : 116-117), 
maintains that even intense pressures on the government resulting 
from the township unrest, the fall of the rand and threats of 
economic sanctions, have not shifted it from its basic position, 
which is a compromise between social differentiation and political 
co-operation. Clearly, policy stalemate has been reached which 
has always been latent in South African politics but which in recent 
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times has come to the fore so forcibly so as to threaten the 
stability and future prosperity of the entire society. Thus, it 
seems essential that an approach to socio-political change be 
evolved which can break the stalemate in policy. He contends that 
one such possibi l ity has come increasingly to the fore since the 
publication of the Buthelezi Commission Report in 1982. This is 
the alternative that major metropolitan regions, sub-provinces or 
even provinces like Natal and Kwa Zulu, in which the vast majority 
of non-rural Black people live, acquire a new status as "open 
areas". One may term this approach that of "regional" options. 
The principle would be that such regions could choose to become 
federal "provinces" within South Africa, linked to the central 
p~liamentary system by a "federal" chamber on which representatives 
from these "provinces" could enjoy an input into national decision-
making. Apart from KwaZulu - Natal, other such regions are greater 
Johannesburg, greater Cape Town and parts of the East London 
corridor between Ciskei and Transkei. 
Within these regions, the entire spectrum of local leadership could 
be drawn in constitutional negotiations over a form of decentralised 
government which would best suit the reconciled requirements of the 
various interest groups in the area. 
It is against this background that a consensus is now emerging 
among the most powerful elements in the state and capital over the 
importance of the following objectives (Cobbett, et al, 1986 : 86): 
5.1 The depoliticisation of society through a narrowing of the range 
of social issues subject to political contestation. This has two 
aspects: 
/ 5.1.1 The reduction of state involvement in the creation and distribution 
of wealth, employment and welfare. Both the State and capital 
currently argue that market forces can allocate resources more 




The "deracialisation" of these state interventions and of 
certain formal institutions of political domination. 
5.2 The decentralisation of policy formulation and implementation 
including the devolution of authority over welfare expenditures to 
regional and local government, and as far as possible the 
privatisation of such services. 
5.3 The continued centralisation of powers concerned with the 
maintenance of order, as well as the retention of the capacity 
for "pragmatic" economic intervention by the central state to 
correct market failures. 
A,s part of the research for more developed solutions, sections of 
the ruling group have begun to explore the possibility of demarcating 
new spatial units of planning, administration and representation 
that by-pass existing, highly politicised spatial units - such as 
the bantustans and group areas. These existing spatial units have 
been identified as a source both of economic inefficiency and 
political instability. "The purpose behind identifying new spatial 
forms would therefore be to disorganise oppositional groups that 
have challenged existing spati al boundaries and the systems of 
political representation predicated upon them; and to provide 
the spatial framework for a renewal of capital accumulation. A 
new set of "depoliticised" spatial concepts - like development 
and metropolitan regions - and new approaches to political 
representation predicted on these spatial forms - like federalism 
- have gained dominance in the strategic thinking of the ruling 
groups" (Cobbett et al, 1985 : 87-88). 
Cobbett et a1 (1985 : 89) maintain further that the crisis and 
questioning of the spatial assumptions of tradi~ional apartheid 
is occurring across the entire field of state intervent~on in 
South Africa whether in the context of political representation, 
labour control and settlement policy or spatial economic planning. 
Sections of the political elite have begun to organ{se 9Pposition 
to existing policies, and to debate alternatives. The meeting in 
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July 1987, of 63 Afrikaners with the ANC at Dakar illustrates the 
extent to which these alternatives are being debated. After 1979 
reformers both inside the State and in the wider verligte and 
liberal communities, began to recognise that the Verwoerdian 
vision of parcelling South Africa up into independent ethnic 
states was unrealisable. It had become obvious that the bantustans 
- the essential pillars of apartheid - were unable to achieve 
either economic autonomy or political legitimacy. Economically 
impoverished and reliant on the South African economy, their 
reintegration into a common economic planning and political frame-
work was increasingly seen as inevitable - notwithstanding the 
granting of independence to Venda in 1979 and Ciskei in 1981. 
P~blicly, the government has conceded to no more than the possibility 
of an ethnically based confederation - in effect an international 
agreement between supposedly independent ethnic states and South 
Africa. However, important interests located inside and outside 
the State system have argued vigorously for a federal type state 
based on spatially reconstructed political units which would by-
pass or supercede the provinces and bantustans. 
At the time of writing, Regional Services Councils (RSCs) are being 
implemented. The government maintains that the RSCs will meet 
the following objectives: 
1. "Broaden" democracy to include all races. 
2. Eliminate and prevent domination of one group over another. 
3. Eliminate discrimination. 
4. Provide local government services as efficiently and cost 
effectively as possible. 
5. Generate additional revenue at local level to promote 
development and provide services in areas with the greatest 
needs. 
RSCs are expected to administer regional services such as electricity, 
water, sewerage, roads, abbattoirs and traffic on a cost effective 





the present political and economic climate and what effect they 
would have on other related statutes (Sunday Tribune, Herald, 
July 12, 1987 : 4). 
However, the RSCs are based on the philosophy of racially 
segregated communities where representatives will be appointed by 
constituent units, such as LACs, community councils and local 
authorities which essentially have an ethnic base. It therefore 
follows that people will first have to be part of such ethnic 
local government structures before they can be members of RSCs. 
Inevitably, the RSCs have been rejected by the extra-parliamentary 
groupings. 
Opposition (Cobbett et al, 1985 : 93) from Black people to the 
tricameral elections of 1984, and the urban turmoil since then 
culminating in the November 1984 stay away, has induced big 
capital to break with tradition and publicly call . for African 
political accommodation within a unitary system. This now seems 
an essential pre-requisite for long term economic and political 
stability in South Africa. While it has not publicly backed a 
specific blueprint, organised capital has privately voiced support 
for some form of federal solution. Some elements within capital 
see in the development regions the possible basis for an evolving 
second tier in a federal-type system, drawing on the United States 
of America (USA) as a model. Their conceptions differ markedly 
from the formulations discussed above in that they conceive of 
these regions as mutually competitive, and not as the objects of 
costly decentralisation policies designed to ensure a geographically 
even spread of population, employment and welfare. Hence, the call 
for federation could become the basis for a wide-ranging consensus 
amongst those favouring a reformist solution in South Africa. 
Whilst Cobbett et al treat the issue of regionalism as the subject 
of an externally-imposed regionalisation policy, Beall et al (1986 
5ff), describe regionalism as an ongoing process not least of all 
involving struggle and qf which the current initiatives are a part. 
Regionalisation ' is not being imposed upon a passive population. 
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In the case of the Natal option, this has been possible and 
applicable as a result of a certain cultural distinctiveness and 
because of specific class alliances which have emerged, notably 
the availability of Inkatha for an alternative reform package and 
the direct continuation of certain authority structures in Natal, 
deriving from the colonial tradition of indirect rule. 
6. '!'HE CASE OF NATAL 
6.1 De€ining Natal Spatially 
Since the empirical data on which this study is based, are obtained 
in the Natal area, it is necessary to elaborate on the particular 
Natal circumstances within the broader South African context. 
By "Natal" is meant the area roughly within the provincial borders 
as set out at union (there have been alterations such as the 
incorporation of Griqualand East, and threats of alterations such 
as the handing over to Swaziland of Ingwavuma). Within this 
political entity, there are further sub-divisions, some of greater 
consequence than others, the most important being the division of 
authority between the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) and the 
Natal Provincial Administration (NPA). At the local level, 
divisions would include magisterial boundaries and areas demarcated 
for local administration such as municipalities and tribal or 
regional authorities. 
Approximately 20% (or 6 301 000) of the total population of South 
Africa lives in Natal. Some 5 049 900 are classified as African 
(~ith more than 90% being Zulu-speaking or about 75% of all Zulu-
speakers in South Africa; 496 560 are classified .as White, 
664 360 as Indian and 90 180 as Coloured people (Beall et al, 1986 : 
6-9). The breakdown of population in Natal is quite different from 
that in South Africa as a whole. Whereas Whites constitute 15,3% 
of the South African population, they are only 7,8% of the total 
in Natal, Indians form 2,8% of the tqtal South African population, 
but 10,5% of Natal's, while the figures ~or Coloured people are 
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8,9% and 1,4% respectively, Africans account for 73,6% of the 
South African population and 80,1% of Natal's. 
KwaZulu is the most fragmented bantustan of all the "national and 
self-governing states", comprising a number of pieces excluding 
many of the freehold areas or black spots. As the Surplus 
People's Project pointed out: " over half of all the African 
freehold areas have still not been eradicated, while the African 
population in what is supposedly the White farming areas still 
greatly exceeds the White population (Beall et al, 1986 : 14). 
While the spatial pattern of population distribution was largely 
set in the nineteenth century, some changes did occur in the 
twentieth, the most important being the land "scheduling" for the 
African population in the 1913 and 1936 legislation (Beall et aI, 
1986 : 14). 
Another consequence of population distribution and land allocation 
in Natal is that the KwaZulu areas are in some cases in close 
proximity to the major "White" urban areas and to industrial 
activity in the province. The only other areas in the country 
where this is the case are the Eastern Cape and around Pretoria. 
This means that formal and "informal" settlements have arisen very 
close to potential sources of employment. In consequence Natal 
has by far the largest number of African commuters as distinct 
from migrants. 
If we look at the pattern of urbanisation in KwaZulu, we find that 
because of the proximity of KLA - administered areas to industrial 
employment, massive "informal" settlement has taken place on the 
outskirts of the Durban-Pinetown area. Haarhoff (1985 : 45) writes 
that around Durban: "over half the Black population (or between 
700 000 and 900 000) were living in informal dwellings of various 
( kinds or roughly one-third of the total city population (of all 
\. race groups)". The need for political stability if nothing else, 
/ brings home the urgency of some integrated system of administration 
and provision of services for all the people of the region. 
/ 
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With regard to Indian settlement patterns, when ex-indentured 
labourers moved off the sugar estates they leased and in a few 
cases bought small plots of land in areas of low cost around 
Durban, notably Riverside, Cato Manor, Bayhead, Sea View, Hillary, 
Bellair, Malvern, Wentworth, Sea Cow Lake and Springfield. 
Initially, many households were engaged in market gardening but 
·with industrial expansion many were forced off their land by 
financial pressures whilst others turned to shale farming in 
response to the increase in urbanisation. Wealthier Indian traders 
had tended to purchase property in Durban itself both for residential 
and trading purposes, despite restrictions designed to prevent 
"Indian penetration" (Beall et al, 1986 : 8). 
The Group Areas Act of 1950 affected Coloured and Indian people 
the most severely since African occupation in urban areas was 
already largely controlled. In Durban alone by 1967, ~ 140 Indian 
families had been relocated and further 13 000 were still under 
threat. The net effect of removals under the Group Areas Act was 
to make the Indian community highly dependent on the municipalities 
to meet its housing needs, needs which were met on the outskirts 
of the metropolitan areas. This put the Indian working class at a 
considerable disadvantage in relation to Whites although they were 
relatively better off than the African workers who had to commute 
from even greater distances. The Group Areas Act was also a 
response to competition from Indian commercial interests which 
were adversely affected as a result, particularly the smaller 
traders (Beall et al, 1986 10-18) • 
Hence the question that needs to be asked now is why was Natali 
KwaZulu chosen by large sections of South Africa's dominant bloc , 
and . the reformist political community allied to it, as the frontline 
for constitutional "reform"? The view that Natal is somehow 
"different" from the rest of the country has a wide popular 
currency, reflected in cliches about colonial-minded Whites and 
proud Zulus / (Glaser, 1986 : 10). 
" 
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6.2 Natal - A Distinctive Political ' Culture? 
In cultural and political terms, English-speaking Natal was 
reluctantly integrated into the national framework. Having failed 
to win a federal constitution at the time of Union, regional 
distinctiveness was manifested in a fear of "Dutch" political 
domination at the national level and in a fiercely expressed 
loyalty to the British crown. These sentiments reached fever 
pitch in the 1920's with accession to power of the Pact government 
under Hertzog, and the move to create a new "clean" South African 
flag. The flag question itself became a national political issue 
and saw extensive mobilisation in Natal to preserve the Union 
Jack as a symbol of the imperial connection (Glaser, 1986 : 271). 
In the 1930's and 1950's Natal's White voters found themselves in 
opposition to a nationalist-dominated government. In both instances 
a specifically Natal form of consciousness was invoked by local 
politicians. It was possible in the 1970's and 1980's to address 
English-speaking Whites in Natal within a discourse of regional 
distinctiveness, despite increasing integration into the national 
polity and the more or less total failure of "Natal politics". 
In time, English-speaking Natal's opposition to Republic and 
Afrikaner political hegemony was gradually appeased by the 
substitution of Afrikaner nationalism with the ideology of free 
enterprise and notions of total strategy as the new factors of 
cohesion in the ruling group. 
The reinvention of a Natal consciousness in the present conjuncture, 
and its reworking to include Africans in its ambit, represent a 
loss of faith in the ability of the national ruling group to 
forge new alliances capable of stemming the mounting crisis. 
Whilst there exists this attempt to forge new alliances, the May 6, 
1987 election showed a shift towards the right. Hence, in the 
final analysis, the extent to which a regional solution would be 




With regard to African politics, there seems to be a regionally 
distinct political history which has formed the basis of -a - particular 
political culture. The Zulu monarchy was never really officially 
recognised; official recognition might have been held back, but 
at least for some (capitalist) interests in Natal the position 
of the King in the African society was less that of a threat than 
of a political and ideological ally. The first Inkatha movement 
brought together traditionalism, the aspiring African petty 
bourgeoisie and commercial agriculture (especially sugar, by far 
the largest economic sector at the time, producing by 1980, more 
than double the income from maize in Natal). The African petty 
bourgeoisie, represented by John Dube, hoped to benefit from the 
political power that a "Zulu nationalism" under the Zulu monarchy 
would give them, while sugar interests hoped that Solomon and the 
Natal chiefs would give them the control over labour that they 
needed to counter the drain to the Transvaal mines and industries 
which was a constant threat (Beall et al, 1986 : 12). 
Dube, first president of the SANNC, was replaced in 1917. After 
that date and until his death in 1946, he created a regional base 
that stood in conflict with the national ANC. His Natal Native 
Congress left a legacy of tension that was only resolved with the 
election of Chief Albert Luthuli as president of the regional (1951) 
and then the National Congress (1952). Welsh (1970 : 228) 
commented that the Natal Congress: "as Dube's organisation 
remained a band of intellectuals and some enlightened chiefs ••• ". 
As editor and founder of Ilanga, Dube was ideaily placed to give 
effect to the other function of the 1920's Inkatha, namely to 
counter (rather than advance) working class interests. Solomon 
was being used by sugar interests, to counter the success that the 
ICU was having in Natal. 
What is clear about this period is that it was not only at the 
I 
administrative level that the I?osition of "traditional" authority 
wat b7ing entrenched. It was also serving capitalist and 
aspir.ing capitalist interests to bolster the ideological position 
62. 
of and ensure an official centrality for the Zulu king and chiefs. 
The 1927 Native Administration Act was a clear enough continuation 
of a Natal tradition in the rule over the local population (Beall 
et al, 1986 : 13ff). 
It was really only after 1959 that the policy of ethnic fragmentation, 
rather than racial separation was pursued with great vigour. 
The legacy of indirect rule and the subsequent policy of 
"retribalisation" after Union as well as the conscious use made of 
the Zulu monarchy by certain Natal interests go a long way towards 
explaining why there still is, in the 1980's, a Zulu king who can 
be used politically and a "tradition" of chieftainship which has 
se'rved geographic fragmentation and political separation in the 
past and might well serve some sort of reintegration today. 
However, retrospective and centrifugal forces were not the only 
ones at work. As with parliamentary politics and the economic 
interests of the capitalist class there were forces at work which 
were serving to unite the oppressed classes nationally. On the 
one hand, there was growing non-racial political solidarity which 
culminated in the Congress Alliance in the 1950's and on the 
other, the development of an organised labour movement (Webster, 
1983 : 221-226). 
Significant to Natal's participation in non-racial popular politics 
was the role played by the Indian population. During the early 
decades of t~e century Indians shared with Whites a tendency to 
look towards the Empire or Commonwealth for articulation or redress 
of their grievances. In many respects it was this access which 
enabled them to win for themselves a relatively more privileged 
status than Af~icans. However, they shared with the African 
population a position in the ranks of the ractally oppressed. The 
conservative AI Kajee/Pather Group which dominated the NIC (Natal 
Indian Congress) was ousted by a new radical grouping in about 1946. 
Being part of the Congress Alliance, the NIC together with the TIC 
(Transvaal Indian Congress) conducted campaigns at a national level. 
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The increasingly militant nature of popular politics during the 
1950's was accompanied by the politicisation of African trade 
unionism, particularly after the formation of the SACTU which 
formed part of the Congress Alliance. SACTU was particularly 
successful in organising in Natal despite difficult history for 
organised labour in the region. There were a number of factors 
which had militated against the development of a strong trade 
union movement in Natal. First and foremost was the need amongst 
Natal capitalists for a controlled labour force, be it indentured 
contract or "the infamous Durban system" of urban control which 
created another captive labour force housed in hostels and barracks 
and isolated from much of the urban dynamics in the region" (Sitas, 
1984 ': 12). Secondly, Natal employers were skilled at putting one 
group of workers against another, for example, migrants against 
urban dwellers or, more precisely, Indian workers against African 
workers (Marie, 1986). 
The 1950's saw a growth in trade unionism which was not only due to 
organisation but a growth in worker militancy resulting from 
pressures on living standards in both the rural and urban areas. 
"Durban and Natal generally was to be the scene of SACTU's most 
outstanding organisational success. Generated by the upsurge in 
popular militancy arising from the Cato Manor Riots of June 1959, 
and encouraged by the enthusiasm for trade unionism of Chief 
Luthuli, 13 500 Natal workers joined SACTU affiliates that year and 
new local committees were formed in Pinetown, Ladysmith and 
Pietermaritzburg" (Lodge, 1983 : 192). 
The 1960's saw the repression of all serious opposition to both 
capital and state which in turn. enabled the latter to forge ahead 
with its own plans for restructuring society. This involved 
the development of African administration along ethnic lines and 
tight control over urbanisation. The economic corollary of this 
~efforts to encourage industrial decentralisation. Despite 
incentives this did not have a great deal of appeal to many sections 






of the reserve-based cheap labour system by becoming increasingly 
capital intensive in their operations. 
There were a number of cases in Natal where this did not apply. 
For example, in the garment and textile industries which remained 
relatively labour intensive. The proximity of the reserves to the 
industrial complex of Durban-Pinetown and that of Pietermaritzburg 
meant that the latter were able to derive some of the benefits of 
border industries without the infrastructural expense and inconvenience 
experienced elsewhere. In this and other ways, patterns of 
accumulati on and class struggle took a specific form in Natal. 
Nevertheless, by the end of the 1960's Natal had become tightly 
integrated into the national political economy in both economic 
and political terms. 
The 1973 strikes had a number of implications for the region. 
Firstly, trade union organisation which was already underway, was 
given a boost. By the end of August 1975 there existed nationally 
twenty-five unions with an estimated membership of 66 000. The 
task of co-ordination and building of unity fell largely upon the 
Natal-based Trade Union Advisory and Co-ordinating Council (TUACC) 
which included the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) and the 
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU). It was the unions under 
the auspices of TUACC which became a major force behind the formation 
of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) in 1979. 
The organisational weight of FOSATU remained in Natal until the 
formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
in December 1985, when the balance shifted dramatically away from 
the region. 
Relations between Inkatha and the popular organisations became 
increasingly strained. In 1979 an ongoing political contact between 
Inkatha and the ANC was severed. Tensions became overt in 1980 when 
Buthelezi came out against the activities of community and other 
popular organisations when he reacted against boycotting school-
children. These tensions were confirmed by the ANC's attack on 
him for this. 
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The Lombard Plan, arose out of the regional specificity of Natal. 
With its suggestions of a "regional approach" and the "regionalisation 
of political and administrative decentralisation" (Beall et al, 
1986 : 14) this was a compromise that would allow ethnically-based 
political representation, while at the same time allowing for 
recognition of the total interdependence that existed in Natal 
between the different racial and cultural groups. Of more direct 
relevance to its sponsors, it would allow the minimum disruption 
of sugar production, that is, in the nature of nearly all 
agricultural production, tied to a particular climatic region. 
The disruption could have arisen from the state's pursuit of a 
political policy that did not always make economic, and in this 
case, agricultural sense. 
The Buthelezi Commission, announced in April 1980, explored the 
possibility of finding a way, within the overall framework of the 
Republic of South Africa, of developing a regional arrangement 
which might provide an alternative to the programmes to which the 
White political parties had become committed. 
Both the Lombard and Buthelezi Commission Reports operated from 
the basis that there were sufficient regionally distinct elements 
in Natal to justify a specific solution which could then be 
duplicated elsewhere (a contradiction in itself). This distinctive-
ness, for their purposes, arose mainly from the ethnic/racial 
composition of the population (ignoring in the main the Indian 
population). It also took into particular account the economic 
interdependence of Natal and the spread of the KwaZulu fragments 
across the whole region-, and the consequent necessity to rationalise 
administration and the provision of services, while minimising the 
risk of economic and political disruption. 
All this at a time when labour was on the offensive, when popular 
political organisation was re-emerging and the State was making 
gestures towards reform through commissions of enquiry, and new 
regional alignment of forces was beginning to make it~elf ~el~. 
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Similarly the KwaNatal Indaba proposals in the late 1980·s 
coincided with a massive upsurge of extra-parliamentary political 
activity. Calling for national self rule it has placed itself 
strategically, as opposition to the wider popular call for a 
unitary society based on one person, one vote. How the balance of 
forces are shifting remains to be seen. This study will address 
that question through an examination of the attitudes prevalent 
within the Durban population. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
1. THE INDEPENDENT INDICATORS OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES 
An analysis of the independent indicators of social attitudes is 
presented as part of the theoretical foundation of the interview 
schedule and the subsequent interpretation of the data. 
1.1 Social attitudes and race 
"Race refers to biological characteristics such as colour, physical 
buiid, body: hair and skull measurements. In contrast, "ethnicity" 
refers to cultural characteristics of diverse types" (Blalock, 
1982 : 4). "Racism refers to discriminatory practices in which a 
socially constructed notion of "race" is implicated" (Rex and 
Mason, 1986 : 110). 
The Markinor surveys of 1976 and November 1977 provide the first 
reliable indicators of some of the personal and attitudinal 
consequences of the unrest which occurred in 1976 and 1977. The 
Markinor surveys did not ask questions directly on the ri.ots. 
However, when asked why relations between the races were getting 
worse, replies were given such as "Whites are killing Blacks" and 
"Whites deny us human rights" (Lever, 1978 : 205). Whilst a severe 
level of pessimism was not induced, young Africans in particular, 
were most resentful of the situation. 
Besides Black attitudes in general, attitudes existing among the 
Black groupings should also be considered. The unity between 
Indians and Africans has never been particularly strong. As Beall 
et al (1986 19) maintain: "the unity which existed at the level 
of leadership did not always have resonance on the ground, as 
acutely evidenced by the 1949 riots". Social inequalities and 
competition playa significant part in fuelling the hostilities 
and differences in attitud~s between the races. 
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Coloureds make up 1 ,4% of Natal's population. Whilst the Coloured 
population in the Cape Province can be seen as relatively militant, 
in Natal the Coloured population is much more conservative. In the 
IBR Special Report (Meer, 1985 : 79) it was indicated that in 1984 
almost 70% of the Coloured population did not subscribe to any 
organisation, whether social or political. After 1985, there 
was a 14% increase in the support for organisations, paralleling a 
greater social consciousness. 
1.2 Social attitudes and class (Occupation, Income and Education) 
"In as much as the groups that demand a highly specific kind of 
access have evolved broad patterns of goals, identities and 
attitudes that differ greatly from those of the centre, they want, 
above all, to change the existing order to conform with their 
orientations" (Eisenstadt, 1971 : 61). The dimensions of collective 
identity are based on race and class factors. 
Whilst Blacks lack access to central power, certain sectors have 
experienced some social mobility in the occupational structure 
giving rise to differences in social attitudes. Income increases 
among Blacks also indicate considerable upward social mobility. 
Whilst it does depict less continuing social mobility than does the 
occupational one, it does indicate upward mobility over time (Van 
der Merwe and Groenewald, 1976 : 260). To what extent does upward 
social mobility change or affect class consciousness? 
In a study conducted by Go1dthorpe and Lockwood (Ha~alambos, 1980 
57-59), it was discovered that even though workers were becoming 
more ~ffluent, they were not developing a middle class consciousness. 
Earlier, Engels (Haralambos, 1980 : 48-49) had written: "The workers 
speak other dia l ects, have other thoughts and ideals, other customs 
and moral principles, a different religion and other politics than 
those of the bourgeoisie. Thus, they are two radically dissimilar 
nations ••• It 
Contributing towards the definitions of varibus sub-cultures is the 
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level of education attained by people within the respective sub-
cultures as was noted during a Markinor study (1977). Yaung and 
better educated individuals generally retain more radical beliefs 
than people from less-educated backgrounds. Prejudices also 
affect classes differently. AM Nzimande (1970 : 178) in: A Study 
of the Attitudes of Two Groups of the Zulu Tribe Toward the Indian, 
showed that the lower the educational attainment, the stronger 
the prejudices towards Indians amongst Africans. There was a steady 
rise in favourability of attitudes with rise in educational level. 
Hence it is necessary to view occupational, income and educational 
differences as class components having varying effects on social 
attitude. 




Since social change was defined as "long-term or short-term 
disintegrative or reconstructive processes" it includes then the 
disintegration of patriachal structures and ideas which can be seen 
as retrogressive for a developing society. Hence, attitudes of men 
and women at this level become significant. There is not much 
available data on differences that might exist between the sexes in 
terms of their social attitudes. Nzimande (1970 : 134), in his 
study found that the influence of sex on the attitude of the Zulus 
towards the Indians was negligible. 
In Britain research conducted by T Veness (1962), and Sue Sharpe 
(1973), indicate that young women of mainly working-class origin 
saw as their priorities in life: "love, marriage, husbands, children, 
jobs and careers", more or less in this order. The girls' attitudes 
towards work reflected their school experience and the general 
cultural definitions of women's roles. This realisation linked to 
Bradfield's assertion that: "for a majority of women, family and 
motherhood are more important than careers" (Chetty, 1983 : 45), and 
Cohen and Shorts assertion that: "By virtue of their roles, women 
reflect and adhere to the norms more closely than men" (Lever, 1978 
: 253), leads to the belief that the social attitudes of women are 
more conservative than men. 
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In a study entitled: Ma i ds and Madams, conducted by Jaclyn Cock 
in 1978 and 1979 in Albany and Bathurst, South Africa, it was found 
that almost a quarter (24%) of Wh i te women employers (of domestic 
servants) believed that women were generally inferior to men in 
their personal qualities. Seventy-five percent thought they were 
not inferior and one did not know. This contrasted with the views 
of the Black domestic servants in the sample, where only 16% thought 
that women were general l y inferior to men in personal qualities 
(1980 : 157). 
What these statistics indicate are differences among women of 
different races and a general conservativeness ~hich may have some 
bearing on the social attitudes of women towards political processes. 
1.4 SOCial attitudes and age 
Fred Cottrell (1976 : 33) in Aging and the Aged maintains that the 
general view of older persons is that they are conservative. But 
traditional wisdom also says that as people are denied the opportunity 
to enjoy the good things about them, they are likely to become radical. 
Older people certainly have been constantly frustrated by new and 
more restrictive limitations imposed on what they can do. consume 
or "enjoy. Many of the poorer older people have supported actions 
that are quite radical. while well to do older people often become 
reactionary. 
A survey conducted by Feit and Stokes (Lever. 1978 131) directed 
at White Afrikaans speaking respondents. discovered that the younger 
age group with urban rather than rural origins manifested more 
liberal attitudes towards Black people. In the same way it is 
assumed that within the Black group older people have more 
traditionalist ideas towards development and change. whereas younger 
people exhibit a desire for rapid. more radical change. 
:=-. r 
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Interviews conducted by Fredman et al (1983 : 101) showed that during 
the Soweto Ri ots parents became involved in political activity mainly 
through pressure exerted by their children. 
/ 
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The attitudes of the young are often in sharp contrast to those of 
many of the older generation, who have an overwhelming feeling that 
nothing can be done to improve their social condition. More than 
half (55%) of those interviewed by the A Bergstraesser Institute 
felt that they were personally powerless to bring about change. 
At the same time, 42% believed that as a group Blacks had no hope 
of achieving anything against White superiority (Fredman et al, 
1983 : 103). Hence, the significance of age as an indicator of 
social attitude cannot be underestimated. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
How does one adopt Western theoretical formulations that predict 
specific types of change when interpreting South African empirical 
data? A complex social structure that exhibits varying and contra-
dictory components can best be explained through the use of a 
framework that synthesizes relevant aspects _?f contradictory 
theories. Gerhard E Lenski showed that theories as contradictory 
as those of Marx and Mosca, or of Dahrendorf and Parsons, could be 
understood within a single, unified framework. Hence, Lenski's 
synthesis of the conflict and structuralist perspectives, within an 
evolutionary framework has been adopted. 
Since Lenski's partial analysis focuses largely on the distributive 
and stratification system it will be complemented with further 
conservative and radical assumptions. The interaction between social 
structure, social movement and social change with the compounding 
influences in the development of social attitude will become evident. 
Lenski developed a theory that purports to be a synthesis rather 
than a simple juxtaposition of conflict theory with functionalist 
analysis. It is evolutionary theory, according to Lenski, that can 
analyse structure as well as process without being limited to a 
narrow time span (Poloma, 1979 : 92). By using different approaches, 
Lenski integrates differing assumptions about the nature of people 
and the nature of society. Functionalism is based upon a 
conservative tradition that views stratification as being essential 
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to meeting the needs of society as a whole. Conflict theory, on 
the other hand, questions the existence of such "societal needs". 
It is more concerned with the needs, desires and interests of 
individuals and their sub-groups rather than of larger societies 
in their struggle for valued goods and services that are in short 
supply. Such differences reflect opposing assumptions about the 
nature of people (Poloma, 1979 : 92-93). 
The basic assumptions that Lenski retains are as follows: 
1. People are social beings who are required to live in society; 
2. Human beings usually place their own or their groups interests 
before the interests of others; 
3. Human beings have an insatiable appetite for the goods and 
services available in a society; and 
4. Individuals are unequally endowed with an ability to engage in 
the struggle for these scarce goods and services (Lenski, 1966 
30-32). As early evolutionists, such as Spencer showed, 
conflicting interests may be incorporated into an evolutionary 
framework (Lauer, 1982 : 63). For radical theorists, such as 
Marx, conflicting interests would polarise classes until 
existing social arrangements are transformed by revolution. 
Lenski maintains: "In our discussion of the nature of man, it was 
postulated that where important decisions are involved, most human 
action is motivated either by self-interest or by partisan group 
interests. This suggests that power alone governs the distribution 
of rewards. This cannot be the case, however, since we also postulated 
that most of these essentially selfish interests can. be satisfied 
only by the establishment of co-operative relations with others. 
Co-operation is absolutely essential both for survival and for the 
efficient attainment of most other goals. In other words, men's 
selfish interests compel them to remain members of society and to 
share in the division of labour" (Lenski, 1966 : 44-45). 
Lenski hypothesizes that power and need are the two principles that 
govern stratification systems. The more complex the society, the 
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more important power becomes in the allocation of available 
resources. He proceeds to discuss the phenomenon of power in more 
technologically advanced societies. Although the use of force or 
coercion is the: "most effective instrument for seizing power in 
society" and: "remains the foundation of any system of inequity" 
(Lenski, 1966 : 51), force is not the most effective means of 
retaining a power position once it has been secured. At this point, 
the importance of creating and maintaining an institutional or 
structural base of operation becomes apparent. In order for the 
new rule to become legitimised, the rule of might must be transformed 
into a rule of right. This implies that force must be replaced by 
institutionalised power that is both socially acceptable and much 
less personal. With similar concerns about rule by force, Spencer 
(Timasheff and Theodorson, 1976 : 37-41) maintained that individuals 
submit to legitimate government and resist actively what is perceived 
as illegitimate forms of government. 
Lenski (1966 : 59) maintained that there is a circulation of political 
power between periods of coercive rule, or "the rule of might" and 
periods of institutional rule, or "the rule of right". The rule of 
might is characterised by a forcible seizure of power by a new 
elite, which involves an initial phase of violence. During this 
repressive phase, the organised resistance is either destroyed or 
suppressed. 
The second phase is one in which the regime strives to reduce its 
dependence on naked force and to increase its legitimate authority. 
The trend at this time is toward constitutionalism, or the rule of 
right. Unless there is a steady succession of challenges against 
the reigning power elite, the long-term trend involves a reduction 
in the active role of force and coercion and an increase in the role 
of persuasion . and incentive. At some time, this constitutional rule 
of right is again challenged by force and the cycle begins again. 
In racial and ethnic terms,power contests can be seen between the 
dominant and subo;dinate racial groups. This is true even though 
these relationships may appear to be smooth running and free of 
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overt conflict. Whenever power is unevenly distributed among 
racial groups, as is the case in South Africa, the minorities that 
are excluded from the socio-political processes, have had to 
accommodate themselves. It must therefore be recognised that power 
considerations are not linked in a simple fashion to the issue of 
whether or not there is overt conflict between two groups. Conflict 
seems more likely whenever two groups are approximately evenly 
matched rather than in situations in which one group obviously 
dominates the other (Blalock, 1982 101) . 
Lenski admits that the duration, the economic situation and the 
ideological nature of the political cycles vary greatly and cautions 
that the differences between political cycles should not be minimised. 
Social movements at each point are constituted by gradual and 
pervasive changes in the values of people - changes which can be 
called cultural drifts. Such cultural drifts stand for a general 
shifting in the ideas of people, particularly along the line of the 
conceptions which people have themselves, and of their rights and 
privileges. Over a period of time many people may develop a new 
view of what they believe they are entitled to - a view made up of 
desires and hopes. It could signify the emergence of a new set of 
values, which influence people in the way in which they look upon 
their own lives (McLaughlin, 1969 : 9). 
Despite substantial movement toward the democratic ideal, political 
. inequality is still a basic fact of life in all advanced industrial 
societies, and political resources are the basis of one of the more 
important, but neglected, class systems. Where an in4ividual stands 
with respect to such resources can have a decisive influence on his 
chances of obtaining many of the things he desires most: "Though 
political status is obviously more important for an individual in a 
totalitarian nation than in a democratic nation it is not without 
considerable influence in both" (Lenski, 1966 327). Lenski does 
not refer specifically to the changes brought about through 






Yet, political organisations are weakened, and broader based and 
oriented political activities and organisations are enhanced by 
the major structural aspects and dimensions of modernisation: 
economic development and differentiation, urbanisation and social 
mobility, the concomitant development of new occupational groups, 
and the structural dislocation of old and new groups on the one 
hand and - above all - their impingement on the centre on the other. 
The development of new groups and their economic and social 
dislocations need not change their basic stratification orientations, 
but it may give rise to new and broader political ideologies and 
organisations. It may - also be connected with keener perception of 
differentiations within the social order in terms of developed -
underdeveloped and the equating of this dichotomy with class conflicts 
(Paulus, 1980 : 75). 
At the same time, however, there is a natural tendency for those who 
seize power by force to strive to rule by constitutional means, so 
far as circumstances permit. Yet in the end, every regime is 
destroyed by force or threat of it. This is the basic theme on 
which there are a thousand variations (Lenski, 1966 : 61). One of 
the chief determinants of the social structure for the duration of 
human history, according to Lenski (1975 : 147) was the environmental 
barriers to human activity and technological development., specifically 
environments that impeded the flow of information from other societies. 
This bears a close resemblance to Parson's distinction between the 
processes productive of structural stability and those productive of 
structural change: "The structure of a system and its environment 
must be distinguished from processes within the system and in inter~ 
change between the system and its environment. But processes which 
maintain the stability of a system, internally both through structure 
and process, and in interchange between the system and its environment 
ie. states of equilibrium, must be distinguished from processes by 
which this balance between structure and more elementary processes 
arealtered in such a way as to lead to a new and different state of 
the system, a state which must be described in terms of an 
alteration of its previous structure" (Parsons, 1964 : 85). 
Within powerless groups, the notion "charismatic authority" is 
extremely important. For Weber, the term "charisma" applies: " ... 
to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of 
which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with 
supernatural, superhuman or at least specifically exceptional powers 
or qualities" (Buckley, 1967 : 58). Such qualities attract disciples 
who are devoted to the charismatic leader personally and who commit 
themselves to the normative or moral order that he or she claims to 
represent. Previous contact as well affects the degree of trust and 
the extent to which the groups can combine and mobilise themselves 
effectively (Blalock, 1982 : 110). "The influence of variations in 
the personal attributes of political leaders also seem to have its 
greatest impact in the more advanced societies, especially when 
constitutionalism is at low ebb. In modern industrial societies, 
political leaders have immense powers available to them, particularly 
in periods of crisis" (Lenski, 1966 : 107). 
In complex industrial societies, a single individual may be a member 
of any number of classes. Class membership must be seen as a multi-
dimensiona~ phenomenon. It is thus important to note that class is 
a more complex phenomenon in modern industrial society, where 
individuals are simultaneously members of a number of classes, each 
with varying power potential. Despite various rankings within as 
well as among classes, members of a particular class stand in a 
similar position with regard to interests and in opposition to 
classes who do not share these interests (Poloma, 1979 : 96). These 
interests dictate a particular form of consciousness. Durkheim 
maintained that the collective conscience which dictates consciousness 
was an outcome of human association and the cultivation of interests 
(Haralambos, 1980 : 238). It was consciousness rather than political 
intervention that, for Comte, could bring about fundamental progress 
(Fletcher, 1971 : 50-52). For Marx, opposing class interests once 
realised, shatter false consciousness and instil a revolutionary 
consciousness (Tucker, 1978 : 520). 
Whilst consciousness plays a crucial/ role, it is the distributive 







system that is central to Lenski's analysis. Lenski (1966 : 85) 
maintains that the degree of inequality in distributive systems 
will vary directly with the size of a society's surplus. Some 
modification of this general pattern could emerge, however, when 
conditions permit persons who individually lack power to combine 
and organise, and thus to develop a collective counterbalance to 
those with greater individual power. Such developments seem most 
probable in democratic nations with an egalitarian or socialist 
ideology. 
A second important property of distributive systems is their rate of 
vertical mobility. Here, too, the same methodological problems 
arise. However, the possibility of rough but meaningful comparisons 
seem possible, especially if appropriate qualifications are made 
for significant variations between class systems and between inter-
and-intra generational mobility. 
On an ad-hoc basis, one might predict that they will tend to vary 
directly with the rate of technological and social change. Such 
change should lead to changes in the bases of power and, in a 
p~riod of flux, traditional means of transmitting and retaining 
power should prove somewhat less effective than in periods of 
relative stability. 
The degree of class hostility is a third variable feature of 
distributive systems. Lenski (1966 : 74-75) defines class as: "an 
aggregation of persons in a society who stand in a similar position 
with respect to force or some specific form of institutionalised 
power, privilege or prestige". Class, for Lenski, is power class. 
On the degree of class hostility, the same methodological problems 
and possibilities that apply to the first two variables apply here 
as well. 
Here, too, there is no basis for predicting systematic variations, 
but again an ad hoc hypothesis suggests itself. If, as suggested 
earlier, the lack of opportunities for upward mobility is one of 
the sources of class hostility, one would predict that the degree 
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of class hostility will t end to vary inversely with the rate of 
upward mobility. Since the rate of upward mobility is assumed to 
be only one among several factors contributing to class hostility, 
we should not expect a strong relationship (Lenski, 1966 : 85-86). 
There are other properties of distributive systems which might also 
be used as bases for comparison, as for example, the degree of their 
complexity, institutionalisation and so forth. 
Lenski found that because hunting and gathering societies have little 
surplus of goods and resources, the stratification system is not 
contingent on such a surplus. The survival of the group requires 
co-operation in allocating what is available, meeting minimal 
survival needs for individuals in the society. There is still a 
stratification system in operation - one that is based on prestige 
and honour. Simple horticultural societies are much like hunting 
and gathering societies in their absence of a surplus that would 
enable the development of more defined social classes. With 
improvement in gardening techniques come surplus in advanced 
horticultural societies and the development of a separate political 
system. Here we see the beginnings of a class system based upon 
birth rather than primarily upon achieved contributions to the group. 
Agrarian societies mark another important stage in human history, 
made possible through the intervention of the plow and the harnessing 
of animal energy. Lenski points out that the advances in productive 
technology: "were matched by advances in military technology" 
(Lenski, 1966 : 193). In these situations techniques of waging war 
become more and more efficient. Here we see the emergence of a 
military class that takes its position alongside the political class. 
~ Other classes are also added to the hierarchy in agrarian societies, 
including foreign ethnics (from wars waged) merchants (because of 
f 
the improvement in transportation of goods), and urban dwellers, 
\ 
including the governing class, who are able to live off the surplus 
pr6duc j d by the agrarian peasants. This social type is characterised 
by a rigidly stratified society with much reliance upon heredity as 
a basis for class. 
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Industrial societies represent the next stage in the evolutionary 
development of the stratification system. Lenski (1966 : 321) 
notes that here: "The raw materials used are far more diversified, 
the sources of energy quite different, and the tools far more 
complex and efficient". There is both a great increase in consumption 
of goods and a great increase in their production. Lenski proposes 
that partly because of the great ability to produce, making desired 
goods less scarce, inequities in advanced industrial societies may 
be showing signs of abating. He observes (1966 .: 308): "The 
appearance of mature industrial societies marks the first significant 
reversal of the age-old evolutionary trend towards ever increasing 
inequality". The relationship of inequality to the social structure 
appears to be a curvilinear one that increases in advanced horti-
cultural and agrarian societies and shows some decrease in highly 
developed industrial societies. At the same time, however, Lenski 
leans towards the conservative position that given .the nature of man, 
inequalities will always exist in societies. 
Lenski (Poloma, 1979 : 100-101) maintains that: "The most basic 
characteristics of distributive systems appear to be shaped by the 
interaction of those constant elements in the human situation". One 
might add that technology, social structure and social movements 
influence social organisational factors whose variation is greatly 
influenced by prior variations in technology. Collective action 
within this context becomes a complex phenomenon. 
Lenski (1966 : 417) maintains that when opportunities for individual 
mobility are insufficient, people often resort to collective action 
as a means of obtaining the rewards they seek, thus generating class 
struggles. These are much more common in industrial societies than 
in agrarian and probably for the reason that Marx suggested more 
than a century ago: these new societies provide unparalleled 
opportunities for communication among the less powerful, and less 
privileged segments of society. 
Lenski's propositions are directly dependent on his assumptions 






have not changed during human history. Lenski depends upon the 
degree of technology. The theory tends in the conservative direction 
in analysing societies with little or no economic surplus. In 
societies in which the surplus is more substantial, the radical 
position of coercions' role in maintaining the stratification system 
is emphasised (Lenski, 1966 : 441). Thus Lenski asserts that his 
theory can be said to be neither conservative nor radical, 
functionalist nor conflict-orientated, but an integration of two 
opposing theoretical perspectives, relying on an evolutionary 
framework in tracing the development of society. 
Sahlins and Service (Hoogvelt, 1978 
advanced societies: 
13) suggest that evolutionary 
1. have embodied more varied and more effective means of exploiting 
the energy resources of a greater variety of environments. 
Such effective means of exploiting the greater energy resources 
of more variegated environments means that 
2. these societies are relatively more free from environmental 
control, that is they can adapt to a greater environmental 
variety than less advanced types. As a consequence, they 
3. tend to dominate and replace less advanced types. 
Sahlins (Appelbaum, 1970 : 57) maintained that adaptation to specific 
conditions, including the previous cultural heritage of a society, 
results in tremendous cultural diversity among societies. "New 
cultural traits arising through adaptation can be considered 
adapted advantages" (Appelbaum, 1970 : 57). Unlike specific 
biological evolution, specific cultural evolution allows for the 
possibil~ty of transmitting variation through diffusion. "Separate 
cultural traditions unlike separate biological lineages, may 
converge by coalescence" (Appelbaum, 1970 : 57). Furthermore, 
cultures may~borrow wholesale the achievements of other cultures 
without recapi t ulating all the stages of development. Thus, 
~ 
specific evolution provides a link to understanding seemingly 
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discontinuous progress in the general evolution to higher forms. 
Specific evolution: "is the phylogenic ramifying, historic 
passage of a culture along its many lines, the adaptive modification 
of particular cultures" (Appelbaum, 1970 : 58). Similarly, Lenski 
maintains that technologies slowly fashioned to enhance human 
heritage is a chief determinant of the social structure for the 
duration of human history. 
Sahlins and Service (Hoogvelt, 1978 : 18) maintain as well that 
diffusion occurs mostly under the wings of dominance. The law of 
cultural dominance merely states that each successive higher culture 
type because of its greater adaptability tends, at the expense of 
lower types, to spread further and faster than previous types. 
Western culture is spreading its dominance - the trend is towards 
greater convergence and consequent homogenity of culture types 
accompanied by a decrease in the diversity of cultures. 
Under the wings of dominance as well, competition for scarce 
resources takes place - not only between individuals and classes 
but also among class systems (Poloma, 1979 : 97ff). Lenski cites 
the illustration of efforts to equalize educational opportunities, 
which would increase the importance of the educational class system 
while decreasing the importance of the racial and sexual class 
system. Employers then, are forced to use educational qualifications 
in hiring more than racial or sexual class system membership. 
Lenski maintains that many, though not all, of the more advanced 
industrial nations of the world contain serious racial, ethnic or 
religious cleavages. So long as such groupings are irrelevant to . 
the distributive process, they cannot be considered classes or 
status groups. When, however, membership in them begins to have an 
appreciable influence on access to important rewards, then it becomes 
impossible to treat them otherwise. To call such groups classes 
does not mean that they are only classes, or even that they are 
identical with other kinds of classes. It does mean, however, that 
they are groups of people who stand in a common position with respect 
to some attribute which functions as a resource in the productive and 
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distributive process - in this instance, race. Significantly, 
Lenski notes that the struggle to reduce inequality has often had 
the effect of increasing racial identity (Lenski, 1966 : 389-395). 
In agrarian societies, power, privilege and prestige of almost 
every woman was determined by the status of the man on whom she 
was dependent and her relation to him. With industrialisation, 
the situation of women has changed rapidly, and it is no longer 
feasible to view them as merely dependents of some male. With 
industrialisation the number of opportunities outside the traditional 
roles of wife, daughter, or dependent kinswomen have been greatly 
increased. In short, the traditional barriers which long separated 
the female stratification from the male, and kept the former 
dependent on the latter, are clearly crumbling. Hence, in analysis 
of advanced industrial societies it is impossible to ignore, or 
treat as obvious, the role of sex in the distributive process. 
Furthermore, Lenski maintains that some of the most dramatic 
indicators of change is the extent to which women occupy positions 
in areas previously the private domain of men (Lenski, 1966 : 402-404). 
Another illustration of the struggle between class systems may be 
seen in totalitarian countries, where political class-system 
membership is increased at the expense of other systems, particularly 
the property class system. Privilege and prestige are given to high 
status party members rather than, as in capitalist systems, to those 
who own the most property. The shifting of the elite thus, results 
in individuals continuing to experience deprivation due to the 
usurpation of power and the competitive nature of the distributive 
system. 
For the deprived in particular, organisations take on a significant 
role. The broad perceptions of the organisations indicate the 
extent of political awareness of elements facilitating the trans-
formation of the stratification system. Ward (Bierstedt, 1981 : 52) 
in this regard believed that people are moved by the power of 
sentiment, not intellect, and that the religious sentiment is the 
most powerful of all. Political sentiment is also crucial. The 
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extent and potential of active mobilisation is discussed to a 
limited extent by Lenski. Not accepting the spontaneity of worker 
uprising as fundamental, Lenin (McLellan, 1979 : 89) emphasised 
the role of the party in directing social behaviour. 
It has already been maintained that Lenski accepts a view of people 
as self-seeking. This assumption is consistent with that advanced 
by functionalism. It may be demonstrated by the theory of 
stratification presented by Davis and Moore in which egoistic, 
self-seeking natures are controlled by the institutional structure 
of society. Lenski (1966 : 26) supports this assertion by pointing 
out that research reveals the human infant as an extremely self-
centred creature who is motivated entirely by a desire to satisfy 
his/her own needs and desires. As children become socialised into 
the world of other people, they learn the norms of the group. The 
inculcation of the norms of the group, leads to a commitment towards 
the distributive and institutional structure'. 
On the political commitment of the population, Lenski (1966 : 54) 
maintains: "Though the majority may become politically active in 
a significant way for a brief time in a revolutionary era, the 
necessity of securing a livelihood quickly drives most from the 
poli tical arena. The affairs of state in any civilised ,society, 
and in many that are not, are directed by a small minority. The 
majority are apolitical. Even in popular democracies the vast 
majority do no more than cast a ballot at infrequent intervals. The 
formulation of public policy and the various other tasks required 
by the system are left in the hands of a tiny minority. This 
greatly facilitates the task of a new regime- as it seeks to make 
the transition from the rule of might into the rule of right'~ 
Lenski acknowledges that altruistic action is possible but believes 
that it is extremely infrequent at the level of major social 
decisions. We could infer that Lenski's human being is rarely free 
and voluntary but rather is usually determined by his/her innately 





social structure. The curbing of the individual can lead to the 
estrangement or alienation of the self. The nature of the 
distributive system also creates barriers between different 
interest groups. 
Furthermore, society as a social system translates beliefs and 
cognitions about ultimate reality into cultural values underpinning 
its social order and orientating peoples' behaviour in the physical 
world. This has implications for the theory of evolution. It 
means that we must focus on the cultural system in order to detect 
fundamental sources of general societal evolution. Since evolutionary 
advance is associated with the development of technology and the 
nature of the distributive system we can expect the progressive 
differentiation of the cultural system to be a significant indicator 
of evolutionary social change. 
2.1 Influences on the formation of attitude 
The following is a summary of the influences on the formation of 
attitude, derived from the theoretical discussion: 
2.1.1 Conflicting social interests 
Lenski's synthesis attempts to explain the operation of social 
classes. Competitive group and individual interests are curbed by 
the institutional st~ucture. Are individualistic group interests 
being curbed by institutions? 
2.1.2 Perceived legitimacy 
In order to be perceived as legitimate the eXisting rule must be 
seen as the rule of right. To what extent is force being replaced 
by institutionalised power that is socially acceptable? 
2.1.3 Experienced repression 
The rule of might is characterised by a number of phases. During 
particular repressive phases organised resistance is either destroyed 
or suppressed. How widespread is repression experienced? 
., 
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Exclusion ~rom socio-political processes 
When power is unevenly distributed among racial groups the minorities 
that are excluded from the socio-political processes will have to 
accommodate themselves. To what extent have people accommodated 
themselves to exclusion? 
Interchanges with the environment 
The structure o~ a system and its environment must be distinguished 
from processes within the system and in interchange between the 
system and its environment. To what extent do environmental 
interchanges affect social attitudes? 
Consciousness 
Members o~ a particular class stand in a similar position with 
regard to interests and in opposition to classes who do not share 
these interests. ~onsciousness is an outcome of human association. 
To what extent is consciousness fundamentally determined by race, 
class and sex? 
Collective action 
When opportunities for individual mobility are insufficient, people 
often resort to collective action as a means of obtaining the 
rewards they seek, thus generating class struggles. Do people believe 
that collective action facilitates changes? 
Gradual adaptation 
Adaptation to specific conditions, results in tremendous cultural 
diversity among societies. To what extent have people adapted to 
their segregated existences? 
Di~rusion under dominance 
/ 
Each successive higher culture type because of its greate,r 
adaptability, tends, at the expense of lower types to spread 
further and faster than previous types. To what exte~t is western 
culture extending its dominance and infl~ing attitudes /of minorities? 
To what extent has there been a diffusion of ruling class ideas? 
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2.1.10 Deprivation 
Groups of individuals experience deprivation of privilege and 
prestige due to their position in the distributive system. The 
extent to which deprivation is experienced by particular classes 
and class systems will need to be addressed. 
2.1.11 Political exposure 
The perceptions of the organisations and structures indicate 
political awareness of elements facilitating transformation of the 
stratification system. What is the extent of political exposure at 
thi~ particular moment? 
2.1.12 eo.mitment 
The inculcation of the norms of the group leads to a commitment to 
the institutional structure. Are peo~le committed to the existing 
social structures or does socio-political apathy exist? 
2.1.13 Alienation 
The self-seeking nature of people and curbing by the norms of the 
social structure can lead to alienation. To what extent do people 
experience alienation? 
2.1.14 Influential contact 
In modern industrial societies. political leaders have immense 
powers available to them. particularly in periods of crisis. Is 
leadership visible? What of political organisations? 
2.1.15 Culture 
The cultural system will allow detection of the major sources of 
general societal evolution. Though not synonymous. the different 
races exhibit different cultural orientations. To what extent does 
culture affect attitude? 
/ 
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2.2 The theoretical analytical framework 
An analytical scheme is presented which takes into account the 
points and questions summarised from previous discussions of 
theories. 
The indicators of social attitudes will be used extensively; however, 
age will not exert as strong an influence as the remaining three 
indicators. Age would affect the favourability towards particular 
methods of change but would not rate as a fundamental indicator of 
social attitude. Furthermore, of the remaining three indicators, 
the ' significance of gender, whilst it is brought into play, is not 
emphasised as often as the relationship between race and class. 
This is not to undermine gender as an instrumental indicator but to 
take cognisance of the fact that theory on the inextricable 
relationship between race, class and sex has not . advanced far enough 
within the field of social change. 
2.3 The resource mobilisation theory 
the role of organisations located within a broad mass social movement 
will be emphasized. The resource mobilisation theory explains the 
emergence and development of social movements in terms of the 
resources available to the discontented groups. The assumption 
here is that whilst there is possibly always enough discontent 
on the grassroots level of a society for the formation of a social 
movement, the deciding factor is whether there are leaders present 
to organise effectively and whether these leaders have power and 
resources to mobilise followers (Goodman and Mar~, 1978 : 276). 
The final interpretation of the data will be done with reference 
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METHODS USED FOR GATHERING EMPIRICAL DATA 
1. A REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
An extensive literature survey was conducted at the initial stage 
of the study. Information was collated from sources at different 
universities and research institutes. Reviewing attitudes discovered 
in past studies was a necessary procedure for the researcher since 
it provided guidelines for the construction of the theoretical 
framework and for the interview schedule. The literature survey 
as the first stage of the research process was essential as a link 
between the theory and the empirical research facets of the study. 
2. CONSULTATION WITH AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
Since South Africa's political environment is so dynamic. it is 
small wonder that many individuals and organisations are now 
studying attitudes and social change. The problem is that many of 
the research findings contradict and negate each other. This is 
probably because of: 
1. the origins of the institutes through which they are conducted 
ego CASS (Centre for Applied Social Sciences) and IBR 
(Institute for Black Research); and 
2. the position from which they are articulated. eg .• whether they 
are state-supportive or anti-system in nature. 
Thus. discussions with researchers. academics. community workers and 
activists. were imperative in order to gain clearer inSights into 
how the schedule should be constructed and what the contemporary 
socio-political issues within the communities are. Further discussions 
were held with political. civic. church and youth groups. Some 
discussions were held with members of the community in a relatively. 
unstructured manner. This type of consultation contributed directlY I 
to the structuring of the questionnaire. 
/ 
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3. THE METIIOD OF EMPIRICAL DATA COLLECTION 
The intention of the study is to compare t he attitudes of different 
Black communiti es towards strategies f or s ocial change. The social 
survey was r egarded as the most appropriate method to collect 
empirical data because it lends i tself to large scale applications, 
it is reasonably controllable and it is compatible with 
representative sampling. The question of "equivalence of meaning" 
as it pertains to cross-societal or cross-community research is 
raised by Marsh (1967 : 271). Marsh points out that using identical 
formal procedures to compare different societies may produce 
functionally non-equivalent meanings and results. Since the survey 
was conducted in the English and Zulu languages, the question of 
whether equivalence in meaning would result had to be contended with. 
The author attempted to resolve possible misunderstandings by: 
1. having the Zulu translations checked by individuals in the 
Department of Zulu, University of Durban-Westville, who pointed 
out contradictions and ambiguities in meaning; 
2. by determining the questions of the survey from an understanding 
of observable characteristics of all three communities and by 
counter-checking with all available material at hand the 
relevance of the particular questions to the required data; 
and 
3. by examining the results of the pilot study to see whether 
differences observed would be as a result of ambiguities in 
meaning. 
There are three types of surveys available, nart)ely, the: 
1. objective survey; 
2. descriptive survey; and 
3. projective survey (Davis, 1971 80). 
Since descriptive surveys are not intended to discover causal 
relationships but rather aim to describe phenomena in detail, they 
present questions allowing respondents to answer freely in their 
own words (Simon, 1978 : 192; Davis, 1971 : 80). Projective 
91. 
surveys present abstract situations requiring the respondent to 
analyse and comment on them. The objective survey was preferred 
since it presents a question and a choice of answers in such a way 
that respondents mere ly mark the answer that is their choice. A 
survey structured in this manner facilitates comparison of the 
different communities as well as the interpretation of the data. 
The survey used the interview schedule as a data gathering technique. 
Although the cost in terms of money and time is high, this was seen 
as the most useful technique since the questions in the schedule 
required substantial explanation and constant probing which would 
have been difficult with the use of any other technique. Furthermore, 
within face-to-face situations the researcher and other fieldworkers 
were able to cross-check information about social class, income, 
age and other specific information that may have been prone to 
exaggeration. The other techniques that were not seen as suitable 
were-; 
1. the mailed questionnaire; and 
2. telephonic interviewing. 
The mailed questionnaire, whilst cheaper, always poses the difficulty 
of obtaining a reasonable random sample size. It was envisaged that 
because of the socio-political nature of the interview schedule, 
the "silent majority" would then not respond but only individuals 
with strong beliefs, thus providing a biased result. The telephone 
interview was seen as unsuitable specifically because many Black 
people, towards whom the survey was directed, do not have telephones 
(Simqn, 1978 : 193; Bailey, 1982 : 15). 
The interview schedule was divided into four parts: 
Part 1 
Part 2 
This comprised questions 1 to 8 and gathered 
biographical data on the respondents. 
This comprised questions 9 to 11 and gathered data 




This comprised statements 12 to 17 and gathered data 
on socio-political consciousness. 
This comprised statements 18 to 67 and gathered 
data on attitudes towards strategies and beliefs 
about the contemporary situation in South Africa. 
4. DETERMINANTS ' OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES 
The way in which the determinants of social attitudes towards 
strategies for social change are related to the items in the 
questionnaire can be briefly indicated. 
4.1 Culture 
The· entire study itself presupposes the existence of different 
cultural groupings by comparing Africans, Indians and Coloureds. 
Thus, all questions in the schedule serve as reflections of these 
categories. Howeve~, more specific consideration has been given to 
this determinant. Statement 31 was included to test how complex 
the South African social situation is perceived to be. Statement 29 
was included to test community consciousness and to view peoples' 
understanding of broad community responses. Statement 55 was 
designed to question whether people thought it necessary to develop 
their own culture within their own communities. Question 2, by 
delineating area, suggested the cultural background of the groups 
involved. 
4.2 Influential contact 
In ~~ Two and Three it is maintained that the initial contact 
between the colonizers and the indigenous people was one of dominance 
and subjugation. The social-psychological effects of this domination 
have affected Black perceptions of themselves and their relationships 
to one another. Statement 13 examines the extent to which people 
identify themselves as having suffered under apartheid. Statement 14 
examines the extent to which Blacks perceive themselves as inferior . 
Statement 9 tests organisational awareness and, most importantly, 
~ 
organisational support. Statements 9 and 10 test organisatlonal 
support and the belief in the progressiveness of certain organisations 
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capable of affecting change in the country. 
tests charismatic leadership. 
4.3 Political exposure 
State",ent 11 
Statements 9, 10, 11 and 12 would reflect the extent to which people 
are politically and socially aware. Statements 26 and 27 are 
useful indicators of people's faith in information received via the 
mass media. In line with the materialist framework upon which the 
theoretical formulations rest, the extent to which people perceive 
their interests as antagonistic to that of the ruling class is 
examined. Statements 18 to 66, all examine socio-political attitudes, 
thus reflecting this perception. Statement 67, in particular, looks 
at the extent to which communication between different groups take 
place. 
4.4 Conflicting social interests 
Questions 6, 7 and 8 are important indicators of the social status 
of Black people. The occupation, income and educational level of a 
person is a clear indicator of that person's social position/status 
within the community, and in society at large. Statements 32, 33 
and 56 refer to "power-sharing" that has occurred and aims to test 
responses to this situation. Statements 50, 51 and 52 are aimed at 
testing whether peoples' allegiances are closer to the trade unions 
or to political organisations. 
4.5 Exclusion from socio-political processes 
Statement 12 examines whether people who are frustrated and alienated 
because of the social situation in this country and who can afford 
it are considering leaving the country. 
Statementq 15, 16 and 17 examine the extent to which people resent 
being disenfranchised and discriminated against. Responses in the 
previous section ~n conflicting social interests would provide some 
insight into whether partial inclusion of two race groups into the 
socio-political~esses was perceived as unifying or destructive to 
unity. Statement 24 questions whether united action or collective 
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behaviour can be viewed as a means to overcome exclusion. 
Statement 41 addresses the question of one person-one vote and 
through the responses here, an indication of whether or not people 
view the present structure as perpetuating exclusion becomes 
evident. 




The repression that people may experience both psychologically and 
physically will inevitably shape their responses and beliefs. Since 
this study is being conducted under the state of emergency, 
precautions are taken to ensure that the responses are true 
reflections of peoples attitudes. This will be elaborated on at a 
later stage. Here it is noted that three questions refer specifically 
to ' this situation, namely, Statements 20, 21 and 30. Statement 20 
questions whether people believe that they would invite difficulties 
merely by talking about their positions. Statement 21 defines a 
broader position on detentions. Statement 30 questions whether 
people feel that the socio-politica1 situation has been aggravated 
to such an extent that it could lead to violent revolution. 
Collective action 
Resistance 
Three types of resistance are broadly defined: Collaborative 
opposition, evolutionary resistance and revolutionary resistance. 
Statements 34, 46 and 57 refer to the first. Statements 48, 49 
and 61 refer to the second, whilst 53 and 65 refer to the third. 
These are historical responses that shape perceptions and provide 
guidelines for what action is possible and desirable in the future. 
Mass pressure 
Here, biological and physi9al factors, dictate, in part, the pace 
of change. Statement 22 addresses this issue. Statement 24 





4.8 Perceived legitiaacy 
Statement 18 questions whether the present government can create 
acceptable reforms. Statement 25 assesses the peoples' perceptions 
of governmental reform, whilst Statement 19 probes whether Black 
people perceive fundamental changes coming about with a change in 
White government. Statements 35, 57 and 58 question whether 
government position on the issue of the SADF cross border raids, the 
present structure of the tricameral parliament and the question of 
conditions of negotiations, are viewed as legitimate. 
4.9 eo.mitment 
4.10 
Sta~ement 23 questions apathetic responses to change. The extent 
to which certain race groups are more content with the existing 
social situation has been assessed through comparative analysis. 
The commitment to change possessed by UXtivi~ and groups shapes 
the socio-political thinking and behaviour alike. Historically, 
people have viewed political organisations and in more industrialised 
nations, trade unions, as being vehicles for change. The extent to 
which people view these as effective organisations will be the extent 
to which they will commit themselves to supporting these organisations. 
Statements 51 and 52 measure peoples perceptions of the organisations' 
effectiveness. 
Interchanges with the environment 
To avoid pressure existing within the country, some people are 
considering leaving the country. Statement 12 examines the extent 
to which Black people are considering leaving the country. Statement 
37 exposes an internal formation of attitude in response to an 
external, international belief. Statements 39 and 40 examine the 
effects and understanding of the effects of disinvestment. 
I Statement 47 looks at Natal's relationship with the rest of the 
\. 
/ 
country. The extent to which people within Natal view Natal as 
being in a position to resolve its problems by itself is questioned. 




The extent to which people can offer views that they believe are 
similar to those of their communities, would indicate the community 
consciousness that exists. Statement 29 examines the extent to 
which people believe the tricameral parliament is supported/not 
supported by the broader community. Statements 36, 38 and 43 
further test this consciousness - the extent to which people can 
offer positive or negative responses will be the extent to which 
they believe that they understand the community. Statement 64 
tests more directly the political consciousness of the individuals 
concerned; if they have clarified a political position then they 
will be able to respond positively or negatively. 
4.12 Diffusion under dominance 
4.13 
Statements 31, 33 and 41 question whether individuals have inculcated 
dominant thinking on political behaviour, ie., whether they support 
the dominant groups' evolved institutions or whether they subscribe 
to more universalistic demands. Statement 66 examines whether 
despite rejection of many of the institutional structures, people 
still have faith in government commissions of inquiry. The extent 
to which Black people view outlawed organisations or advocates of 
rapid change, in the same way that the White electorate does, will 
be established by Statements 42 and 44. 
Alienation 
Statement 67 examines the extent to which Black people communicate 
and interact with each other. Living segregated lives created 
alienation and misperceptions of different experiences of the various 
communities. Linked to this are the different community responses 
to Statement 54. What attitudes do African peoples have towards 
~ Bantustan independence? Do Indian and Coloured people subscribe 
to similar attitudes? If not, are those differences a result of 
racial alienation? In a Marxian sense, once alienation is accentuated, 
th~hardships posed by capitalism as an economic system becomes 
increaJingly evident. Statement 6~ tests this consciousness with 
Statement 63 questioning whether socialism would be perceived as an 
alternative. 
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4.14 Gradual adaptation 
The extent to which people have adapted to constraints within the 
South African environment will be measured by Statements 20 and 21 . 
Statement 28 tests whether, despite the violence and unrest, Black 
people still believe that we may gradually evolve into an 
acceptable, democratic system through peaceful means. For those 
individuals who have adapted to the South African situation, 
criticisms of the government arise through lack of understanding 
of a concrete, complex reality. Statement 31 tests this attitude 
whilst Statement 45 examines the extent to which all existing 
organisations within the country are viewed as being legitimate and 
representative enough to constitute a National Convention. 
4.15 Deprivation 
Deprivation shapes, subdues and nourishes attitudes, particularly 
those of a socio-political nature. Whilst Black people have 
historically endured constraints entrenched within a racially 
stratified society, to what extent do Black people perceive the 
system as being unjust? Statement 13 thus, questions at a basic 
level, the extent of deprivation perceived. The leadership of 
prominent Black political organisations have emanated from the 
universities and local schools. Boycotts of Black tertiary 
institutions by students in response to broader socio-political 
situations have become regular occurrences in South Africa. To 
what extent are these protest actions the consequences of deprivation, 
and is this particular tactic understood by the community. 
Statement 59 addresses this issue. Statement 60 questions more 
directly the issue of frustration at the ?enial of political rights. 
5. SOCIO-POLITICAL STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 
The schedule also distinguishes between intra-parliamentary and 
extra-parliamentary responses as means toward social change. 
This is related to items in the schedule as follows: 
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5.1 Intra-Parliamentary evolutionary responses 
(i) Existing parliamentary structures accepted: 
17.3; 32; 33; 29; 56 
(ii) Existing social structures accepted: 
17.2; 62; 63 
(iii) Legislation accepted: 
17.1; 21; 44 
(iv) Mi"litary defence of existing structures: 
35; 36 
(v) Commissions of inquiry as means to change: 
66 
5.2 Extra-Parliaaentary evolutionary responses 
(i) Self-interested collaboration: 
18; 31; 54 
(ii) Collaborative opposition: 
34; 46; 57 
(iii) Non-collaboration: 
12; 24; 64 
(iv) Trade union action: 
49; 50; 52 
(v) Economic measures: 
39; 40 
(vi) Independent political structures: 
45; 47 
(vii) Negotiated change: 
42; 43; 58 
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5.3 Extra-parliamentary revolution~y response 
(i) Conflict based change: 
38; 53; 65 
6. SCORING OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
The statements on all the indicators were listed in schedule items 
13 to 66 and respondents were asked to choose among five response 
categories for each item. The scale used in these items is the 
Likert scale. The essence of the Likert technique is to increase 
the variation in the possible scores, by coding from "strongly 
agree" to "strongly disagree" (Bailey, 1982 : 365). A scale is 
computed for each respondent. If person A makes a very high score 
and person B a very low score, then the age, sex, race and class 
of the person can be considered to explain the differences. 
Further, their answers to all questions can be compared to see if 
there is any single question that the persons with the two very 
evident scores answered identically. 
Within the context of extra-parliamentary evo1ut'ionary change, 
positive statements indicating a high level of agreement to such 
a strategy for change can be-illustrated as follows: 
Passive resistance by the communities 
gives rise to significant change 
Strongly Agree .•.••..•....•• 5 
Agree ...................... 4 
Undec i ded •...•....•••....•• 3 
Disagree .•....•..•.••...... 2 
Strongly Disagree •.•...•..• 1 
/ 
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Within the context of extra-parliamentary revolutionary change, 
negative statements indicating a high level of disagreement to 
such a strategy for change can be illustrated as follows: 
Armed struggle should not be used to bring 
about change 
Strongly Agree ............... 1 
Agree ....................... 2 
Undecided ................... 3 
Disagree .................... 4 
Strongly Disagree ......•..•. 5 
Within the context of intra-parliamentary evolutionary change, 
positive statements indicating a high level of agreement to such a 
strategy of change can be illustrated as follows: 
The reform programme initiated by the 
government should be supported since it 
is moving us in the right direction 
Strongly Agree .............. 5 
Agree ...................... 4 
Undecided •.....•...•.•••••. 3 
Disagree ................... 2 
Strongly Disagree ......••.. 1 
The scoring of each question can be observed by referring to the 
schedule which is attached as addendum A of this study. 
This procedure is in line with 8ailey's advice (1982 : 365-366), 
that in a Likert scale, researchers should code all responses so 
that a higher score on a particular item indicates a strong 
agreement with the attitude being scaled. This means that the 
researcher must code 5 for strong agreement with a positive statement 
or strong agreement with a negative one, and code 1 for strong 






a negative one. A scale is then computed for each respondent 
by summing his or her score on all questions. Items 1 to 12 and 
item 67, comprised some fixed alternative, three scale and open-
ended questions and statements which were individually analysed. 
7. PROBLEMS POSED BY THE SURVEY 
7.1 Response rate 
A survey deals with a large representative sample from a population 
and thus permits inference from the sampled data to the population. 
It is thus imperative that the sample main~ its representativeness 
which may be affected severely when a substantial portion of the 
respondents fail to participate in the study (Lin, 1976 : 241). The 
interview schedule which is administered personally by fieldworkers, 
was used to minimise the possibility of a poor response rate. 
However, the political overtone of the interview schedule could 
have resulted in reluctance on the part of respondents to answer 
freely and honestly. Interviewers therefore constantly reiterated 
the confidential and academic nature of the survey to encourage a 
greater willingness on the part of the respondents to provide . 
complete and honest answers. 
7.2 Lack of dynamics 
Lin (1976 : 243) points out that the survey presents a "frozen" 
slice of reality; that is, data are collected at one point in time. 
Whilst it is true that the data may be collected from geographic 
cross-sections and from different strata composed of different groups 
of persons defined according to race, sex, class and age, such a 
comparison makes sense only in terms of one point in time and does 
not provide a view of how things became what they are and how things 
will be in the future. 
In this particular study, Chapters One, Two and Three locate 
historically the defined problem, and attempt to link up and provide 
insight into the processes that gave rise to the present development 
of social and political attitudes and the consequent socio-political 
behaviour. 
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The present study was completed on the eve of the effective banning 
in early 1988 of the UDF, COSATU and fifteen other legal-democratic 
extra-parliamentary organisations. The research shows that the 
organisations affected are amongst the most widely supported in 
Natal, ~ as a~~ to advance the quality of life of Black 
people in South Africa. 
The silencing of these particular organisations will, in addition to 
drastically reducing the potential for negotiation, increase the 
polarisation between contending forces. 
It seems unlikely that the present study could have been completed 
if the restrictions had been implemented before the fieldwork was 
finished. The importance of the intervening period within which 
this study was completed must be emphasised, that is, the time 
before the restrictions on organisations, before the escalation of 
township violence and before the devastating floods which would have 
made access to people in the areas extremely difficult. 
The researcher contends that even should there be continuing violence, 
further detentions and bannings, socio-political attitudes will not 
be significantly affected. The fear and reluctance to express social 
attitudes and political sympathies will certainly increase, but the 
fundamental demands, beliefs and aspirations will not change. 
With proper training and execution, the survey remains the most 
powerful method of data collection available to the social researcher 
to infer results from a sample to a population. 
8. TRAINING THE INTERVIEWER/FIELDWORKER 
Just as there is no standard surveyor interview, so there can be 
no ~tandard training programme. The type and intensity of training 
will depend on the goals of the study, the number of interviewers, 
their previous experience, the availability of time and the difficulty 
of 7he questionnaire (Warwick et al, 1975 : 224). In this study, 
the interviewers chosen were students from various tertiary 
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institutions and community workers, all of whom lived in the 
delineated areas and all with previous experience in doing field 
work in the community. They were thoroughly trained for the field-
work especially with reference to the directions of Warwick et al 
(1975), Backstrom and Hirsch (1963), Chadwick et al (1984), and 
Johnson (1978). 
9 . 'l1iE PILOT STUDY 
A pilot study was conducted in which the entire survey procedure was 
tested. Since the researcher at the early stage had not fully 
trained the interviewers involved, she undertook to do the fieldwork 
herself. A random sample of 21 respondents revealed minor problems 
of ,design which were rectified at the early stages. It was at this 
point that the researcher formulated further explanations and 
definitions that the fieldworkers were to refer to during their 
field visits for the purposes of clarification and confirmation. 
10. CHOICE OF LOCALE AND SELECTION OF 'l1iE SAMPLE 
The quantitative method used in this study involved, as already 
indicated, largely the objective survey as a method of research. 
The population was chosen in terms of nine broad areas . The areas 
defined were within the Durban Functional Region (DFR) and 
represented homogenous groupings comprising Africans, Indians and 
Coloureds. 
The extent of a city is often defined by municipal boundaries. In 
practice, however, there are usually a considerable number of 
communities living relatively far awaY,from the Central Business 
District and beyond the municipal boundaries. The term DFR which 
is used by a number of research institutes including the Urban 
Foundation and Built Environment Research Group, is defined as 
including people and communities who: 
1. 
2 . 
work and shop in the city or surrounding areas; and 
identify themselves as living "in Durban". 
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The map shows the approximate boundaries of the DFR and, in 
diagrammatic form, the major residential areas (City Engineers' 
Dept., 1987). 
MAP 1 
(Se'e page 105) 
Since the Durban population is perceived as fairly heterogenous as 
a whole, the simple random sampling method on its own was seen as 
inappropriate. A stratified random sample recognises the composition 
of strata which represent different types of individual groups. 
This implied that the three sub-populations would have to be 
equalised to facilitate comparisons. 
Since the intention of the researcher was not only to compare the 
three areas, but to ascertain socio-political attitudes of Blacks 
in Durban towards social change in South Africa, the proportional 
stratified sampling procedure was seen as the most appropriate. 
Durban contains significantly more Africans than Indians and 
Coloureds, thus this group's attitudes would have to weigh more 
heavily in terms of defining Durban's attitudes. To equalise the 
population in terms of these three groups would culminate in a 
biased result. 
The proportional stratified design combined with cluster sampling 
was seen to be the answer to the problem. The first step here was 
to effect a separation of the several elements in the total 
population and then to select from each of the individual groups, 
three clusters that proportionately represent different class 
interests existent in that racial group. 
Clusters within each stratum were decided upon after it was discovered 
that the three areas, ie., African, Indian and Coloured were difficult 
to compare because of the differences in social indexes that existed 
when comparing single areas. Since most areas are distinguished as 
being upper class, middle-class or working class it was seen as 
necessary to extract clusters that appear to comprise these particular 
11'/ /) I .ct 1'/ 
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class interests. The cluster would represent the class sectors of 
the community proportionately, eg., since African people comprise 
largely of a working class/lower stratum component, the cluster 
comprising this group would be far larger than the cluster comprising 
an upper-middle class sector. Hence, each racial stratum would 
then be a true reflection of the particular population group. The 
process of combining two or more sampling techniques is known as 
multi-stage sampling (Lin. 1976 : 154). 
10.1 Selection of areas 
Three African, Indian and Coloured areas each were chosen allowing 
for .representation of 
1. upper middle class; 
2. middle class; and 
3. working class elements. 
However, these classifications were more evident in the Indian and 
Coloured areas than the African areas. 
Thus the population was stratified proportionately because of the 
existing differences in terms of population figures. It was further 
stratified in terms of race. Finally, within each racial category, 
cluster sampling was necessary to accentuate class and social mobility 
diff~es. The areas were not chosen randomly. They were purposively 
selected on two grounds. First, taking into account the present 
accessibility of the areas (due to the volatile nature of unrest in 
the townships) and second, taking into account class factors, ie. 
which of the accessible areas represent different class interests. 
Hence, at this stage, a non-probability sampling technique was 
utilised. According to Selltiz et al (1959 : 535-536) if sampling 
is carried out in a series of stages, it is possible to combine 
probability and non-probability sampling in one design and still 
retain a representative sample with a valid generalisation of 
inferences from sample to population, within limits of error. ~ The 
/ 
present sampling plan complies with Selltiz et al's description. 
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The nine areas chosen were as follows: 
African Areas 
1 . Umlazi (Upper Middle Class) 
2 . Lamontville (Middle Class) 
3 . Clermont (Working Class) 
Indian Areas 
1 . Reservoir Hills (Upper Middle Class) 
2 . Overport (Middle Class) 
3 . Chatsworth (Working Class) 
Coloured Areas 
1 . Greenwood Park (Upper Middle Class) 
2. Newlands East (Middle Class) 
3. Wentworth (Working Class) 
The rest of the stages were conducted according to probability 
sampling principles. Within each area a socially defined cluster 
was drawn in which the simple random technique was used . 
The researcher acquired the following statistics from the publication 
of the City Engineer's Department , "Durban Focus" (May , 1987) : 
Durban Functional Region 
Total 3 514 186. 
Whites 316 591 
Coloureds 63 929 
Indians 552 819 
Africans (Formal Areas) 849 285 
Africans (Informal Areas) 1 731 562 
.  
Previous figures such as those reflected in the Population Census 
<Central Statistical Agency, 1985 : 37) , appear to seriously 
underemunerate the African sector.: 
/ 
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Durban Metropolitan ( I ncluding Pinetown and Inanda) 
Total 634 301 
Whites 173 863 
Coloureds 54 465 
Indians 372 000 
Africans 33 973 
Beall et al (1986 : 6), in defining Natal spatially, maintain that 
because of the excessive under-enumeration of the 1980 census 
especially with regard to the African population of South Africa, it 
is not possible to give more than an indication of the population of 
the region. In this study the Durban City Engineers Department 
figures for the DFR are accepted as the most valid available . 
Bodies such as the Urban Foundation and Built Environment Study 
Group also use these statistics . 
With a population of 3 514 186 people in the Durban Functional Region 
and 3 197 595 Black people, the ratio of African, Indian and Coloured 
people is 40,5 : 8 , 5 : 1. 
Developing a proportional but manageable sample based on the above 
ratio's would result in the construction of a sample with too few 
Indians and Coloureds to ascertain reliable characteristics . Thus, 
in keeping with a proportional stratified design, the ratio 
3 : 2 : 1 was utilised. On selecting a number of cases from 
different strata it became necessary to adjust the findings in 
accordance with the ratio 40,5 : 8,5 
the population could be made. 
1 before final inference to 
According to a table developed by Backstrom and Hirsch (1963 : 33), 
and confirmed by Arkin and Colton (1964), a sample size of 267 
r espondents is needed to attain a 95% confidence limit, and a 5% 
margin of error. Thus, to ensure that 95 elements out of 100 
would contain the population value in an interval within 6% in 
either direction of the estimate, it was decided to multiply the 
employed ratio's by 60 in order to make up the total sample number 
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of 267. This number was exceeded, thus making allowance for 
possible wastage of sample elements. The larger sample size allowed 
for incorporation of a greater number of elements within the clusters, 
thus facilitating the representation of different class interests. 




(3 x 60) 
(2 x 60) 







A tolerated error of 6% is claimed, although the sample size comes 
close to 384 elements which Backstrom and Hirsch (1963 : 40) 
indicate as necessary for a 5% tolerated error. 
10.2 Saaple elements from each area 
The number of elements chosen from each area were based on an 
approximation of the class strata within the Black areas. In 
practice, there is insufficient data to specifically quantify the 
exact ratios in this respect, but their existence can be empirically 
observed by referring to styles of life in different residential 
areas: 
1. Within the African areas it is clear that the majority of the 
people belong to the labouring class, with "a small but 
significant middle class and an established upper middle class. 
Each "class group" has tended to congregate within a certain 
residential area, and these areas were used as indicators of 
class membership. 
2. Within the Indian areas, the majority of the people are still 
working class. However, there is an expanding upper middle 
and lower middle :·class representing the entrepeneurial and 
professional sectors. Again residential areas are used to 
define class membership. 
/ 
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3. The comparatively small Coloured population in Durban also has 
a relatively large working class population. With constant 
social mobility, however, middle and upper middle class 
populations have appeared, and these are also identified with 
reference to residential area. 




Umlazi (upper middle class sector) 
Lamontville (middle class sector) 
Clermont (working class sector) 
Indians: 
Reservoir Hills (upper middle class sector) 
Overport (middle class sector) 
Chatsworth (working class sector) 
Coloureds: 
Greenwood Park (upper middle class sector) 
Newlands East (middle class sector) 













It must be emphasised that the ar~as were not differentiated for the 
purposes of comparison within themselves but were viewed as segments 
of a composite whole, eg., i~ the case of the Coloured population 
. / ' 
the purpose is not to co~pare Greenwood Park with Newlands East or 
111. 
Wentworth (since the number of e lements is too small). Rather, 
they are vi ewed as a composite whol e , but one in which the various 
class/income strata are all repres ented in an approximation of their 
actual ratio. Bailey (1982 : 100) maintains that 30 elements are 
sufficient for the purposes of inference. 











Representation and accessibility~--~-J 
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10.3 Area profiles 




This study was conducted against a background of instability and 
social turbulence. A series of sporadic conflicts in the townships 
are surfacing and receding. 
The fieldwork for this study was conducted during June-August 1987, 
a period which included June 16 (Soweto Day) and June 26 (Freedom 
Day). This together with the overriding implications of the state 
of emergency, led to the survey being undertaken under extremely 
trying conditions. 
The- three African areas chosen: Clermont, Um1azi and Lamontville, 
represent three urban areas with some degree of social mobility. 
Clermont is one of half a dozen urban areas in the country offering 
freehold land rights to Africans. In Clermont one observes rows of 
single room homes, some well built but most constructed of second 
hand material, cardboard and beer cartons. There are well built 
blocks of flats, small cottages and large houses all grouped 
together alongside shabby underdeveloped roads. It was housing 
that was the visible criterion for class categorisation. The 
majority of the houses were shack settlements, with the larger well-
built houses rented and occupied by a number of families. This area 
was seen as useful for examining working class attitudes. 
Clermont's spatial distribution caused some problems for the 
researcher. Since the houses were so badly spaced and many had no 
house numbers, it was difficult to construct a random table of 
house numbers. With the assistance of the postmaster in Clermont, 
house numbers were provided with inconsistencies, discrepancies 
and omissions made clear to the researcher. Thus, the researcher 
was able to randomly select numbers from the simple random table. 
Houses and shack settlements without numbers were retained within a 
table and afforded a number, eg., 2nd from 3351 or 5th from 7210's 
left. 
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In Umlazi, Section 0 has a large number of self-built houses 
occupied by professional and business people. In Section A, white 
collar employees live in well built houses subsidised by their 
employers. This implies that Umlazi is appropriate to study the 
most affluent group of Afr ican people. 
At the fieldwork stage, the administration of the township of 
Umlazi fell under the Department of the Interior of the KwaZulu 
Government. The Township Manager, appointed by Pretoria, and 
seconded to the KwaZulu Government, was 'effectively in control. It 
was through the township manager's office that information on the 
structure of the area was obtained. A cluster of houses were 
called a section. The sections were ordered and given codes such 
as AA, A, BB, B, C, 0, etc. There were no street names nor house 
numbers. The researcher had to randomly select streets with the 
aid of a map (and number the randomly chosen streets independently). 
All houses were given numbers as in the case of the few omitted 
numbers in Clermont. 
In Lamontville, according to a study made by Padayachee (1985 
60), there exists an average of 1,36 earners and almost one 
unemployed person per household. Households were crowded; 6,36 
persons on average and dependency burdens high. However, there were 
less shack settlements and more brick houses than in Clermont, so 
this area was appropriately selected to draw a middle-range group 
of individuals. 
Here, few technical problems were experienced. House numbers were 
obtained with the aid of the post office and the researcher went 
into the area to check the authenticity of the numbers given. 
However, it was here that one of the field workers was almost 
assaulted, being accused of being a police spy. 
10.3.2 Indian areas 
/ 
The Indian areas resemble to some extent social conditions existing 
. h / 
~n t ose of the Coloured areas. These areas have been unaffected 
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by sustained unrest as evident in the African townships, except 
during the Inanda/Phoenix unrest in 1985. 
In 1976, 83% of the Indians in South Africa were concentrated in 
Natal. As a consequence, Indians comprise 12,2% of Natal's 
population compared with only 2,9% of the South African population. 
A large concentration of this minority group is in the Durban 
Functional Region. 
Reservoir Hills, seen as one of the more elitist Indian areas in 
Durban, has a large proportion of Indian doctors, lawyers, business 
persons and other professional people. Hence, it was envisaged 
that this area would depict upper middle class attitudes. 
The researcher had no difficulty in constructing a sampling 
framework, since the household numbers were indicated on valuation 
rolls. After the numbers within clusters were randomly selected 
the researcher went into the area to check whether the numbers 
chosen existed in the field. Thus omissions and discrepancies 
were further rectified. 
Overport, distinguishes itself from other areas in its vicinity by 
containing mainly flats. Whilst Overport does contain many self-
built houses with laid out gardens, the majority of the people live 
as tenants in flats. 
A large number of people are seen as well-educated, with a significant 
proportion having had tertiary education. However, there appears 
to be also a considerable number of unemployed persons residing in 
the area. By and large, though, it could be reg~rded as an area 
that would reflect middle class attitudes. 
The valuation rolls gave an account of the number and names of flats 
in Overport. However, the flat numbers per building had to be 
ascertained through direct observation in the field on the part of 
the researcher, once the cluster was randomly chosen. 
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The Indian people have been affected more than any other group in 
South Africa by the Group Areas Act. By 1970, about 37 653 Indian 
famili es had been required to move which represented over 300 000 
of the total Ind i an population of about 624 000 at that time. The 
artificial pattern of mob i l i ty was the highest in Chatsworth, 
where over 70% o f heads of hcu:;eholds had been required to move 
(Sugden, 1978 : 37 ) . Chatsworth has since developed into the 
largest Indian area outside India. 
The typical Chatsworth home is a small but double storeyed brick 
house alongside the road, shared by at least two families. This 
area offers an adequate representation of the lower working class 
sector of the Indian population. With the assistance of valuation 
rolls and direct observation in Chatsworth, the sampling frame was 
constructed. 
10.3.3 Coloured areas 
Unlike the instability experienced in the African areas, the Coloured 
areas exhibit relative calm. 
In Natal, the Coloured community is a numerical and sociological 
minority. As such, the political cohesiveness or assertiveness 
of the group has never been clearly defined. As pointed out in 
Chapter Three, by 1984 almost 70% of this population in Durban did 
not belong to any organisation. 
The Coloured communities of Greenwood Park, Newlands East " and 
Wentworth represent three urban areas with less social mobility 
than segments of the African areas, but with a slightly higher 
d~gree of occupational mobility. The upper middle class area of 
Greenwood Park has well constructed buildings with a brick and tile 
dwelling on a plot large enough 
average house. 
to accommodate a garden for the 
Whilst Greenwood Park itself was identified as an upper middle 
class Coloured area there is also a strong middle class and to a . ~ 
lesser extent working class component. ~ larger proportion of its 
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population comprises professional people - doctors, lawyers, 
teachers and business persons. The 1985 census indicates that 
Greenwood Park has a significantly large "educated population". 
The researcher structured the sample frame with the aid of valuation 
rolls, maps and by visiting the area to observe whether any 
contradictions exist between the household numbers contained in the 
rolls and those that were apparent. 
Newlands East, on the other hand, was identified as a middle class 
to lower middle class area. There are a significantly large number 
of people working in the retail industry that live in that area. 
Most however, work in white-collar professions or do clerical work. 
Some are factory workers. 
A small percentage of Newlands East's income is earned in the area 
through self-employment, shop and shebeen-keeping and through 
vendoring. 
Whilst there are a fair amount of self-built houses, there are parts 
of the area that exhibit duplexes, semi-detached housing and the 
housing scheme homes. The household numbers did not pose any 
problems in the construction of the sampling frame. 
Austerville or Wentworth, as its inhabitants prefer it to be called, 
is a Coloured housing area about 11km south-east of Durban. It was 
proclaimed a Group Area in 1963 and rehoused Coloured people moved 
from areas such as Clairwood, Sea Cow Lake and Clare Estate. It is 
home to 40% of Durban's Coloured people. 
Meer (Daily News, April 15, 1987 : 15), described Wentworth as: "one 
of~ Durban's most depressed communities, a compound of both material 
and spiritual deprivation. Unemployment is high, educational 
achievements low. Almost one-fifth of the families live on less 
than R~OO a month. Over one-third of the babies in the community 
are born dut of wedlOCk. Alcoholism and ga~terism are rampant". 
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1 d An indication of A fair amount of the population are unemp oye • 
household income is given in the following table: 
TABLE 3 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
INCOME CHATSWORTH WENTWORTH 
RO 8 (10%) 3 (6%) 
Rl R200 8 (10%) 3 (6%) 
R201 R400 12 (15%) 12 (23%) 
R401 R600 17 (22%) 5 (10%) 
R601 Rl 000 18 (23%) 22 (42%) 
More than Rl 000 16 (20%) 7 (13%) 
AVERAGE R748,39 R775 ,11 
(CRU , 1986 16) . 
The average household incomes for Wentworth and Chatsworth are very 
similar (CRU, 1986 : 16) . From the above discussion it is clear 
that Wentworth qualifies without doubt as a low income , working 
class area. 
The researcher noted that many houses were not properly numbered and 
this was taken into consideration during the construction of the 
sampling frame . 
11 . DATA PROCESSING AND STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES ' 
11 • 1 Coding · 
After editing, the data were reduced to a suitable form for analysis. 
The main task of data reduction is coding. Coding for computer 
analysis generally consists of assigning a code number to each answer 
category so that the answers may be stored in the computer. All of 
the questions were precoded, e~cept question 9 which was post-coded. 
I . 
Then the relatively simple. but labor10us task of transferring codes 
from interview schedules on to data sheets was set about . 
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Open ended data resulting from open-ended questions, were not 
statistically or quantitatively analysed by the computer, but 
subjectively and qualitatively analysed by the researcher . 
regard to all other data, codes were transferred from the 
interviewer schedules pnto data sheets . 
With 
The data sheets were then given to a computer programmer who 
i dentified and functionally analysed the requirements . System 
software was used to: 
(a) define data elements; 
(b) build a file on disk (file size: 360 records; record 
length: 126 characters); and 
(c) set up a data file utility (DFU) programme to capture data 
directly on to the disk file. 
The data were then keyed from the data sheets directly onto the 
visual display unit . The captured data from the data sheets were 
inserted into the file. A computer printout was obtained . The 
printout was manually checked against the data sheets for possible 
errors incurred during the keypunching process . Hence, the data 
were edited, ensuring that the file was free of errors . 
The programme was written in RPGII and the system hardware was the 
IBM system 36. The programme was run against the disk file to 
produce the information required for statistical analysis . 
11 . 2 Stat ist i cal t echniques utilised t o addres s the hypotheses 
Bailey t1982 : 401-407) asserts that truth or falsity of a hypothesis 
are called inferential statistics, in contrast to descriptive 
statistics, which do not seek to make an inference but merely to 
provide a description of the sample data . 
A further distinction is made between parametric and non-parametric 
statistics . Non-parametric statistics are ~hose used when the 
/ 
variables being analysed can be classified on an ordinal scale. 
/ 
Interval measurement may not be assumed . Non-parametric statistics 
were used to address the hypotheses . 
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The statistics used in the present study are as follows: 
11.2.1 Chi square: 
With the chi square test of statistical significance we learn the 
probability that the observed joint distribution of cases would 
have happened by chance when no association exists between the two 
variables in the population. Actually. the chi square statistic 
itself is not a probability. but it can be converted into a 
probability figure which is called the significance level (Klecka 
et al. 1975 : 74). Hence. with chi square we measure the association 
between variables such as race. occupation. income. education. sex 
anq age on the one hand and favourability towards types of change on 
the other hand. The null hypothesis would suggest that no 
association exists between these variables. 
11.2.2 Spearman Rho: 
This is also called Spearman's coefficient of rank order (rs) and 
it is an ordinal level of association and measures the relationship 
or degree of correlation between variables. It has been used here 
to examine the relationship between the socio-political attitudes 
of the different race groups. 
11.2.3 Further measures of association: 
The median and frequency and percentage distributions are also used. 
11.2.4 Weighted mean: 
The number of responses in each category were multiplied by the 
appropriate numerical weighting; . the products were added and the 
sum divided by the total number who replied to the item. The result 
of this calculation is a measure of the overall direction and 
intensity of the degree of obligation felt. The weighted mean (Xw) 
ranges between 1 and 5. The closer Xw is to 5. the more obligatory 
the activity mentioned in the statement is felt to be. 
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11.2.5 Variance 
The variance (V) indicates the amount of agreement among respondents 
on the extent of the obligation. The smaller the variance the 
greater the consensus. 
Further inferences have been made through the examination of cross 








PRESENTATION OF ANALYSIS 
The analysis wi thin this Chapter is divided into t!1ree broad parts: 
1. Profile of the sample; 
2. Addressing the hypotheses; and 
3. Addressing theoretical issues discussed in Chapter Three. 
1. PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE 
The sample consisting of 360 elements contained: 
1.1 Race 
Africans 180 
From Umlazi 30 (Upper Middle Class) 
Lamontville 50 (Middle Class) 
Clermont 100 (Working Class) 
Indians 120 
From Reservoir Hills: 20 (Upper Middle Class) 
Overport 40 (Middle Class) 
Chatsworth 60 (Working Class) 
Coloureds 60 
From Greenwood Park 15 (Upper Middle Class) 
Newlands East 20 (Middle Class) 











Skilled worker 83 
Unskilled worker 29 
Student 66 
Other (Unemployed, housewife, 
pensioner) 39 
360 
Family income per annum 
Less than R3 000 65 
Between R3 000 R6 000 89 
Between R6 000", R10 000 81 
Between R10 000 R15 000 57 
Between R15 000 R25 000 42 
More than R25 000 26 
360 
It is from this particular subset of the population that the 
researcher is to generalise the results obtained to statements 
about the population. 
Educational qualifications 
None (and non-literate) 3 
None (and literate) 8 
Primary school education 25 
Junior secondary 77 ;. 
Senior secondary 189 ( 
Higher than Std 10 58 \' 






































2 . ADDRESSING THE HYPOTHESES ' 
In this section broad scores are given which will serve to test the 
validity of the working hypotheses formulated in Chapter One . 
The broad scores indicating favourability towards intra-parliamentary 
and extra-parliamentary strategies are as follows: 
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TABLE 4 
Distribution of Responses in terms of Support for 
Intrapar1iamentary Evolutionary Strategies and 
Assumptions 
SUPPORTIVE UNDECIDEjl UNSUPPORTIVE 
95 - 76 75 - 58 57 56 - 38 37 -





Freq. Totals % 
Median . 
14,17 4,17 56,67 25,00 
51 15 294 
14,20 4,20 81,60 
61 44 
Mean of. Total 61,65 45,20 
TABLE 5 
Distribution of Responses in terms of Support for 






Freq. Totals % 
Median 
SUPPORTIVE UNDECI DEjl UNSUPPORTIVE 
95 - 76 75 - 58 57 56 - 38 37 -43 265 10 42 -11,19 73,61 2,78 11,67 -
308 10 42 
Mean of Total 
85,55 2,78 11,67 







Tables 4 and 5 show that a far greater number of respondents 
supported extraparliamentary evolutionary strategies and assumptions 
than intraparliamentary strategies and assumpt i ons. The median in 
both instances compares qu i t e f avourably with the mean indicating 
further that a significant number of those supportive of intra-
parliamentary strategies are close to undecided whi l st a number of 
those supportive of extraparliamentary strategies are close to 
strongly supportive. The median of those unsupportive of extra-
parliamentary strategies and assumptions differs significantly from 
the mean of the total score. This indicates the combination of two 
extreme groupings - those unsupportive but close to undecided and 
those very strongly unsupportive . 
Hence the first working hypothesis i s tentat ively proved 
since Black (African, Indian and Coloured) urban communities do show 
preference for strategies for evolutionary change outside of those 
provided for by the formal state structure. 
The bro~d scores indicating favourability towards extraparliamentary 
revolutionary change are as follows: 
TABLE 6 
Distribution of Responses in terms of Support for 
Revolutionary Strategies and Assumptions 
SUPPORTIVE UNDECIDED UNSUPPORTIVE 
40 - 33 32 - 25 24 23 - 17 16 -





Freq. Totals % 
Median 
8,89 58,89 11,11 20,56 0,56 
244 40 76 
67,78 11,11 21,11 
27 . 23 
Mean of Total 31,62 20,36 I 
/ 
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When the broad scores indicating favourability towards revolutionary 
assumptions and strategies were reviewed, it was found that support 
for extraparliamentary evolutionary change was greater than support 
for revolutionary change (85,55% as opposed to 67,78%) (See: Table 
5 and Table 6). 
When race was taken into consideration in comparing evolutionary 
and revolutionary change, the following were the results: 
TA~E 7 
AFRICANS: TYPE OF CHANGE FAVOURED 









Hence, the second working hypothesis is tentatively 
disproved since the indications are that a greater number of African 
respondents support evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. 
Similarly, the Indian and Coloured scores can be displayed in Tables 
8 and 9 as follows: 
TABLE 8 
INDIANS: TYPE OF CHANGE FAVOURED 









COLOUREDS: TYPE OF CHANGE FAVOURED 
Total: 60 




Revolutionary Change 35 
Hence the third working hypothesis is tentatively 
proved. Indians and Coloureds prefer evolutionary as compared to 
revolutionary social change. 
Spearman Rho was used -to test the degree of correlation between 
African and non-African attitudes and the results are shown in 
Tables 10, 11 and 12: 
o - 37 
38 - 56 
57 
58 - 75 
76 - 95 
TABLE 10 
Attitudes towards Intraparliamentary Change 
Cd) 
African R " Non African R - .~ R R , - . ~ 61 2 29 3 -1 
101 1 103 1 0 
3 4 12 4 0 
15 3 36 2 1 
(). 5 0 5 0 
1 
1 
Cd) = 0: d~ = 2 








Attitudes towards Extrapar1iamentary Change 
o - 37 
38 - 56 
57 
58 - 75 
76 - 95 












rs = 0,95 (strong agreement) 
TABLE 12 
(d) 
R R R .!l ;, - ;~ 
5 0 0 
2 1 1 
4 0 0 
1 0 0 
3 -1 1 
(d) = 0: d~ = 2 
Attitudes towards Revolutionary Change 
o - 16 
17 - 23 
24 
25 - 32 




















R.!l R, - R.2 
5 0 0 
2 0 0 
3 1 1 
1 0 0 
4 -1 1 
(d) = 0: d!). = 2 
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The ranking of the broad scores indicate correlation and not the 
qualitative differences that exist in terms of social attitude. 
Here, one can infer that the social attitudes of the different race 
groups are very similar. 
3. ORGANISATIONS WORKING TO IMPROVE THE LIVES OF BLACK PEOPLE 
In this section comparative attitudes towards social organizations 
are discussed. 
Tables 13, 14 and 15 reflect the frequency of responses to statement 
10 which required an indication of the organisations which 
respondents considered to be working to improve the lives of the 
Black people. 






Three of the five organisations can be seen as extraparliamentary 
organisations functioning until recently within South Africa at a 
legal-democratic level viz. COSATU, UDF and AZAPO. The fact that 
COSATU and the UDF are the two most popular fronts, shows further 
that there is a tendency amongst the African population in the 





AFRICANS: ORGANISATIONS WORKING TO IMPROVE LIVES 
STATEMENT 10 F % 
Religious 33 18,33 
Inkatha 64 35,55 
Sporting and Recreational 24 13,33 
Student / Youth 35 19,44 
NPP 12 6,66 
Labour Party 20 1,11 
UWUSA 63 35,00 
Welfare 27 15,00 
Wanens 19 10,05 
COSATU 96 53,33 
Solidarity 3 1,66 
Cultural 7 3,88· 
NIC 21 11,66 
UOF 93 51,66 
Garment Workers' Union 1 0,55 
Red Cross 7 3,88 
Health Care 2 1,11 
Legal Aid 1 0,55 
St. Johns Ambulance 3 1,66 
S.A.N.T.A. 1 0,55 
YMCA 1 0,55 
Urban Foundation 1 0,55 
Small Business Corporation 1 0,55 
W.B.O. 1 0,55 
Operation Hunger 3 1,66 
KwaZu1u Oeve1opment Corporation 1 0,55 
Natal Association for the Blind 1 0,55 
Medical Association of S.A. 1 0,55 
TUCSA 11 6,11 
AZAPO 38 21,11 ' 





INDIANS: ORGANISATIONS WORKING TO IMPROVE LIVES 
STATEMENT 10 F % 
UDF - 42 35,00 
NIC 34 28,33 
NPP 9 7,50 
Solidarity 8 6,66 
PFP 3 2,50 
BSRC 1 0,83 
KwaZulu Natal Indaba 2 1,66 
COSATU 30 25,00 
TUCSA 5 4,16 
AZAPO 8 6,66 
TIC 2 1,66 
ANC 10 8,33 
IBR 1 0,83 
Religious 12 10,00 
Cultural 6 5,00 
Unaffiliated Unions 3 2,50 
UWUSA 5 4,16 
Womens 2 1,66 
Student / Youth 4 3,33 
Inkatha 6 5,00 
Labour Party 3 2,50 
UCC 3 2,50 
Cheshire Homes 2 1,66 
Welfare 60 50,00 
Here, the 5 most popular organisations are: 




5. Religious Organisations 
Three of the five organisations are formidable e~traparliamentary 
organisations viz. UDF, NIC and COSATU. Welfare, although still 
partially subsidised and administered by the state (whil~t being 
privatised) cannot be seen as voluntarily state supportive. Neither 
can respondents supporting welfare organisatio~s be seen / as 
,/ 
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necessarily state supportive. Religious organisations cannot also 
be seen as state supportive. Islamic and Christian organisations 
to which Black people belong have a long-standing tradition of 
rejecting state initiatives. However, major Hindu religious bodLes 
which represent the majority of Indians in Natal, have been more 
collaborative with state initiatives than the other two. 
TABLE 15 
COLOUREDS: ORGANISATIONS WORKING TO IMPROVE LIVES 
STATEMENT 10 F % 
UOF 22 36,67 
UCC 9 7,50 
Wanens 14 23,33 
Youth 6 10,00 
Labour Party 3 5,00 
Religious 8 13,33 
Political 1 1,67 
Sporting 2 3,33 
KwaNatal Indaba 1 1,67 
Welfare 7 11,67 




























Here, the 5 most popular organisations are: 
1 . UDF 
2 . Women's Organisations 
3 . UCC 
4 . COSATU 
5 . Religious Organisations . 
Here again, three of the five organisations are sister organisations 
working outside of parliament . Whilst many women's organisations 
are not attached to political structures , most are aligning themselves 
to fronts , such as the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW), 
which are supportive of the UDF . Religious organisations here 
would be mainly church and some Islamic organisations , most of whom 
would probably not support state structures . 
Overall the five organisations perceived by Black (African, Indian 
and Coloured) respondents as working to improve the lives of Black 
people in South Africa are: 
1 . UDF 
2. COSATU 
3. Welfare Organisations 
4. Inkatha 
5. UWUSA 
The greater support for the UDF rather. than COSATU amongst Indians 
and Coloureds led to the UDF being seen as the most popular, with 
COSATU following. Increased amount of support for welfare 
organisations amongst the Indians led to it replacing Inkatha as 
the third most significant . Inkatha was followed closely by UWUSA. 
I 
4. ORGANISATIONAL AWARENESS· . 
When organisational awareness was examined (Statement 9) the following 
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ORSS. HEARD OF :ORS :ORS: ORS:ORS: DRS : DRS : DRS: DRS : DRS : DRS : ORG: DRS: DRS : DRS : DRS : DRS : DRS : DRS: DRS: DRS : ORI 
1 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 J 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2 
===================================================================================================================: 
IN TOTAL J49 270 276 107 J23 247 220 281 122 27J 307 168 96 266 199 2JJ 269 158 248 215 
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4J 154 121 109 IJ9 
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64 169 126 III 142 
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48 124 141 
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98 IJJ IJ4 
27 J6 J7 
58 129 101 100 IJ5 
16 35 28 27 37 
75 124 110 
20 J4 30 
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135. 
Again, the UDF was the best known followed by Inkatha, COSATU, the 
Labour Party, AZAPO and both the NIC and UWUSA equally known. 
Religious organisations followed, with welfare organisations closely 
behind. The least known were trade unions not affiliated to any 
federation and the National Forum Committee. 
A racial breakdown indicates that amongst the Africans the 
organisations heard of most frequently were : 
1. UDF (98,00%) 
2 . COSATU (95,00%) and Inkatha (95,00%) 
3 . UWUSA (92,00%) 
4 . AZAPO (87,00%) 
5. NIC (61,00%) 
Least known were trade unions not affiliated to any org~nisation 
(2i',00%) . 
Amongst Indians, 
1. Solidarity (96 , 00%) 
2 . Religious Organisations (95 , 00%) 
3 . UDF (94,00%) and Labour Party (94,00%) 
4. NPP (93,00%) 
5 . NIC (91,00%) and Welfare Organisations (91,00%) . 
The least known was the NF Committee (29,00%) . A larger number of 
Indians had heard of unions not affiliated to federations because 
man~ Indian workers belong to unions that disaffiliated from TUCSA 
and which have not affiliated to any other federation . 
Amongst Coloureds, 
I 
1. UDF (98 , 00%) 
Labour Party (93,00%) 2 . 
3. Inkatha (88,00%), NPP (88,00%) ~ an? Religious Organisations 
(88,00%) 
/ 
4 . Solidarity (83,00%) 
5. NIC (81,00%) 
136. 
Here again, unaffiliated unions were not heard of (25,00%). 
It is interesting to note that COSATU has not been popularised and 
thus, not heard of as frequently as the other organisations. In 
Indian areas, 73,00% and in Coloured areas, 80,00% had heard of 
COSATU. 
When class or specifically income levels, were used to differentiate 
organisational awareness, it was found that the UDF and Inkatha 
were still the most heard of amongst all income groups . Awareness 
of the existence of the various organisations increases substantially 
as income increases . The one exception was UWUSA; where 
organisational awareness was lowest amongst the highest income 
group . 
The researcher, whilst aware of the difficulties of ascertaining 
membership to organisations in the region , continued to question 
affiliation. 
Table 17 lists the highest scores recorded for the Africans: 
TABLE 17 
AFRICANS: AFFILIATION TO ORGANISATIONS 
STATEMENT 9 F % 
1. Religious organisations 57 31,66 
2. UDF 54 30,00 
3. Inkatha 36 20,00 
4. Sporting & Recreational org. 35 19 ,44 
5. COSATU 28 15,50 
6. Welfare organisations 27 15,00 
7. Youth/Student organisations 22 12,20 
7. Cultural organisations 22 12,20 
9. UWUSA 10 5,55 
9. Other organisations 10 5,55 
137. 
A relatively significant amount of support was expressed for 
religious organisations, the UDF and Inkatha. The political 
interests again show divided support for contrasting political 
groups. 
Table 18 lists the highest scores r ecorded for the Indians: 
TABLE 18 
INDIANS: AFFILIATION TO ORGANISATIONS 
STATEMENT 9 F % 
1. Sporting & Recreational org. 26 21,66 
· 1. Religious organisations 26 21,66 
3. Student/Youth organisations 14 11,66 
4. Welfare organisations 10 8,33 
5. NIC 9 7,50 
5. Cultural organisations 9 7,50 
5. Civic organisations 22 12,20 
8. Womens organisations 8 6,66 
9. UDF 7 5,83 
10. COSATU 5 4,16 
There ~ significant affiliation to sporting, recreational and 
religious organisations. There~ also some support for civic 
organisations which can take on a politicising role. SUPP9rt for 
political organisations ~ insignificant • 





COLOUREDS: AFFILIATION TO ORGANISATIONS 
STATEMENT 9 F % 
1. Religious organisations 9 15,00 
2. Student/Youth organisations 3 5,00 
3. Other organisations 2 3,33 
4. Sporting & Recreational org. 1 1,66 
5. UDF 1 1,66 
It is worth noting that membership to organisations in the Coloured 
co~unity was very low. Membership to religious organisations was 
most prominent. 
5. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
~ 
~ 
When political leadership was questioned, it was found that the 
following were preferred as political leaders by the different 
race groups. (Tables 20 and 21) 
The summary of results in Table 21, whilst suggestive of stronger 
support for the UDF/ANC alliance in general, conceals the particular 
differences between the races. Support for Mandela in the African 
areas ~ as strong as support for PW Botha in the Indian areas. 










LEADERSHIP PREFERENCE PER GROUP (STATEMENT 11) 
AFRICAN AREAS RESPONDENTS 
F % 
Mandela 51 (28,33) 
Buthelezi 37 (20,55) 
Tutu 8 (4,44) 
Tambo 6 (3,33) 
Gumede 4 (2,22) 
Dhlomo 3 (1,67) 
Sisulu (Walter) 2 (1,11) 
Slabbert 2 (1,11) 
No response 67 (37,22) 
180 (100%) 
INDIAN AREAS RESPONDENTS 
F % 
P W Botha 34 (28,33) 
Mandela 6 (5,00) 
Slabbert 4 (3,33) 
J N Reddy 4 (3,33 ) 
Gumede 1 (0,83) 
Tutu 1 (0,83) 
Tambo 1 (0,83) 
Boesak 1 (0,83) 
Buthelezi 1 (0,83) 
Eglin 1 (0,83) 
No response 66 (55,00) 
120 (100%) 
COLOURED AREAS RESPONDENTS 
F % 









LEADERSHIP PREFERENCE IN TOTAL (STATEMENT 11) 











































6. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
6.1 . Intraparliamentary strategies for change 
141. 
TABLE 22 
Statement 18: The reform programme initiated by the 
government should be supported .since it is moving us in the 
right direction . 
AFRICAN INDIAN 
Strongly Agree 16 (8,00%) 6 (5,00%) 
Agree 40 (22,22%) 37 (30,83%) 
Undecided 68 (37,77%) 18 (15,00%) 
Disagree 28 (15,55%) 43 (35,83%) 
Strongly Disagree 28 (15,55%) 16 (13,33%) 
Median 3 (Undecided) 
Xw = 2,81 
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142. 
In Tables 22 and 23, the lack of consensus and general indecisiveness 
of respondents on this question shows the degree of apprehension 
towards addressing socio-political issues prevalent amongst the 
Black population. Apprehension appears to be a greater factor 
amongst the African population with a larger proportion of Indians 
and Coloureds rejecting state initiatives. There was disagreement 
within the rankings of the attitudes of the different race groups 
since a low positive correlation co-efficient was discerned. 
Disagreement here, could be related to the fact that Indians and 
Coloureds have had an opportunity to decide whether or not to 
participate in parliamentary structures, irrespective of the power 
allocated to the individual chambers. The stronger rejection of 
state initiatives on the part of Indians and Coloureds probably 
arises from the fact that the tradition of some long-standing political 
organisations within these communities has been to campaign against 
voting for parliamentary organisations. The further association 
between occupation, income and attitudes towards this statement will 
strengthen the suggestion that the most vociferous anti-election 
campaigners and anti-system activists have been from the more 
affluent class. 
The strongest disagreement to the statement from a single occupational 
group, came from the professionals, whilst the greatest indecision 
came from the sales personnel and the skilled workers. As income 
increased, it was shown that rejection of state initiatives 
increased. Furthermore, stronger disagreement came largely from the 
better educated respondents. As educational qualifications increase, 
the lesser the indecision with regard to state strategies. 
MOfe men than women were unsupportive of state strategies. No 
significant association exists between attitude towards statement 








Statement 19: No matter which white government comes into 















37 (20,55%) 8 (6,66%) 
44 (24,44%) 58 (48,33%) 
35 (19,44%) 20 (16,66%) 
25 (13,88%) 31 (25,83%) 
39 (21,66%) 3 (2,50%) 
3 (Undecided) 
COLOURED TOTAL 
5 (8,33%) 50 
18 (30,00%) 120 
15 (25,00%) 70 
18 (30,00%) 74 
4 (6,66%) 46 
The' median 3 and the weighted mean equivalent to 2,85 show the 
general indecisiveness of the population (Tables 24 and 25) . Whilst 
the average agree with the statement, the weighted mean is closer to 
3 (undecided) than. 2 (agree). The relatively high variance at 1,59 
show the lack of consensus on this particular question. 
TABLE 25 
STATEMENT 19 
L RACE OCCUPATION INCOME L Xw v Xw V EDUCATION AGE GENDER Xw V 
l AFRICAN Xw V Xw V CLERK LESS THAN Xw I v 2 91 , 2 10 2 76 , NONE (AND BETWEEN , 1 27 R3 000 MALE 
l INDIAN PROFESSIONAL 2 92 " 1 85 ILLlT,ERATE) 16 - 2,5 YEARS 2--,-78 T 1 82 ' 2 69 , 1 02 2 83 , 1 32 2 00 0 66 2 83 1 18 BE'l'IiEEN PEHALE 
L 
COLO,UREO i SALES R3 - R6 000 I NONE (AND 26 - 35 2 91 OJ 2 39 2 96 1 23 LITERATE) 2 97 , 1 61 2 94 ! 1 26 2.,69 , 1 76 2 76 ., 1 32 , 
, SELF-~PLOYEO 
BETWEEN , PRIMARY SCHOOL 36 - 45 X" - 13,027 
I 
>f!- • 56,521 I 3 03 , 1 46 R6 - RI0 000 L 300' 184 2--,-96 , 1 40 wi th 4 0 with 80 , SK!LLED WORKER I 46 - 60 freedom freedom 2,86 ! 1,50 I JUNIOR 2 75 , 1 46 I 2 83 ' 1 58 I BETWEEN \ SECONDARY P - 0,011 
I 
p - 0,0001 I 'UNSK'ILd:D i OVEr 60 >0 ,05 <.0 / 05 I WORKE.~ RI0 - IR15 000 I 2 58 f 1 54 1 33 0 23 
! 3 10 I 1 71 I 2 71 1 21 SENIOR BE'l'IiEEN ! SOCONDARY x" • 20,064 
! 
STt.'DEl'IT R15 - R25 000 l 2 87 I 1 42 : rs ,. 0,60 2 77 1 75 with , 1 6' 3 ,26 f 1 28 POST-)!A'rRIC : OTHER J freedom I 2 76 , o 79 MORE THAN 3 12 i 1 73 P • 0,217 R25 000 
j 1 3,45 , 1 40 x, ,. 19,427 (.0,05 i x' ,. 45,263 
I with 28 0 I x' wi th 20' 
I 
,. 40,120 freedom I f reedom with 20 ' p • 0,492 ! 
. 
I P ,. 0 , 020 freedom >0,05 
I <. 0 , 05 P ,. 0,004 I 
L <. 0,05 














For Indians, the difference between White parties were minimal; 
and a change in White government would not mean anything different. 
The fact that Coloureds have closer cultural links with the White 
population, however, may account for the fact that more Coloureds 
believe that a change in White government would bring about broader 
changes. Given conflicting political interests within Natal, those 
of the UDF/COSATU alliance and those linked to Inkatha, political 
attitudes towards change emanating through state initiatives, vary. 
The high percentage suggesting support for change in White government 
amongst the Africans may be reflective of those sympathetic towards 
Inkatha's views rather than any other more radical grouping. A 
moderate correlation coefficient indicated the average degree of 
agreement amongst the attitudes of the different race groups. 
Again, an association existed between attitude, occupation and income. 
A significantly greater number of unskilled workers disagreed with 
the statement than students and professionals. However, when income 
was reviewed it was found that the upper income group within the 
Black community believed that change could be negotiated through a 
change in the White parliamentary structure. For the poorer class 
their lot would not change irrespective of change in government. 
Disagreement to statement 19 tended to increase as educational level 
increased. Furthermore, a greater number of men than women agreed 
with statement 19. Those between 46 years and older agreed more 
strongly with statement 19. The most indecisive were those between 
26 and 45 years. Those between 16 and 25 years were slightly more agreeable 
to statement 19. It would seem that the median age group was largely 
indecisive and hence, most reluctant to consider the social 




Statement 20: People cannot talk freely about their 
problems as they may get into trouble. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED 
Strongly Agree 117(65,00%) 28 (23,33%) 24 (40,00%) 
Agree 50 (27,77%) 84 (70,00%) 21 (35,00%) 
Undecided 2 (1,11%) 2 (1,46%) 5 (8,33%) 
, Disagree 7 (3,88%) 6 (5,00%) 8 (13,33%) 
Strongly Disagree 4 (2,22%) 0 (0,00%) 2 (3,33%) 
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In Tables 26 and 27, the median at 2 suggested a high level of 
agreement and the variance at 0,80 confirmed a very high degree of 
consensus. The high amount of agreement amongst all race groups 
indicates their resentment of their existing lack of freedom. The 
slightly lower percentage of agreement amongst Coloureds shows the 
isolation of the broader Coloured community in Natal from the 
harsher effects of state legislation. An association exists between 
attitude towards statement 20 and race. A strong correlation 
coefficient showed significant agreement amongst the rankings of 
the different races. 
The notably high agreement amongst the professionals, workers and 
students suggests the resentment of the most politicised and affected 
occupational categories. Agreement with statement 20 was relatively 
constant amongst income groups. 
Stronger agreement to statement 20 came from higher educated people 
showing resentment of the socio-political situation from this sector. 
Attitudes towards statement 20 and sex differences were independent 
of each other. 
TABLE 28 
Statement 21: Detentions only worsen the country's 
problems. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL % 
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(65,00%) 28 (46,66%) 154 42,78 
(6,66%) 7 (11,66%) 24 6,67 
(5,00%) 2 (3,33%) 19 5,28 
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With reference to Tables 28 and 29, as many as 85,84% of the 
respondents agreed, with 7,~~ disagreeing, 6,67% being undecided. 
The median at 2 compared with the weighted mean of 1,81 and indicated 
a high level of agreement with the statement. The variance at 0,87 
\ 
reinforces this suggestion. 
An equal number of Africans and Indians (86,66%) agreed whilst 81,66% 
of the Coloureds agreed with statement 21. A high positive 
correlation was thus discerned. Furthermore, attitude towards 
statement 21 was independent of occupation, income, education, sex 
and age differences. 
I 
Before and particularly during the declaration of the state of emergency, 
a number of anti-apartheid campaigners have been detained without 
trial - these included children as young as eleven years old (Amnesty 
International, 1987 : 421). Furthermore, detention has been regardless 
of the nature of political opposition (ie. violent or non-violent) 
afforded by individuals. 
148. 
All occupational categories agreed with statement 21. Some conflict 
of opinion was exhibited by the unskilled workers indicated by a 
high variance. On average, however, both skilled and unskilled 
workers agreed with the statement. 
TABLE 30 
Statement 25: The government is entrenching rather than 
dismantling apartheid. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL % 
Strongly Agree 79 (43,88%) 22 (18,33%) 20 (33,33%) 121 33,61 
Agree 57 (31,66%) 67 (55,83%) 25 (41,66%) 149 41,39 
Undecided 33 (18,33%) 13 (10,83 % ) 9 (15,00%) 55 15,28 
Disagree 8 (4,44%) '17 (14,16% ) 6 (10,00%) 31 8,61 
Strongly Disagree 3 (1,66%) 1 (0,83%) 0 (0,00%) 4 1,11 . 
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STATEMENT 25 
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149. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from Tables 30 and 31. 
The median at 2 was compatible with the weighted mean at 2,02 
indicating a high degree of agreement. The variance at 0,9~, 
indicates a comparatively high degree of consensus. 
As many as 75,55% of the Africans, with 74,16% of the Indians and 
75,00% of the Coloureds agreed with Statement 25. Again, a high 
positive correlation coefficient showed agreement within the rankings. 
The strong belief that the state is not dismantling apartheid but 
rather strengthening it, almost four years after the tricameral 
parliament has come into effect can only reveal the tricameral 
parliament as a structure without support from the two communities 
it is supposed to represent as well as the large community that it 
constitutionally excludes. The imminent further government created 
structures, legislation and policies do not seem to be able to effect 
any changes. It also suggests above all that changes thus far are 
not seen as far-reaching, but perhaps as another means to protect 
White hegemony. 
The results contrast strongly with those of statement 18. It would 
follow that if people felt that the state is entrenching apartheid 
they would not view its so-called reform initiatives positively. 
Yet, there was general indecisiveness on that question - which as 
already maintained was probably due to apprehension, rather than 
political ambiguity. 
As many as 6,11% of the Africans disagreed with statement 25, whilst 
15,00% of the Indians and 10,00% of the Coloureds believed that the 
state was dismantling-apartheid. Hence, a larger proportion of 
Indians were supportive of state initiatives. 
An association exists between attitude towards statement 25 and 
occupation. I 
Income and : aucational qualifications were independent of attitude 
towards statement 25. 
150. 
Men were a bit stronger in their beli e f, than women, that the 
government was entrenching rather than dismantling apartheid. 
TABLE 32 
Statement 27: At the moment the mass media covers news 
events adequately. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL % 
Strongly Agree 3 (1,66%) 2 (1,66%) 5 
Agree 12 (6,64%) 18 (15,00%) 5 
Undecided 21 (11,66%) 4 (3,33%) 4 
Disagree 57 (31,66%) 72 (60,00%) 28 
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Strongly Agree (5) 
Agree (4) 
Undecided (3) 
Disagre e ( 2) 
Strong l y Disagree ( 1 ) 
(8,33%) 10 2,78 
(8,33%) 35 9,72 
(6,66%) 29 8,06 
(46,66%) 157 43,61 
(30,00%) 129 35,83 
AGE GENDER 
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With reference . to Tables 32 and 33, the median at 2 indicates 
agreement but the variance at 1 ,08 does not show consensus. However, 
a high positive correlation showed significant agreement amongst 
the ranking of attitudes of the different l' aces. 
Whilst there was no clear association between occupation and attitudes 
towards statement 27 the highest amount of disagreement came from the 
students, unskilled workers and professionals. It is mainly this 
sector of the population that is seriously affected by the curbing 
of ' the press. Inadequate media coverage of political events and 
unrest is due to the muzzling of the press under emergency regulations. 
Whilst the state is maintaining that the muzzling is to encourage 
objective reporting, all race and occupational groups were unanimous 
in their resentment of present media coverage. 
An association existed between income and attitude towards the 
statement. Agreement to statement 27 tended to decrease as income 
increased, and then to increase as income further increased. 
An association existed between education and attitude towards statement 
27. Disagreement tends to decrease as educational qualifications 
increase. No significant differences between the different age 
groups or the different sexes were perceived. 
TABLE 34 
Statement 29: The tricamera1 parliament is not supported by 
people in my community. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL % 

















(33,88%) 51 (42,50%) 21 (35,00%) 133 36,94 
(8,88%) 21 (17,50%) 16 (26,66%) 53 14,72 
(5,00%) 26 (21,66%) 10 (16,66%) 45 12,50 
(2,77%) 6 (5,00%) 1 (1,66%) 12 3,33 
2 (Aaree) 
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Strongly Agree (1) 
Agree ( 2) 
Undecided (3) 
Disagree ( 4) 
S t rong l y Disagree ( 5) 
GENDER 
Xw I V 
MALE 
1 94 'j 1 09 
FEMALE 
2 0 5 I 1 49 
~ a 6,'OQ 
with 4· 
f r e edo,n 
P a 0,,,,,0 
, 0 ,05 
As many as 69,44% agreed with statement 29 whilst 15,83% disagreed 
and 14,72% were undecided. Of the Africans, 93,75% agreed whilst 
55,83% of the Indians and 55,00% of the Coloureds agreed, while 
26,66% of the Indians and 18,33% of the Coloureds disagreed, 
believing that people within their communities supported the 
tricameral parliament (Table 34). Whilst the median indicates that 
a large sector of the population is agreeable to statement 29's 
contention, the variance indicates the overall indecisiveness or 
lack of consensus on this issue. A low, but positive correlation 
coeffici~nt reinforced this indication (Table 35). 
The stronger resentment towards the tricameral parliament by the 
Africans than the Indians and Coloureds is clearly due to the fact 
that Africans were not offered representation in an acceptable 
parliament. The tricameral parl i ament is probably being v~ewed as 
inadequate in addressing the demands of th~ majori ty of the population. 
Given the low percentage polls at the f984 Indian and Coloured 
elections, one would have expected resentment ' towards the tricameral 
153. 
parliament to be significant. However, the degree of resentment 
was significantly less than that of the Africans. It would seem 
that although not supported by the majority of Indians and Coloureds, 
the tricameral parliament was becoming more acceptable to a sector 
of the population. 
Whilst less Indians than Coloureds voted for the tricameral 
parliament in 1984, it seems now that a larger amount of Indians 
support the tricameral system. This could be a result of the lack 
of acceptable alternatives offered by opposition Indian extra-
parliamentary forces since the election campaign. 
The greatest amount of support for the tricameral parliament came 
from the "other" sector (unemployed,housewives and pensioners) 
whilst the greatest opposition came from the sales and unskilled 
workers. An association existed between attitude towards statement 
29 and differences in income level. Disagreement tended to increase 
as income increased. 
However the best educated sector was least supportive. 
More men than women believed that the tricameral parliament was not 
supported by the communities. Again, there was a tendency for 
women to appear more sympathetic towards the State. 
TABLE 36 
Statement 31: People who criticise the government don't 














10 (5,55%) 3 (2,50%) 
27 (15,00%) 55 (45,83%) 
49 (27,22%) 7 (5,83%) 
51 (28,33%) 38 (31,66%) 
43 (23,88%) 17 (14,16%) 
3 (Undecided) 
COLOURED TOTAL % 
3 (5 , 00%) 16 4,44 
17 (28,33%) 99 27,50 
12 (20,00%) 68 18,89 
13 (21 , 66%) 102 28,33 
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Stcongly Disagree (1) 
With reference to Tables 36 and 37, as many as 49,16% disagreed 
whilst 31,94% agreed, while 18,88% were undecided. Of the 
Africans, 20,56% agreed whilst 52,22% disagreed and 27,22% were 
undecided. Of the Indians, 48,33% agreed whilst 45,84% disagreed 
and 5,83% agreed whilst 46,67% disagreed and 20,00% were undecided. 
The median 3 as well as the high variance indicate the indecisiveness 
of or lack of consensus on this issue. A very low positive 
correlation coefficient showed little agreement within the rankings 
of attitude of the different races . 
. 
Whilst there was stronger belief that government critics do understand 
the complexity of the South African situation, a significant proportion 
were of a contrary belief suggesting some measure of dissension with 
eXisting leadership . 
In particular there was stronger agreement amongst the Indians 
showing this group to be most dissatisfied with government critI cs. 
The least amount of dissatisfaction was existent amongs't the Africans _ 
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where a larger amount of people agreed that critics do understand 
the issues pertinent to South Afr ica . 
It was mainly the self-employed, unskilled workers and "other" 
sectors that were agreeable to statement 31. There were no s i gnificant 
differences between the attitudes of the various income groups. 
However, the significantly high variance for each category showed 
the lack of consensus of respondents belonging to the various 
income groups. 
An association existed between attitude towards statement 31 and 
educati onal level. Those with higher education disagreed more 
strongly with statement 31, than those with lower education. 
Except for the unskilled workers as a group, the majority of those 
supporting critics of the government were largely (thoug~ not 
entirely) from more affluent backgrounds. An almost equal number 
of men and women disagreed and there were no significant differences 
in attitudes amongst the different age groups. 
TABLE 38 
Statement 32: The tricamera1 parliament has increased the 















16 (8,88%) 1 (0,83%) 
35 (19,44%) 26 (21,66%) 
56 (31,11%) 14 (11,66%) 
39 (21,66%) 58 (48,33%) 
34 (18,88%) 21 (17,50%) 
2 (Disaqree) 
COLOURED TOTAL % 
. 
1 (1,66%) 18 5,00 
10 (16,66%) 71 19,72 
9 (15,00%) 79 21,94 
19 (31,66%) 116 32,22 
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Strongly Disagree (1) 
Turning to Tables 38 and 39, as many as 66,67% of the Coloureds 
and 65,83% of the Indians disagreed whilst 40,55% of the Africans 
disagreed. Of the Africans, 28,33% agreed while 42,50% of the Indians 
and 18,33% of the Coloureds agreed. The median of 2 indicated dis-
agreement, but the weighted mean at 2,55 was closer to undecided 
75 
22 
than disagree. The low positive correlation coefficient strengthened 
the indication of the weighted mean, by exhibiting a low level of 
agreement amongst the rankings of attitude of the different races. 
Most disagreed that the tricameral parliament has increased the 
unity of Indians and Coloureds, further depicting disillusionment 
with the state created structure . 
I 
It is interesting to note that a greater number of Africans than 
Indians and Coloureds believed that the tricameral parliament has 
~ / 
increased the unity of the other two ~lack groups. It would seem 
/ 
that the apparent co-option of Indians and Coloureds has led to 
their (the Africans) further isolation. 
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The strongest disagreement to statement 32 came from the professionals 
and the students. The most indecisive were the unskilled workers. 
A further association exists between attitude towards statement 32 
and differences in income earned. Disagreement tended to increase 
as income increased. 
No relationship existed between attitude and sex differences. Both 
men and women disagreed that the tricameral parliament has increased 
the unity of Indians and Co l oureds. 
TABLE 40 
Statement 35: SADF raids on ANC bases should be conducted 















5 (3,89%) 4 (3,33%) 
10 (5,56%) 37 (30,83%) 
30 (16,67%) 21 (17,50%) 
49 (27,22%) 45 (37,50%) 
84 (46,67%) 13 (10,83%) 
2 (Disagree) 
COLOURED TOTAL 
° (0,00%) 11 5 (8,33%) 52 
24 (40,00%) 75 
14 (23,33%) 108 
17 (28,33%) 114 
Of the total respondents, 61,67% disagreed whilst 17,50% agreed. Of 
the Africans 73,88% disagreed whilst 48,33% of the Indians and 51,66% 
of the Coloureds disagreed (Table 40). A low positive correlation 
coefficient was discerned when the scores of the different race 
groups were ranked (Table 41) . . 
Most disagreed with the SADF's raids on the ANC not only because it 
was a violent form of opposition but probably also because the ANC 
is actually comprised of mainly Black people from South Africa, and 
African people in particular. This accounts for the fact that a 
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Stro~gly Disagree (1) 
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The weighted mean reinforced the median, indicating disagreement; 
however, the variance did not suggest a high degree of consensus. 
An association existed between attitude and occupation. Some support 
for SADF raids was found amongst the unemployed, housewives and 
pensioners whilst the strongest opposition was exhibited by the 
professionals and unskilled workers. 
Whilst disagreement towards SADF raids tended to increase as income 
, level increased, this was not significant. Strongest disagreement 
came from the best educated and least educated categories. : 
There seemed to be some differences between male and female 
responses. Men disagreed more strongly, showing that men on 
I 
~ , 





Statement 36: SADF raids in neighbouring states are 
increasing the regions instability. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL 
Strongly Agree 106(58,89%) 16 (13,33%) 19 (31,67%) 141 
Agree 56 (31,11%) 65 (54,17%) 22 (36,67%) 143 
Undecided 9 (5,00%) 20 (16,67%) 12 (20,00%) 41 
Disagree 4 (2,22%) 17 (14,17%) 6 (10,00%) 27 
Strongly Disagree 5 (2,78%) 2 (1,67%) 1 (1,67%) 8 
Median · 2 (Aqree) 
xw = 1,94 
V = 1,01 
TABLE 43 
STATEMENT 36 
RACE OCCUPATION INCOME 
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As many as 78,88% of the sample agreed whilst 9,72% disagreed and 
1l,~ were undecided (Table 42). The median at 2 showed a strong 
tendency towards agreement whilst the mean at 1,94 showed responses 
ranging between strongly agree and agree, but t ending towards 
agree (Tables 42 and 43 ) . 
Of the Africans, 90,00% agreed whilst 67,50% of the Indians and 
68,33% of the Coloureds agreed. As in the results of the previous 
statement, the African population appeared more resentful of the 
destabilising effects of the SADF rai ds. A moderate correlation 
coefficient showed agreement within the rankings. 
Attitudes towards statement 36 and differences in income earned were 
independent of each other. Similarly, no significant difference 
was noted amongst the frequencies of respondents with different 
educational qualifications. 
A greater number of men and older people agreed with statement 36 
than women and younger people. 
TABLE 44 
Statement 44: The government needs to banLout1aw 
organisations calling for raEid change. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL 

















(6,67%) 25 (20,83%) 6 (10,00%) 43 
(14,44%) 10 (8,33%) 9 (15,00%) 45 
<37,22%) 61 (50,83%) 27 (45,00%) 155 
(39,44%) 20 ( 16,67%) 16 (26,67%) 107 
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As many as 76,66% of Africans and 67 , 05% of the Indians as well as 
71 , 66% of the Coloureds disagreed (Table 44) . The median at 2 
coinciding with the weighted mean at 2,15 showed belief that the 
government should not affect organisations calling for rapid change 
(Tables 44 and 45) . A strong positive correlation coefficient 
showed significant agreement within the rankings. Since most were 
already disillusioned by reform initiatives and the tricameral 
parliament, faster change was in order. Moreover, there was strong 
consensus that detentions were worsening the South African situation 
- hence , the banning of organisations could probably be seen in the 
same light . 
An association existed between attitude towards statement 44 and 
occupation. Stronger disagreement was found to exist among the 
/ professionals, the unskilled workers, the students and the clerks. 
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However disagreement was not as strong amongst the other 
occupational categories. It was mainly the professionals/student 
grouping and the unskilled worker grouping that were represented 
in popular political and trade union structures, respectively. 
Attitude was relatively constant when income groups were reviewed. 
However, there was a tendency for disagreement to increase slightly 
as income increased. 
When educational qualifications were taken into consideration, it 
was found that the most disagreeable to statement 44 were the best 
and the least educated. 
There was no clear association between the attitudes of men and 
women. Less women than men disagreed with statement 44. It would 
appear that the greater concentration of women in the domestic 
sphere has left them more sceptical or conservative in socio-political 
matters. 
TABLE 46 
Statement 54: Granting independence to all the Bantustans 
















12 (6,67%) 3 (2,50%) 
29 (16,11%) 55 (45,83%) 
23 (12,78%) 18 '(15,00%) 
50 (27,78%) 31 (25,83%) 
66 (36,67%) 13 (10,83%) 
2 (Disaqree) 
COLOURED TOTAL % 
1 (1,67%) 16 4,44 
12 (20,00%) 96 26,67 
14 (23,33%) 55 15,28 
18 (30,00%) 99 27,50 
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. P a 0,0001 
(,0 ,05 
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S trongly Disagree (1) 
x 2 .. 24,778 
Wl th 20· 
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P .. 0,210 
;> 0,05 
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2 40 T 0 47 
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2 64 I 1 62 
26 - 35 
2 39 1 1 59 
36 - 45 
2 63 I 1 64 
2 4:6 1- ~O 28 
OVE,R 60 
2 66 I 1 55 





With reference to Tables 46 and 47, 53,61% of the respondents 
disagreed whilst 31,11% agreed. On the one hand, 22,77% of the 
Africans agreed whilst 48,33% of the Indians and 21,66% of the 
Coloureds agreed. On the other hand, 64,45% of the Africans 
disagreed \\hi.lst 36,66% of the Indians ,and 55,00% of the Coloureds 
disagreed. A low positive correlation coefficient was discerned. 
Stronger disagreement from the Africans as compared to the other two 
groups, in particular the Indians,. shows the minority groups I lack 
of understanding of the other group~ needs - but at the same time 
-
projects some of its fears. The large amount of Indians supporting 
i 
Bantustan independence, shows the fear that may prevail over the 
question of majority rule or greater non-racial participation. The 
stronger ppposition to Bantustan independence reflects, amongst 
/ 
Africans a ~nity between opposition ideologies because both the UDF 
and Inkatha oppose Bantustan independence . 
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The median at 2, indicates a high degree of disagreement. However, 
contrasted with the weighted mean at 2 ,56 indications are that the 
average is closer to 3 (undecided) t han 2 (disagree). The variance 
at 1,57 shows a lack of consensus. 
Again, an association exists between occupational status and attitude 
towards statement 54 . More professionals disagreed whilst a 
significant proportion of sales staff, students, clerks and unskilled 
workers also disagreed. Lesser disagreement was exhibited by the 
self-employed, the skilled workers and the unemployed. 
No association exists between income and educational differences and 
attitudes towards statement 54. 
Less women disagreed than men. As in previous statements , women 
exhibited more conservative beliefs in this case showing less 
disagreement towards independence of Bantustans. 
No association existed between age and attitude towards statement 
54. But, 30,53% of those over 35 years agreed with this statement, 
whilst 31,44% of those under 35 years agreed. 
TABLE 48 
Statement 55: The Group Areas Act serves the important 
function of allowing people to develop their own culture 















14 (7,78%) 3 (2,50%) 
22 (12,22%) 50 (41,67%) 
28 (15,56%) 8 (6,67%) 
53 (29,44%) 38 (31,67%) 




1 (1,67%) 18 
13 (21,67%) 85 
10 (16,67%) 46 
19 (31,67%) 110 
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> 0.05 
Tables 48 and 49 indicate the following: the median at 2 indicates 
disagreement whilst the mean at 2,47 is between undecided and 
disagree. Within the African sector, 64,44% disagreed whilst 20,00% 
agreed. But, 15,55% were undecided. African responses compared 
favourably with the Coloureds. As many as 60,00% of the Coloureds 
disagreed with statement 55 whilst 23,33% agreed, and 16,67% were 
undecided. Within the Indian sector, however, 49,16% disagreed 
whilst 44,16% agreed and 6,66% were undecided. A low positive 
correlation showed limited agreement within the rankings. 
Most Black people disagreed with the National Party's conventional 
argument for the retention of the Group Areas Act - namely, that 
of the protection of group, minority and cultural rights. Stronger 
oppOSition came from the Africans and Coloureds. Whilst there was 
strong opposition from the Indian community, there was also 
I 
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significant support, probably because of the importance this 
community places on cultural preservation. 
There were significant differences or associations amongst the 
race, occupational, income, educational groups and the different 
sexes . Attitude, however was independent of age differences . 
The most prestigious occupational categories were less agreeable .. 
These include professionals, the self-employed, the students, the 
clerks and the skilled workers. Less disagreeable were the 
unskilled workers and the unemployed. 
The tendency for disagreement to increase as income increased was 
again confirmed . The higher income groups disagreed more strongly 
than the lower income groups. 
Those with higher educational qualifications disagreed more strongly 
that the Group Areas Act facilitated cultural preservation, than 
those with lower educational qualifications. 
A significant difference between gender responses was discerned. 
Women generally were closer to "undecided" than to "disagree" as 
compared to the strong disagreement exhibited by the men . Women, 
again exhibit more conservative views than men. 
TABLE 50 
Statement 56: Constant consultation between Bantustan 
leaders and the government would resolve problems existent in 
these 'areas. 
AFRICAN IND~AN COLOURED TOTAL % 

















(27,78%) 69 (57,50%) 
(18,89%) 9 (7,50%) 
(21,67%) 25 (20,8l%) 
(17,22%) 14 (11,67%) 
, 
3 (Undecided) 
,24 (40,00%) 143 39,72 
11 (18,33%) 54 15,00 
13 (21,67%) 77 21,39 
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Strongly Agree (5) 
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Undeciaed . (3) 
Disagree (2) 
Strongly Disagree (1 ) 
With reference to Tables 50 and 51 , 49 , 44% agreed whilst 35,55% 
disagreed and 15,00% were undecided. The median at 3 compared with 
the weighted mean at 3,09 indicates a very low degree of obligation . 
Variance at 1 , 56 indicates a lack of consensus . 
positive correlation coefficient was discerned . 
A relatively low 
Whilst Africans were divided on this issue (shown by the significant 
lack of consensus) a greater number of Indian and Coloured respondents 
agreed. 
An association exists between attitude towards statement 56 and 
differences in occupational and income level . A greater number of 
I 
the unemployed agreed as well as a significant proportion of the 
\ skilled workers and the self-employed. Less agreement was exhibited 
by the clerks, the sales staff, the students and the professionals . 
/ 
The professionals were least supportive of consultations ,with 
i 
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Bantustan leaders. Similarly, as income increased disagree-
ment to the statement increased. 
Stronger agreement than disagreement showed the urgency with which 
Black people, particularly less affluent people, viewed the 
necessity for resolving problems in the region through the use of 
even collaborative strategies. Whilst the support for Bantustan 
leader - government consultation was more definite amongst the 
Indians and Coloureds, there was less confidence expressed by the 
African sector. However, the greater overall confidence towards 
consultation could also be discerned from the fact that some 
respondents recognise that Buthelezi, who has a presence in the 
area, is in a position to consult with governmental authorities. 
The tendency towards agreement within the sample is a result of far 
greater support amongst women than men towards consultation. 
TABLE 52 
Statement 58: The Government should hold talks only with 
organisations that reject violence. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL 
Strongly Agree 8 (4,44%) 5 (4,17%) 4 (6,67%) 17 














(20,56%) 13 (10,83%) 
(28,89%) 54 (45,00%) 
(38,33%) 13 (10,83%) 
2 (Disagree) 
11 (18,34%) 61 
23 (38,34%) 129 
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The median indicated disagreement (Table 52). The variance at 1,38 
showed a lack of consensus. A low positive correlation, however, 
showed limited agreement. 
Of the Africans, 67,22% disagreed whilst 55,83% of the Indians and 
53,33% of the Coloureds disagreed. Hence, the government position 
on outlawed organisations renouncing violence rather than merely 
suspending it, was not supported by the majority of Black people. 
Stronger disagreement came from the more affluent sectors. However, 
the middle income group tended not to disagree as much as the lowest 
income group. 
:. . 
This was further confirmed by comparisons within the occupational 
sector. Whilst the professionals and students were most disagree-
able, so too were the unskilled workers as compared with the skilled 







There was no clear association between attitude towards statement 
58 and educational qualifications. Strongest disagreement, however, 
came from the most educated group. 
A greater number of men were of the opinion that the government 
should hold talks with organisations that do not reject violence, 
than women. This is consistent with the trend exhibited thus far. 
TABLE 54 
Statement 60: I feel frustrated because I don't have 
2Q1itica1 rights. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL % 
Strongly Agree 122(67,78%) 25 (20,83%) 18 (30,00%) 165 45,83 
Agree 23 (12,78%) 58 (48,33%) 25 (40,00%) 105 29,17 
Undecided 4 ( 2,22%) 16 (13,33%) 8 (13,33%) 28 7,78 
Disagree 29 (16,11%) 18 (15,00%) 10 (16,67%) 57 15,83 
Strongly Disagree 2 ( 1,11%) 3 '( 2,50%) 0 (0,00%) 5 1,39 







The following conclusions can be drawn from Tables 54 and 55: 75,00% 
of the respondents agreed whilst 17,22% disagreed;7,78% were uncertain. 
The weighted mean at 1,98 varied between strongly agree and agree, 
but remained closer to agree; this was reinforced by the median at 
2. The variance at 1,30 however, did not reflect a significantly 
high degree of consensus. However, a relatively strong positive 
correlation coefficient was discerned. 
Within the African sector, 80,55% agreed (67,78% had strongly agreed). 
Within the 
Within the 
Indian sector, 69,16% agreed (20,83% had strongly agreed). 
Coloured sector, 70,00% agreed {30,00% p ad stron,gly agreed). 
\ The stronger agreement expressed by the Africans illustrates the 
severe frustration experienced by this community. j The frustration 
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Strongly Oisagree (5) 
that have been to some extent differentially incorporated into the 
political and economic infrastructure. 
An association between attitude towards statement 60 and occupational 
level was evident. Whilst agreement was relatively constant amongst 
all categories. the unemployed (including the housewives and 
pensioners) tended not to agree. The weighted mean here was close 
to "undecided" . The unemployed. thus far . have appeared as an 
apathetic and alienated group whose responses have contradicted 
those of the majority of respondents. 
There was no significant difference amongst the responses of the 
different income groups as well as among those with different 
educational qualifications. It is significant to note that 
frustration at being excluded from the political processes was 
stronger amongst the older group. i.e •• those over 35 years as 
opposed to the younger group. i.e .• under 35 years old. Whilst 
, , 
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it is being maintained in political circles that the political 
initiative is lying increasingly in the hands of the youth; on 
average, there appears to be somewhat greater frustration on the 
part of the older sector. 
The fact that fewer women agreed with statement 56, than men, shows 
the greater political apathy of women in general. 
TABLE 56 
IStatement 64: Political organisations workirig outside of 




AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL 
Strongly Agree 43 (23,89%) 13 (10,83%) 12 (20,00%) 68 
Agree 47 (26,11%) 57 (47,50%) 21 (35,00%) 125 
Undecided 53 (29,44%) 18 (15,00%) 15 (25,00%) 86 
Disagree 28 (15,56%) 30 (25,00%) 12 (20,00%) 70 
9' Strongly Disagree ( 5,00%) 2 ( 1,67%) ° lO,OO%) 11 







Out of the total, 53,61% agreed whilst 23,89% were undecided and 
22,5~ disagreed (Table 56). The mean at 2,53 showed that 
respondents were between undecided and agree whilst the median at 
2, shows that respondents were tending towards agree. The variance 
at 1,2 indicates the lack of consensus. A moderate correlation 
coefficient was discerned (Tables 56 and 57). 
On the whole, 50,00% of the Africans, 58,00% of the Indians and 
55,00% of the Coloureds agreed. But, 20,56% of the Africans, 26,67% 
of the Indians and 20,00% of the Coloureds disagre~d. Furthermore, 
29,44% of the Africans chose to remain undecided. 
\ 
All race groups supported extraparliamentary organisations, in 
particular the Indians. This could be a result of the ~on~ history 
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However, the largest number of disagreeing respondents were also 
Indians - showing that the pro-parliamentary forces were also 
beginning to counter the traditional support for oPPosition to state 
initiatives . The large amount of Africans and Coloureds that were 
undecided exemplified the reluctance of those population groupings 
to express a positive or negative answer, as well as considerable 
apathy prevalent. Moreover, the difference within Coloured 
responses also show the tensions between p~o- and anti-parliamentary 
forces. Within the African sector, the differences in strategy 
between Inkatha and other extraparliamentary forces may also be 
highlighted. 
No association existed between attitude towards statement 64 and 
income, occupation, education and age. The greatest amount of 
support for organisations not working with the government came from 






income groups was relatively constant. Agreement was stronger amongst 
those with higher rather than lower education. At the same time 
there was very little consensus amongst the more educated categories. 
TABLE 58 
Statement 66: Commissions of inquiry that establish causes 
of problems, can be used as a means for bringing about 
changes. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL % 
Strongly Agree 38 (21,11%) 9 ( 7,50%) 6 (10,00%) 53 14,72 
Agree 88 (48,89%) 75 (62,50%) 37 (61,67%) 200 
Undecided 23 (12,78% ) 14 (11,67%) 11 (18,33%) 48 
Disagree 16 ( 8,89%) 11 ( 9,17%) 3 ( 5,00%) 30 
Strongly Disagree 15 ( 8,33%) 11 ( 9,17%) 3 ( 5,00%) 29 
Median 
Xw = 3,61 
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Wi th reference to Tables 58 and 59: the mean at 3,61 is closer 
to 4 (agree) than 3 (undecided) whilst the median at 4 indicates a 
significant degree of agreement. However, the variance does not 
indicate significant consensus. The very high positive correlation 
coefficient however, indicates very significant agreement within 
the rankings of the different race groups. 
It appears that 70,00% of the African and Indian respondents as 
well as 71,66% of the Coloured respondents agreed. Irrespective 
of inevitable governmental influences over commissions of inquiry, 
most Black people would see these as a step towards constructive 
change. There were similar degrees of agreement from all race 
groups involved. 
Some differences were exhibited by the different occupational 
groups. 
The professionals and clerks were closer to "undecided" whilst the 
remaining occupational categories were closer to "disagree". 
No association existed between statement 66 and income. As far as 
educational background was concerned, there was a tendency for 
agreement to increase as qualifications increased. 
An association existed between statement 66 and gender differences. 
More women than men supported commissions of inquiry. 
of 
&jnparyAconclusions on intraparliamentary strategies for change 
Examination of responses to specific statements in the schedule 
suggest that people do not support and are very uncertain about the 
authenticity of reform initiatives, believing strongly that the 
' state is entrenching rather than dismantling apartheid. Uncertainty 
i . 
was evident over whether change could be elicited through a change 
in the 1white government. A very high consensus was evident on 
p~QPleis perceptions on the lack of freedom of speech. A significantly 
hlgh ~umber of people believe that detentions are only worsening 
the situation in the country. 
176. 
/ . 
A high degree of dissatisfaction was expressed over media coverage 
of unrest events as a result of press curbing by thel state. However, 
there was indecisiveness over the question ~f suppor~ for the 
tricameral parliament. Whilst most people agreed that the ~ 
communities did not support the tricameral parliament, only 55,00% 
of the Indians and Coloureds agreed. More Africans than Indians 
and Coloureds believed that the tricameral parliament has increased 
the unity of Indians and Coloureds. 
Whilst most believed that government critics understand the 
complexities of the South African situation, there was still 
uncertainty on this question. 
Respondents did not support SADF raids on ANC bases with strong 
agreement that the SADF is destabilising the region. None of the 
groups supported the banning of organisations calling for rapid 
change. 
Mainly Africans and Coloureds rejected the belief that Bantustan 
independence was a prerequisite to development in those areas. On 
the question of whether the Group Areas allows people to develop 
their own culture within their own community, there was a considerable 
lack of consensus. Whilst the majority disagreed, differences did 
exist. 
Most people were frustrated because they did not have political 
rights and most believed that the government should hold talks with 
"violent organisations". Most believed as well that organisations 
working outside of parliament should be supported. 
Contradicting rejection of intraparliamentary strategies, was the 
belief by most people that problems could be resolved through 
consultation between the government and Bantustan leaders, as well 
as the belief that commissions of inquiry can be used as a means 
towards change. 
More men than women tended to be unsupportive of state ideology and 
TABLE 60 
INFERENCE FROM PROPORTIONAL STRATIFIED SAMPLES TO THE POPULATION 
Po,eulation African Indian Coloured Total 
(a) Absolute size 2 580 847 552 819 63 929 3 197 595 
(b) Relative size 80,7 17,3 2 100 
Proportional/ Cluster Sample 
(c) Absolute size 180 120 60 360 
(d) Percent supportive of intraparliamentary 51 
change 8,33 20,83 18,33 (14,16) 360 
---
(1 ) Absolute size (d x a) 214 985 115 152 11 718 341 855 
(2) Relative size (d x b) 6,72% 3 , 6% 1,56% ( 11,88%) 
, .• 
Hence, 11 , 88% (almost 12,00%) of the Black population support intraparliamentary strategies as opposed to 
14,16% when the ratio 3 : 2 : 1 is used. 








initiatives. Stronger disagreement a s well tended to emerge f rom 
the higher income and higher educated respondents as well as from 
the professional and sales personnel . 
There were no significant differences in attitudes reflected by the 
different age groups. 
In the final analysis it can be stated that Black people do not 
support intraparliamentary assumptions and s trategies largely because 
of a tendency to vi ew the State as illegitimate and due to its 
seeming refusal to move towards genuine negotiation. The support for 
consultation, no matter how limited, emphasises this point. 
6.2 Extraparliamentary evolutionary strategies for change 
! 
TABLE 61 
Statement 22: The fact that the Black population is 
increasing at a faster rate than the White population only 












AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL 
28 (15,56%) 7 ( 5,83%) 4 ( 6,67%) 39 
37 (20,56%) 37 (30,83%) 18 (30,00%) 92 
61 (33,89%) 27 (22,50%) 18 (30,00%) 106 
41 (22,78%) 46 (38,33%) 18 (30,00%) 1~5 
13 ( 7,22%) 3 ( 2,50%) 2 ( 3,33%) 18 
3 (Undecided) 
With reference to Tables 6' and 62: the mean at 3,08 indicates 
the general indecisiveness of the population whilst the median at 
3 indicates that a large proportion of the population were undecided 
on this question. The variance at 1,18 shows a lack of consensus. 
However a relatively high correlation coefficient shows agreement 
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Within the African sector 36,11% agreed, 30,00% disagreed whilst 
33 ,89% were undecided. 
Within the Indian sector, 36,66% agreed, 40,83% disagreed and 
22 ,,50% were undecided . 
Within the Coloured sector, 36,66% agreed whilst ' 33,33% disagreed 
and 30,00% were undecided. 
The results from the different groupings are somewhat similar. No 
definite statement can be made due to , the high degree of indecision. 
However, it is apparent that inevitable evolutionary change as a 
result of natural causes was not confidently viewed as a possibility :' 
An association, however, exists between attitude towards statement 
22 and occupational and income differences. Agreement was strongest 
amongst the unskilled workers, the self-employed and the students 
whilst it was lowest among the professionals, the unemployed and 
/ 
180. 
the sales staff. No clear pattern was established as both affluent 
and non-affluent occupational groups agreed and disagreed. The 
d t th professionals, believed to a greater students, as oppose 0 e 
extent in the inevitability of change. 
There was however, a slight tendency for disagreement to increase 
d There was also stronger agreement amongst as income increase • 
those with lower education than those with higher education. 
Agreement decreased as educational qualifications increased. 
stronger agreement amongst the men on the inevitability Also, there was 
of evolutionary change, who were less pessimistic than the women. 
TABLE 63 
Statement 23: I think we could have changed our situation a 
long time ago if people were less apathetic. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL 
Strongly Agree 87 (48,33%) 15 (12,50%) 13 (21,67%) 115 
Agree 62 <34,44%) 85 (70,83%) 35 (58,33%) 182 
Undecided 11 ( 6,11%) 5 ( 4,17%) 7 (11,67%) 23 
Disagree 14 ( 7,78%) 13 (10,83%) 5 ( 8,33%) 32 
Strongly Disagree 6 ( 3,33%) 2 ( 1,67%) 0 (0,00%) 8 







The following conclusions can be drawn from Tables 63 and 64: the 
mean equalled the median at 4, both indicating agreement. The 
variance at 0,94 indicates a high degree of consensus. This was 
matched by a significantly high degree of correlation between the 
rankings of the different races. 
The scores of the different responses correlated positively with 
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Strongly Disagree (1) 
Coloureds agreeing . The majority of people of all races blamed 
community apathy as a major factor for a stagnating political 
situation . 
All occupational groups chose to blame themselves rather than the 
State for the present p~litical ·situation. 
No clear association existed between statement 23 and differences 
in income earned. However, there was a slight tendency for agreement 
to decrease as income increased. The exception here being the 
highest income group that agreed more strongly than other groups. 
, No association existed between statement 23 and educational 
\. 
differences. There was also general unanimity amongst the different 






Statement 24: If people with the same problems were to come 
together as a group they would be able to change their 
situation . 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL % 
Strongly Agree 97 (53,89%) 22 (18,33%) 18 (30,00%) 137 38,01 
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The results in Tables 65 and 66 show that: 86,11% agreed with 
statement 24 whilst 8,88% disagreed. Only 5,00% were undecided. 
Th·e mean at 4,14 was between agree and strongly agree but tended 
towards agree. The median was 4 and the quantile at 25,00% was 
also 4. Hence, the variance at 0,85 indicated a very high degree 
of consensus and a significantly high correlation coefficient 
was discerned. 
It appears that 82,22% of the Africans, 93,33% of the Indians and 
83,33% of the Coloureds agreed with the statement. The belief 
that collective rather than individual action would necessitate 
changes in individual lives was strongest amongst the Indians. It 
is probably stronger within this group because group rather than 
individual effort is more strongly emphasised. 
There was high agreement amongst all occupational groups, notably 
amongst the self-employed where 100,00% of the respond~nts agreed. 
Strongest agreement came from those within the highest and lowest 
income groups. 
Agreement was relatively constant, except amongst the. illiterate 
group who disagreed with statement 24. This shows that collective 
action of some sort would be supported by a broad section of the 
populati on. Furthermore, more women than men favoured collective 
ac t ion. 
TABLE 67 
Statement 26: The mass media should furnish us with all the 
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Wi th regard to this statement, Tables 67 and 68 indicate that: 
90,55% of the popUlation agreed whilst 6,38% disagreed and 3 .06% 
were undecided. The median is at 4 whilst the variance at 0 , 76 
indicates a very high consensus. A high percentage, 92,22% of the 
Africans, 89,16% of the Indians and 88,33% of the Coloureds agreed , 
with significant correlation existing within the rankings. It is 
clear that media coverage was viewed as inadequate . There seems to 
be a high degree of consensus with the extraparliamentary demand 
that press censorship be lifted and that the public be furnished 
with all the information concerning unrest in the country . 
An association exists between statement 26 and differences in 
occupation. Strongest agreement was amongst the professionol~clerks, 
students and the unskilled workers . 
I 
185 . 
There was a tendency for agreement to decrease and then increase 
as qualifications increas ed . Strong agreement came from t he most 
and leas t educated groups. 
A greater number of men (93,33%) agreed than women (87 , 77%) s howing 
men to be more critical of the pres ent state of the media . 
TABLE 69 
Statement 39: Disinvestment by international companies is 
an important way through which racial discrimination can be 
overcome. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL % 
Strongly Agree 41 (22,78%) 10 ( 8,33%) 10 (16,67%) 61 16,94 
Agree 45 (25,00%) 42 (35,00%) 16 (26,67%) 103 28,61 
Undecided 30 (16,67%) 10 ( 8,33%) 9 (15,00%) 49 13,61 
, Disagree 39 (21,67%) 52 (43,33%) 23 (38,33%) 114 31,67 
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From Tables 69 and 70 it is clear that out of the total, 45,55% 
agreed whilst 40,83% disagreed and 13,61% were undecided. The mean 
at 3,13 tended between undecided and agree, but was closer to 
undecided. The high degree of indecision was matched by the 
variance at 1,64 which showed a lack of consensus. A relatively 
high correlation coefficient was discerned . 
Of the Africans, 47,77% agreed whilst 35,55% disagreed and 16,67% 
were undecided . While 43,33% of the Indians agreed,48,33% disagreed 
and 8 , 33% were undecided . Furthermore, 43,34% of the Coloureds 
agreed whilst 41,66% disagreed . A small percentage (15,00%) were 
undecided. There was stronger agreement than disagreement on the 
que.stion of disinvestment, with a greater number of Africans agreeing 
and Indians disagreeing . 
No association existed between attitudes towards statement 39 and 
occupational differences when the categories were viewed independently. 
Strongest agreement came from the unskilled workers and strongest 
disagreement from the professionals. 
When these categories were reorganised in terms of percentages and 
condensed, tendencies were more clearly discerned (Table 71): 
TABLE 71 
ATTITUDES TO DISINVESTMENT IN PERCENTAGES 
AGREE DISAGREE 
% % 
Professi onals 31,48 57 , 41 
Clerical , self-employed , sales 48 , 10 37 , 84 
Unemployed 41,03 46,16 
Students 54 , 55 33,33 
Workers (skilled & unskilled) 51 . 00 31 . 51 
187. 
Only the professional and unemployed were unsupportive of disinvestment 
whilst other sectors including the workers supported disinvestment. 
There was a slight tendency for support for disinvestment to 
increase as income decreased. 
When the results here were compared to those of the Schlemmer 
(December 1984) and CASE/IBR (September 1985) studies, a hardening 
of attitudes over time was noted (Table 72): 




RESULTS OF OTHER STUDIES 
Schlemmer CASE/IBR 
(Dec. 1984 ) (Sept. 1985) 




(n = 360 ) 
4S,S5 
(Orkin, 1986 :24) 
The figures ·show that it is probable that a greater number of people 
are becoming more inclined to support unconditional disinvestment 
in an attempt to end apartheid, as time goes on. It would be likely 
that supporters of disinvestment would be from the lower income and 
less prestigious occupational groups. 
It may also be probab~e that they would come from a lower educated 
background. In the present study, slightly greater support for 
disinvestment came from the l~ss educated groups. 
~ 
The difference between male a~d female responses was minimal and 
hence, not significant. / 
188. 
TABLE 73 
Statement 40: The effects of disinvestment in the long-run 
would be positive. 
AFRICAN INDIAN 
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(13,89%) 10 ( 8,33%) 
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(22,78%) 51 (42,50%) 
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According to Tables 73 and 74, 36,95% agreed whilst 41,66% disagreed 
and 21,39% were undecided. The mean at 2,96 was closer to undecided 
than disagree. The median was at 3 whilst the variance at 1,47 
showed a lack of consensus. A higher moderate correlation 
coefficient was evident. 
While, 33,88% of the Africans agreed and 39,44% disagreed, 37,50% 
of the Indians agreed whilst 47,50% disagreed. But, 45,00% of the 
Coloureds agreed whilst 36,66% disagreed. Whilst more supported 
disinvestment, most people believed that the long term effects 
would be negative. The exception here were the Coloureds where a 
greater proportion ~optimistic about the after effects of 
disinvestment. 
There was greater disagreement than agreement to statement 40 amongst 
all occupational categories except the unskilled workers and students 
where there was a tendency towards agreement. 
The differences amongst the different income groups are depicted 
below (Table 75): 
TABLE 75 
DIFFERENCES AMONG INCOME GROUPS ON LONG TERM EFFECTS OF 
DISINVESTMENT 
Income Earned % of Respondents % of Respondents 
Per Annum that Aqreed that Disaqreed 
Less than R3 000 36,93 30,77 
R 3 - 6 000 39,32 ~ 32,59 
R 6 - 10 000 35,80 I 45,68 
RIO - 15 000 36,84 I 52,64 
R15 - 25 000 33,34 \. 47,62 







Whilst agreement seems relatively constant, disagreement t ends to 
increase as income increases with the exception of one income group 
(R15 - R25 000 per annum) which also exhibited the largest number 
of undecided respondents. 
Those with post-matric education tend to be more supportive of the 
view that the effects of disinvestment would be positive than those 
with only matric education or lower. However, those with primary 
school education tend to be more supportive than those with junior 
secondary education (Tab le 76): 
TABLE 76 




Higher education (Post-Matric) 44,83 41,38 
Senior Certificate 33,86 43,39 
Junior Secondary 37,66 40,26 
Primary Education 40,00 36,00 
No Education 36,36 36.36 
A greater number of men than women believed that the effects of 
disinvestment in the long run would be negative. 
TABLE 77 
Statement 41: One person, one vote would transform this 
country into a democratic society. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL ' 
Strongly Agree 115(63,89%) 18 (15,00%) 15 (25,00%) 148 
Agree 45 (25,00%) 48 (40,00%) 16 (26,67%) 109 
Undecided 14 (7,78%) 21 (17,50%) 18 (30,00%) 53 Disagree 5 (2,78%) 30 (25,00%) 8 (13,33% ) 43 Strongly Disagree 1 (0,56%) 3 (2,50%) 3 (5,00%) 7 
Med~an 4 (Aaree) 
Xw 3,97 
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Strongly Disagree (1) 
With reference to statement 41 (Tables 77 and 78), 71,38% agreed 
whilst 13,88% disagreed and 14,72% were undecided. But, 88,89% of 
the Africans agreed whilst 55,00% of the Indians and 51,67% of the 
Coloureds agreed. A greater amount of Coloureds were undecided 
(30,00%) as opposed to the percentage of Indians (17,50%) and the 
lower percentage of Africans (7,78%) that were also undecided. A 
very low positive correlation coefficient shows disagreement within 
the rankings of attitude of the different races. 
The weighted mean at 3,97 is closer to the median at 4 implying 
agreement. However, the variance at 1,21 does not indicate 
I consensus amongst the respondents. When consensus amongst the 
" different race groups was reviewed it was found that the Africans 
\' 
/ 
exhibited a significantly high degree of consensus. However, Indians 
and Coloureds showed a considerable lack of consensus amongst 
J themselves on this issue. It is probable that a significant sector 
192. 
amongst the Indians and Coloureds who perceive themselves as 
minorities are afraid of the consequences of majority rule which 
is implicit in the principles of one-person-one-vote. 
An association existed between attitude towards statement 41 . and 
occupational level. Ranking in terms of agreement was as follows: 
1. Unskilled workers (89,66%) 
2. Self-employed (75,00%) 
3. Clerks (71,43%) 
4. Students (71,22%) 
5. Skilled workers (69,88%) 
6. Unemployed (69,23%) 
7. Professionals (68,52%) 
8. Sales staff (57,9%) 
It is interesting to note that the professionals and sales staff 
that appeared most critical of the present situation earlier on, 
were most disagreeable to one-person-one-vote. 
It would seem that as income increases favourability towards one-
person-one-vote decreases (Table 79): 
TABLE 79 
I 
RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE toWARDS' ONE-PERSON-
ONE-VOTE 
Income Aqreed Disaqreed Aqreed (Group Averages) 
% % 
R3 000 83,08 3,08 ~ R3 - 6 000 74,16 10,11 77,92% 
R6 - 20 000 71,61 16,04 
~ RIO - 15 000 63,16 17,54 68,11% 
R15 - 25 000 59,52 23,81 
~ R25 000 69,23 23,08 63,23% 
193. 
However, the highest income group is more favourable towards one-
person-one-vote, than the second highest group. When the income 
groups are combined into 3 (as opposed to 6), the indications are 
that agreement decreases as income increases. Within the lower 
income groups there was consensus on support for one-person-one-vote. 
The higher income groups exhibited a lack of consensus as well as 
lesser support. 
No association between statement 41 and educational qualifications 
was evident. However, those with post-matric education were more 
favourable towards one-person, one-vote than those with less 
education. Again, those within the median range were least favourable 
towards a unitary system. 
Men were more supportive of one-person-one-vote than women. 
When age was reviewed it was found that the older people were most 
supportive (Table 80): 
TABLE 80 
RELATION BETWEEN AGE AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS ONE-PERSON-
ONE-VOTE 
Aqe Aqree Disaqree 
% % 
16 - 25 years 71,73 10,35 
26 - 45 68,96 17,24 
46 .. 60 75,71 15,63 





, , , 
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TABLE 81 
Statement 42: The country now needs the unbanning of 
outlawed organisations, people in exile to return, the 
release of those in detention and the calling of a National 
Convention. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL % 
Strongly Agree 104(57,78%) 23 (19,17%) 23 <38,33%) 150 41,67 
Agree 46 (25,56%) 70 (58,33%) 24 (40,00%) 140 38,89 
Undecided 25 (13,89%) 14 (11,67%) 10 (16,67%) 49 13,61 
Disagree · 3 (1,67%) 12 (10,00%) 2 (3,33%) 17 4,72 
Strongly Disagree 2 (1,11%) 1 (0,83%)\ 1 (1,67%) 4 1,11 
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(1 ) 
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According to Tables 81 and 82 the median at 4 indicates a high 
level of agreement whilst the mean at 4,15 compares favourably. 
The variance at 0,82 indicates a high level of consensus and a 
very high positive correlation exists amongst the rankings. 
It appears that 83,34% of the African respondents agreed whilst 
77,~ of the Indians and 78,33% of the Coloureds agreed. Tremendous 
support fr.om all groupings show that no solution to the country's 
problems could be resolved without the participation of excluded 
forces. 
A high degree of agreement was existent amongst all occupational 
groups, in particular the professionals, the self-employed and 
the unskilled workers. 
An association existed between attitude towards statement 42 and 
income earned (Table 83): ' 
TABLE 83 
RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS EXCLUSION 
OF OPPOSITION 
Income Aqree Disaqree 
% % 
R3 000 70,77 4,62 
R3 - 6 000 75,28 12,36 
R6 - 20 000 81,49 4,94 
R10 - 15 000 85,96 5,26 
R15 - 25 000 90,48 0,00 
R25 000 , 92,31 0,00 
Agreement increased as income increased. This supported tl1e weighted 
means which SOCwed agreement tending to increase as income increased. 
\. 






The following differences in terms of age were discerned (Table 
84J: 
TABLE 84 
RELATION BETWEEN AGE AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS EXCLUSION OF 
OPPOSITION 
Age Aqree Disagree 
% % 
16 - 25 years 78,62 3,45 
26 - 45 79,77 8,33 
46 - 60 87,14 6,25 
Strongest agreement came from the older grouping. It is this s.ector 
of the population that lived through the period during which time 
\ . 
the Congress Alliance and other organisations were emerging and 
mobilising the population. These were eventually deactivated 
through bannings, imprisonments and detentions amongst other factors. 
TABLE 85 
Statement 43: A National Convention will not solve the 
countries problems. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL 
Strongly Agree 22 (12,22% ) 3 (2,50%) 2 (3,33%) 27 
Agree 19 (10,56%) 22 (18,33%) 13 (21,67%) 54 
Undecided' 28 (15,56%) 17 (14,17%) 14 (23,33%) 59 
Disagree 34 (18,89%) 68 (56,67%) 20 (33,33%) 122 
Strongly Disagree 77 (42,78%) 10 (8,33%) 11 (18,33%) 98 
Median 4 (Disaqree) ', ' 
/ 
Xw = 3,58 
V = 1,54 
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Tables 85 and 86 show that whilst 61,11% disagreed and 22 , 50% agreed. 
16,39% were undecided. The median at 4 indicates that over 50,00% 
disagreed, whilst the mean at 3,58 indicated an average response 
between undecided and disagree but closer to disagree. The variance 
at 1,54 shows the lack of consensus . An extremely low correlation 
coefficient showed insignificant agreement among the rankings. 
Out of the total, 65,~ of the Indians, 61 , 67% of the Africans and 
51,66% of the Coloureds were most optimistic about the outcome of a 
National Convention . At the same time, a Significantly high number 
of Coloureds (25,00%) believed that a National Convention would not 
solve the country's problems. The fact that a National Convention, 
or a forum through which all political forces come together to 
develop consensus on a future constitution, is not to be seen as an 
end product, was recognised by a proportion of the population that 
agreed that this forum would not solve the country's problems . 
198. 
However. the majority of respondents in each group had faith in a 
National Convention as a means towards resolving the country's 
problems. The scepticism shown by the Coloured community could be 
associated with minority fears coming to the surface. 
An association existed between attitudes towards statement 43 and 
occupational groups. Very strong disagreement was exhibited by the 
sales staff. The professionals. self-employed and unskilled workers 
also disagreed with the statement. Low disagreement showed pessimism 
amongst the clerks and students. 
When income groups were reviewed it was found that the lower income 
.groups were not as supportive as the higher income group. 
Educational qualifications did not play too significant a role in the 
formulation of attitude towards a National Convention. However. 
from the post-junior secondary level average responses were favourable 
and constant. 
There was very little difference between male and female responses. 
TABLE 67 
Statement 45: A National Convention should be called only 















57 (31,67%) 7 
68 (37,78%) 68 
16 (8,89%) 11 
22 (12,22%) 25 
17 (9,44%) 9 
2 (Aqree) 
INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL % 
(5,83%) 7 (11,67%) 71 19,7: 
(56,67%) 24 (40,00%) 160 44,4 · 
(9,17%) 7 (11,67%) 34 9,4 · 
(20,83%) 12 (20,00%) 59 16, 3~ 
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Statement 45 shows that 64,16% agreed whilst 26,36% disagreed. The 
weighted mean at 2,53 was closer to undecided than agree whilst the 
median at 2 indicated agreement. The variance at 1,58 showed a 
lack of consensus. This was matched by a low positive correlation 
coefficient (Tabl e 88). 
So strong was the belief in negoti ation and eonsultation that there 
was agreement from all race groups that even without the exiled and 
banned organisations participating, consultations between existing 
organisations should take place. Out of the total, 69,45% of the 
Africans, 62,50% of the Indians and 51,67% of the Coloureds agreed 
with statement 45. Agreement here was not as significant as with 
statement 42 which included banned organisations and imprisoned and 
exiled persons. There was also a lack of consensus here as compared 
with statement 42. 
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An association existed between atti tude towards statement 45 and 
income earned per annum (Table 89): 
TABLE 89 
RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWMIDS A NATIONAL 
CONVENTION AND ONLY LEGAL ORGANISATIONS PARTAKING 
Income Aqree Disaqree 
% % 
R3 000 64,62% 18,46% 
R3 - 6 000 73,03% 21,35% 
R6 - 20 000 62,97% 28,39% 
RIO - 15 000 68,43% 26,31% 
R15 - 25 000 47,62% 38,1% 
R25 000 53,84% 38,46% 
Disagreement increases as income increases (with the exception of 
the R10 - R15 000 income group). 
Agreement was stronger amongst those with lower education as opposed 
to those with higher education showing the less educated to be most . 
inclined to support all forms of pressure. 
It would .appear that in line with the women's more conservative 
stance depicted through this study, a greater number of women were 
more inclined to support negotiations under any circumstances. Yet, 
the weighted means indicating male and female responses were 




Statement' 46: The state should attempt to solve problems at 
a provincial or regional level eg. develop a political 
structure for Natal to resolve its problems by itself. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED 
Strongly Agree 8 (4,44%) 4 (3,33%) 4 
Agree 34 (18,89%) 35 (29,17%) 20 
Undecided 30 (16,67%) 16 (13,33%) 12 
Disagree 49 (27,22%) 56 (46,67%) 17 
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freedom 
P • 0,J145 
> 0,05 
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According to Table 90, 54,72% disagreed whilst 29,16% agreed, 
and 16,11% were undec ided. The median at 4 indicates disagreement 
whilst the mean at 3,42 is closer to undecided than disagree. The 
variance at 1,43 shows a general lack of consensus. The low 
positive correlation showed some disagreement within the rankings 
(Table 91). 
Table 90also shows that 23,33% of the Africans agreed whilst 60,00% 
disagreed and 16,67% were undecided. But, 32,50% of the Indians 
agreed whilst 54,17% disagreed and 13,33% were undecided. It 
appears that LIO,OO% of the Coloureds agreed whilst 40,00% were undecided. 
The majority disagreed with a regional solution to the country's 
problems. Significantly, strongest disagreement came from the 
Africans, thus undermining Buthelezi's initiative on the KwaZulu 
Indaba. 
No association existed between atti t ude towards statement 46 and 
occupational differences. Strongest disagreement was exhibited by 
the students and the clerks. 
An interesting association was depicted by the different income 
groups (Table 92): 
TABLE 92 
RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOLVING 
PROBLEMS AT A REGIONAL LEVEL 
Income (o.a. ) 
R3 000 
R3 - 6 000 
R6 - 10 000 
R10 - 15 000 
















~ Most favourable group 
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The median income group tended to be most supportive of regional 
alternatives for social change, whilst the lowest and highest 
income groups tend to be least supportive. 
When educational categories were reviewed it was found that those 
with higher education tended to disagree with statement 46 more 
strongly than the other educational categories. 
Some differences between the sexes were noted, with men disagreeing 
to a larger extent than women, i.e. 50,56% disagreed whilst 31,11% 
of the men agreed and 58,89% disagreed. 
Only 37,25% of those who supported intraparliamentary change, also 
supported statement 46. This represented 5,27% of the sample. 
But, 57,14% of those that supported extra parliamentary evolutionary 
change disagreed with statement 46. 
TABLE 93 
Statement 47: Natal cannot separate itself politically from 













72 (40,00%) 18 
58 (32,22%) 66 
23 (12,78% ) 5 
20 (11,11%) ,30 
7 (3,89%) 0 
4 (Aqree) 
INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL 
(15,00%) 18 (30,00%) 108 
(55,00%) 26 (43,33%) 150 
(4,17%) 5 (8,33%) 33 
(25,00%) 11 (18,33%) 61 
(0,00%) 1 (0,83%) 8 
According to Table 93, 71,66% agreed whilst 19,16% disagreed and 
9,17% were undecided. ~ith the median at 4 indicating agree~ent 







to agree, the variance at 1,23 shows a lack of consensus. A moderate 
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3 98 I o 98 
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Xw 1 V xw V 
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NONE ( AND 
R3 000 ILLITERATE) 




R3 - t6 000 LITERA'rE) 
3 76 1 12 3 75 1 0 93 
BE'lWEEN 1 PRIMARY SCHOOL 
R6 - R10 000 ' 3 84 1 1 01 
3 77 1 1 25 JUNIOR 
BE'lWEEN 
RI0 - R15 000 
3 84 I 0 97 
BE'lWEEN : 
R15 - R25 000 I 
3 95 I 1 04 
MORE THAN 
R25 000 
3,_96 1 1 34 
x" a 28,859 
wi th 20" 
f reedom 
P ,. 0,0906 
:>0,05 
SECON,DARY 
3 61 1,45 
SENIOR 
SECONDARY 
3 82 1 1 23 
POST-jTRIC 
4 05 0 84 




P a 0,0997 
>0,05 
Strong l y Agree (5) 
Agre e (4) 
Undecided (3) 
Disag ree (2) 
Strongly Disagree (1) 
GENDER AGE 
Xw V xw I V 
MALE BE'lWEEN 
3 90 1 1 26 16 - 25 YEARS 
F&lALE 3 84 1 1 12 
3 70 1 1 17 26 - 35 
3 88 1 1 22 
x~ a 7,074 36 - 45 
wi th 4" 3 78 1 1 34 
freedom 46 - 60 
P • 0,1320 3 65 I 0 98 
>0,05 OVER 60 
3 50 I o 91 
1 x» ,. 18,758 
with 16" 
freedOiD 
P ,. 0,2814 
:>0,05 
Table 93 also shows that 72,22% of the Africans, 70,00% of the Indians 
and 73,33% of the Coloureds agreed whilst 15,00% of the Africans, 
25,83% of the Indians and 18,33% of the Coloureds disagreed . Hence, 
when a more direct question of political exclusion was addressed, 
stronger disagreement from all communities was expressed. It is 
interesting to note at the same time that a recent survey has shown 
growing support for the Indaba amongst rank-and-file Nationalists . 
However, this has been discounted by the local NP leaders for various 
reasons, including the fact that the poll was commissioned by the 
Indaba itself (Daily News, 22 January 1988 : 12) . 
:. 
When occupation categories were reviewed, it was found that strongest 




When income levels were reviewed the following pattern was 
established (Table 95): 
TABLE 95 
RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE toWARDS NATAL' S 
POLITICAL SEPARATION FROM REST OF COUNTRY 
Income Aqree Disaaree 
% % 
R3 000 63,08 20,00 
R3 - 6 000 70,78 19,10 
R6 - 10 000 69,13 20,98 
R10 - 15 000 77,19 17,54 
R15 - 25 000 78,57 16,67 
R25 000 80,77 19.23 
Whilst disagreement remains fairly constant, agreement tends to 
increase slightly as income increases. 
When educational qualifications were reviewed it was found that 
agreement was strongest amongst the highest income group and lowest 
amongst those with junior secondary education. 
Agreement was also stronger amongst men than women. 
TABLE 96 
Statement 48: Civic actions such as refusing to pay high 
















37 (20,56%) 13 
40 (22,22%) 61 
57 (31,67%) 9 
38 (21,11%) 32 
8 (4,44%) 5 
4 (Aqree) 
INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL 
(10,83%) 12 (20,00%) 62 
(50,83%) 20 <33,33% ) 121-
(7,50%) 6 (10,00%) 72 
(26,67%) 17 (28,33%) 87 
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with 8-
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P .. 0,0001 
,0,05 




OCCUPATION INCOME EDUCATION 
Xw V Xw V Xw V 
CLERK LESS THAN !'lONE (AND 1 ! 3 33 ! 1 26 R3 000 1 ILLITERA'rE) . PROFESSIONAL 3 38 , 1 46 I 3 )) , a n. 
I ) 16 1 51 BETWEEN NONE (AND 
SALES R3 - R6 000 , Ll TE,RA'rf::) i . 3 50 , 1 10 3 87 0 60 ) 57 1 SO 
I SELF-EMPLOYED I 3,60 : 1,09 , BETWEEN • PRIMARY, SCHOOL R6 - Rl0 000 : 3-<-28 1 32 
SK !LLED WORKER 3 35 ! 1 06 I 3,22 , 1,40 I BETWEEN 
R10 - R15 000 UNSKILLED I WORKER 3 17 I 1 47 
• 3 L17 I 1 03 BETWEEN 
! STUDENT R15 - R25 000 
I 3,54 , 1 152 3,16 I 1142 I 
OTHER I MORE THAN i ! , 3 28 i a 97 
x~ .. 36,143 
wi th 28-
freedom 
I i R25 000 I 
3 23 I 1 79 
P .. 0,1390 
>0,05 
x2 .. 28,493 
wi th 20-
freedom 
P .. 0,0982 
>0,05 




Strongly Di$agree (1) 
JUNIOR 
SECON,DARY 
3-,-36 1 16 
SENIOR 
SECONDARY 
3 ,34 I 1,52 
POST-MATRIC 
3 ,24 I 1,14 I 
x~ .. 18: 327 
wl th 20 
freedom 
P .. 0,5659 
>0,05 
GENDER AGE 
Xw V Xw , V 
I MALE 
3 32 -f 1 46 
BETWEEN 
16 - 25 YEARS 
3 45 , 1 44 P94ALE 
3 35 -j 1 24 26 - 35 
3 44 I 1 22 
I x" .. 2,478 36 - 45 
wi th 4' 3 09 , 1 40 
freedOlll 46 - 60 
P .. 0 , 6486 3 17 I 1 14 
>0,05 OVE,R 60 
3 33 1 22 
x" .. 15,095 
I wi th 16-freedom I p s O,5177 
I >0,05 
Tables 96 and 97 show the following results . The median at 4 
indicates agreement whilst the weighted mean at 3,33 shows 
indecisiveness. The low agreement and variance at 1,45 shows a lac~ 
of consensus. By group, 42,~ of the Africans agreed whilst 25 , 55% 
disagreed; 61,66% of the Indians agreed whilst 30,84% disagreed; 
53 , 33% of the Coloureds agreed whilst 36,66% disagreed. A low 
positive correlation shows some disagreement within the rankings. 
There was no consensus on this issue . Stronger support came from 
Indian respondents followed by Coloured and then African respondents . 
At the same time strongest disagreement came from the Coloureds, 
then the Indians and then the Africans . Ambiguous responses from 
the race groups could probably be a result of the experiences people 
have had with civic issues. Where support is stronger, community 
victories have been won in the past, where support is minimal serious 
losses have been encountered in the past . 
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Strongest agreement came from the students, self-employed, the 
unemployed and the sales staff. Lowest agreement was exhibited by 
the professionals, the skilled workers, the clerks and the unskilled 
workers. 
The differences in income levels were as follows (Table 98): 
TABLE 98 
RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS CIVIC ACTIONS 
Income p.a. Aqree Disaqree 
% % 
R3 000 
R3 - 6 000 
R6 - 10 000 
RIO - 15 000 













Strongest agreement came from the lowest income group. Close behind 
was the highest income group with the middle income group being the 
most resistant to this sort of strategy. 
There was very little difference regarding support for this sort of 
strategy between the different educat ional groups. 
Women agreed more strongly than men with statement 47. This could 
-
probably be because women have been traditionally more active in 




Statement 49: The trade unions should be supported by 
workers since these are the most important organisations 
through which workers can change their economi c situation. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL % 
Strongly Agree 107(59,44%) 28 (23,33%) 19 (31,67%) 154 42,78 
Agree 62 (34,44%) 81 (67,50%) 
Undecided 7 (3,89%) 5 (4,17%) 
Disagree 4 (2,22%) 5 (4,17%) 












4 51 0 46 
INDIAN 
4 08 l 0 50 
COLOfREO 
4 11 0 6 6 
x~ - 47,279 
v ith 8· 
freedom 
P - 0 , 0001 
(, 0,05 












4 281 0 34 
PROFESSIONAL 
4 37 I 0 34 
SALES 
4 26 ! 1 77 
SELF-I!MPLOYED 








5 5 0 52 
STU,DENT 
4 31 0 58 
OTHER 
~10 1 0,29 
x" - 39 , 015 
vith 28· 
freedom 









4-,-43 :1 0 58 
BE'lWEEN 
R3 - R6 000 
4 38 1 0 39 
BE'lWEEN 
R6 - R10 000 
4 22 I 0 64 
BE'lWEEN 
R10 - R1 5 000 
421 ' 044 
BE'lWEEN 
R15 - R25 000 
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4 33 I 0 22 
NONE (AND 
I LITERA'rE) 
I 4 87 I 0 10 
PRIMARY SCHOOL 
4 32 I 0 45 
' JUNIOR 
SECON,DARY 
4 25 0 63 
SENIOR 
SECONDARY 
4 29 , o 50 
POST-MA'rRIC 
4 29 , 0 66 
x' - 16,742 
I vith 20· 
I freedom P - 0,6691 
> 0,05 
34 (56,67%) 177 49,17 
2 (3,33%) 14' 3,89 
5 (8,33%) 14 3,89 
0 (0,00%) 1 0,28 
GEN DER AGE 
Xv V Xv I v 
MALE BE'lWEEN 
4 36 T 0 6 2 1 6 - 25 YEARS 
FI!MALE 4-,-30 1 0 48 
4 23 1 0 48 26 - 35 
4-,-27 1 0 69 
x" - 1 0 ,349 36 - 45 
vi th 4· 4 18 1 o 73 
freedOlll 46 - 60 
I P - 0,0349 4 42 I o 33 ~0,05 OVER 60 4 66 1 0 22 
x~ - 13,735 
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freedom -





With reference to Table 9~ 91,94% agreed whilst 4,17% disagreed 
and 3,89% were undecided. The mean at 4,3 and median at 4 indicate 
agreement whilst the variance at 0 , 56 indicates a very high degree 
of consensus. This was matched by a strong positive correlation 
coefficient (Table 100). 
Table 99also shows that 93,88% of the Africans agreed whilst 90,83% 
of the Indians and 88,34% of the Coloureds agreed. The very high 
consensus here can only point to the potential trade unions have in 
terms of mobilising Black (African, Indian and Coloured) support 
for social change strategies. It also emphasises the increasingly 
significant role of the trade unions. 
There was general unanimity amongst the different occupational 
categories with the unskilled workers, the professionals, the 
students and the clerks showing the strongest support. 
When the different income groups were reviewed, it was found that 
the highest agreement was found amongst the lowest income groupings, 
followed by the highest income grouping, but without much difference 
among the highest and lowest groupings. 
Agreement amongst the different educational groups was comparable. 
However, it would seem that stronger agreement was exhibited by the 
lower income groups. 
Strong consensus and agreement was exhibited by both women and men, 




Statement 51: Political organisations are not effective. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL % 
Strongly Agree 4 (2,22%) 2 (1,67%) 10 (16,67%) 16 4,44 
Agree 26 (14,44%) 25 (20,83%) 14 (23,33%) 65 18,06 
Undecided 29 (16,11%) 21 (17,50%) 10 (16,67%) 60 16,67 
Disagree 74 (41,11%) 64 (53,33%) 22 (36,67%) 160 44,44 
Strongly Disagree 47 (26,11%) 8 (6,67%) 4 (6,67%) 59 16,39 
Median 4 (Disagree) 
Xw = 3,50 
V = 1,21 -- - --
TABLE 102 
STATEMENT 51 
RACE OCCUPATION INCQ4E EDUCATION GENDER AGE Xv V Xw I v Xw v Xw v Xw v Xw -.l V AFRICAN CLERK LESS THAN NONE (AND MALE BE'l'WEEN 3 74 f 1 13 3 50 -, 1,34 R3 000 ILLITERATE) 3 53 , 1 31 16 - 25 YEARS 
IND,IA.~ I PROFESfIONAL 3 56 ' 1 53 4 33 I 0 22 FIIMALE 3· 67 J 1 06 3 42 0 89 3 50 1,21 BE'l'WEEN NONE (AND 3-L46 J 1 09 .~6 - 35 COLOURED ! SALES R3 - R6 000 LITERATE) 3 47 J 1 22 2,93 -f 1 52 I 3 52 J 1,19 3 61 , 1 02 3,00 , 1 25 ,f • 16,326 36 - 45 
SELF- &ItLOYED BE'l'WEEN PRIMARY SCHOOL with 4" 3 47 I 1 13 xl • 51,235 3 64 1 08 R6 - 110 000 3 64 1 1 51 freedOlll 46 - 60 with 8· ! SKI LLED, WORltER ' 3 51 1 02 JUNIOR P • 0,0026 3 25 , 1 40 freedom 31 46 1 95 BE'lWEEN SF£ON1ARY < 0,05 OVER 60 P • 0,0001 UNSKIL!.ED Rl0 - ,R15 000 3 40 0 98 2 66 1 0 88 £0,05 WORKER 3 28 lL21 SENIOR 
3 411 1 001 BE'l'WEEN SF£ONDARY x~.29,747 
STU,DENT R15 - IR25 000 3 50 1 1,20 with 16" 
I rs • 0,362 3 72 1 16 3 26 1 43 POST- !tATRIC freedom OTHER MORE THAN 3 60 I 1 17 P • 0,0194 3 15 -, 0,89 R25 000 £0,05 3 76 , 1 02 x~ • 19,778 
x2. • 25,48 wi th 20" 
Wl th 28° I x
2 • 26,842 
I 
freedom 
I freedom wi th 20· P - 0,4719 
I P - 0,6016 freedom >0,05 
i >0,05 P J' 0,1398 
I ":>0,05 
Strongly Agree (1) \ 
Agree (2) 
Undec ided ( 3) 
Disagree (4) 
Strongly Disagree (5) / 
/ 
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In Tables 101 and 102, the median of 4 shows disagreement· whilst the 
mean at 3,5 suggests that the strength of the responses lie between 
undecided and disagree. The variance ~t 1,21 indicates a lack of 
consensus. A low positive correlation coefficient was discerned. 
According to Table 101, 67,22% of the Africans disagreed and 16,67% 
agreed. But, 60,00% of the Indians disagreed whilst 22,50% 
agreed and 43,34% of the Coloureds disagreed whilst 40,00% agreed. 
Significantly more Africans believed that political organisations 
were effective than Coloureds, where a low percentage were of the 
same opinion. 
The responses of people within the different occupations were as 
follows (Table 103): 
TABLE 103 
RELATION BETWEEN OCCUPATION AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLITICAL 
ORGANISATIONS 
Occupation Aqree Disaqree 
% % 
Clerks 21,42 66,67 -Unemployed 30,77 46,15 
Professionals 24,07 61,11 
Sales Staff 26,32 57,89 
Se1f-:emp1oyed 14,28 60,72 
Skilled Workers 24,09 60,24 
Students 16,67 71,21 
Un~kil1ed Workers 24,14 51,72 
The strongest support for political organisations came from the 
., 
students whilst the lowest support came from the unem~loyed. 
Disagreement or support for political organisatio;s, J as strongest 
amongst the highest earning group (Table 104): / 
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TABLE 104 
RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLITICAL 
ORGANISATIONS 
Income Earned Aqree Disaqree 
% % -
R3 000 23,07% -61,53% 
R3 - 6 000 19,1% 67,42% 
R6 - 10 000 18,52% 53,08% 
RIO - 15 000 28,07% 54,38% 
R15 - 25 000 -33,33% 59,52% 
R25 000 
L _________  
15,39% 76,92% 
Stronger support for political organisations came from the lowest 
\ -
rather than middle income group. This compares favourably with the 
weighted means of those income groups. 
Support for political organisations amongst respondents with different 
educational qualifications was similar. 
When gender was considered, men tended to be more supportive of 
political organisations than women. 
There were some differences exhibited by the different age groups. 
As age increas~s agreement increases i.e. older people believe more 
strongly that political organisations are ineffective. 
Tables 105 and 106 show that 73,33% disagreed_ whilst 8,61% agreed 
and 18,06% were undecided, whilst the weighted mean at 3,83 was 
close to the median at 4 indicating disagreement. 'I T~e variance at 
0,79 indicates a significant degree of consensus. An exceptionally 
strong positive correlation coefficient was disc;rneJ . 
/ 
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TABLE 10 5 
Statement 52: Trade unions are not effective. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL % 
Strongly Agree 5 (2,78%) 2 (1,67%) 0 (0·,00% ) 7 1,94 
Agree 5 (2,78%) 12 (10,00% ) 7 (11,67%) 24 6,67 
Undecided 45 (25,00%) 14 (11,67%> 6 (10,00%) 65 18,06 
Disagree 75 (41,67%) 79 (65,83%> 38 (63,33%) 192 53 , 33 
Strongly" Disagree 50 (27,78%) 13 (10,83%) 9 (15,00%) 72 20,00 
Medlan 4 (Disaqree) 
xw . - 3,83 
V = 0,79 
TABL! 106 
S'l'AT!M!N'l' 52 
RAC! OCCUPATION INCCMB EDUCATION GENDER Xv V Xv AGB V Xv V Xv V Xv T V AFRICAN CLBRJt Xv V 
3 88 1 0 87 3 90 -j 0 56 
LESS THAN NONB (AND MALS 8B'lWBBN R3 000 ILLIT,!RATBI 3 93 .OJ 0 81 
INDIIAN PROFES,SIONAL 3 76 - , 0 85 16 - 2,5 YEARS I 3 33 0 22 FiliAL! 3 84 0 70 3 88 0 65 3 82 0 79 
COLOIURBD 
8B'lWBBN NON! (AND 3 72-' 0 77 26 --rr SALES R3 - R6 000 LITB,RATBI 3L 8l 0 68 3 84 ", 0 86 3 74 f 1 01 3.86 , 0 87 4 12 0 35 x2 .7,43 36 - 45 
x" • 40,338 
SBLP- EMtLOYEO 8B'IW!BN PRIMARY, SCHOOL with 4- 3 77 , 0.86 3 82 0 86 R6 - IRlO 000 3"92 0.79 freedOID with 8- SKILL!D, WOIU<ER 3 79 0 70 46 - 60-
freedom JUNIOR P • 0,1148 3 84 , 0 91 3 80 0 90 8E'IW!BN S!CON,DARY P • 0,0001 UNSKILLED RlO - IRl5 000 3 77 0 66 
>0,05 OVE,R 60 
,,0,05 WORKER 3,84 0 69 SENIOR 
3 66 0 55 
3 58 ., 0.76 8B'lWBEN S!CON1DARY xa a 14 , 548 
i STUIDBNT R15 - R25 000 3 76 0 94 I rs • 0 , 975 3 87 1 04 4,04 f 0 37 POST-rATRIC vi th 16· OTHER MORB THAN 4 0 3 0 65 freedom I 3 79 -f 0 47 P .. 0,558 R25
1 
000 
4 00 0 92 X2 .. 16,977 
>0 , 05 
Xl - 61,,652 
X~ a 29,,297 
wi t h 20· 
w1th 28 fceedOdl 
freedom w1th 20 P • 0,.6545 
P - 0 , 0002 freedom > 0,05 .e.O , 05 P .. 0,0821 
>0,05 
Strongly Agree (11 
Agree (2) 
Undecided (3) 
DiSAgree (4 ) 
Strongly DiSAgree (5) 
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Table 105 also shows that 69,45% of the Africans disagreed whilst 
5,56% agreed and 25,00% remained undecided. But, 76,67% of the 
Indians disagreed whilst 11,67% agreed and 11,67% remained undecided. 
The number of Africans disagreeing with the statement i.e. believing 
that trade unions were effective was slightly higher than the number 
supporting political organisations (2,Ory~ higher). The differences 
evident within the Indian and Coloured sectors were significant. 
Approximately 17,00% more Indians and 35,00% more Coloureds supported 
trade unions, than .political organisations. 
Strongest belief in the effectiveness of trade unions was exhibited 
by the students, the clerks and the professionals. There was 
significant support from the workers as well. 
The following were the results when respondents from different 
income groups were reviewed (Table 107): 
TABLE 107 
RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWAROSTRADE UNIONS 
BEING INEFFECTIVE 
Income Earned Aqree Disaaree 
% % -
R3 000 7,7CJ1, 67,69% 
R3 - 6 000 11,23% 69,66% 
R6 - 10 000 7,41% 66,66% 
R10 - 15 000 12,28% 80, 7CJ1, 
R15 - 25 000 2,38% 88,1~ 
R25 000 7,70% 80,77% 
Those with higher incomes were more confident about the effectiveness 
of trade unions. 
Furthermore, 73,27% of those with h" h ~g er education disagreed whilst 




There was stronger support for trade unions amongst men than 
women. Both men and women were more supportive of trade unions 
than political organisations. 
TABLE 108 
Statement 57: A fourth chamber for Africans should be added 
to the tricamera1 parliament. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL % 
Strongly Agree 71 (39,44%) 9 (7,50%) 6 (10,00%) 86 23,89 
Agree 55 (30,56%) 27 (45,00%) 67 (55,83%) 149 41,39 
Undecided 13 (7,22%) 13 (10,83%) 4 (6,67%) 30 8,33 










17- (9,44%) 10 (8,33%) 11 (18,33%) 38 
2 (Aqree) 
According to Table 108, 65,27% agreed whilst 26,38% disagreed and 
8,33% were undecided. In Table 108 the median at 2 indicates 
agreement whilst the mean at 2,48 is closer to agree than undecided. 
However, the variance at 1,68 shows the lack of consensus existent 
amongst the population. The lowest positive correlation coefficient 
(O) showed no agreement within the rankings. 
10,56 
Table 108 also indicates that 70,00% of the Africans agreed and 
22,77% disagreed, whilst 63,33% of the Indians agreed and 25,83% 
disagreed. But, 55,00% of the Coloureds agreed and 38,33% disagreed. 
Strongest support for the fourth chamber c,ame from the African 
sector - contradicting the rejection of the proposal for the fourth 
chamber by extraparliamentary evolutionary forces. 
An association existed between attitude towards statement 57 and 
occupation. Agreement was not strong among higher prestige 



















RACE _l OCCUP.JI.TION INCOME EDUCATION GENDER AGE 
Xv V Xv V Xv V , Xv 1 V Xv V Xv L V 
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I OTHER MORE THAN 2 46 1 2 07 P • 0,9915 2,41 ! 0,95 R25, 000 >0, 05 I 3 46 2 24 I x' - 24,046 ! x" • 69,296 wi th 20· I 
I wi t!l 28 ° x' • 59.291 freedom 
, f reedoln wi th 2O· P • 0,2 404 
; P - 0,0001 f reedom I :> 0,05 I .:. 0,05 i P = 0 , 0001 I ! 
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Strongl y Disagree (5) 
The differe~ces in income exhibited the following differences 
in terms of attitude (Table 110): 
TABLE 110 
RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS A FOURTH 
PARLIAMENTARY CHAMBER FOR AFRICANS 
Income Earned Aqree Disaqree 
% % - -
R3 000 78,46 13,85 
R3 - 6 000 71,91 16,86 
R6 - 10 000 70,37 20,98 
RIO - 15 000 54,39 40,36 
R15 - 25 000 52,38 38,09 
R25 000 38,46 57,69 
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This indicates clearly that agreement to the formation of a fourth 
chamber decreases as income increases. An examination of the 
weighted means also shows an identical relationship. 
Agreement tends to increase as educational qualifications decrease. 
There was lesser agreement from the higher educated groups. This 
is to be expected since the leadership of the anti-apartheid forces, 
which have rejected the idea of the fourth chamber, have always 
tended to arise from better educated backgrounds. 
A greater number of women than men were supportive of the fourth 
chamber. 
Differences in strength of attitude were discerned amongst the 
various age groups. 
Strongest dlsagreement came from the oldest group, showing them to 
be most opposed to reformist strategies. 
TABLE 111 
Statement 59: The nation 'wide boycotts at schools and 
universities show student's rejection of the South African 
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(50,83%> 31 (51,67%> 160 44,44 
(11,67%> 7 (11,67%> 42 11,67 
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According to Table 111, 73,88% agreed (29,44% strongly agreed), 
14,44% disagreed whilst 11,67% were undecided. The variance at 
°fo t s "'h';lst the mean at 3,87 was 1,09 did not show sign~ ~can consensu w ~ 
closer to agree than undecided and thus compared favourably with the 
median at 4. A very strong positive correlation coefficient was 
evident (Table 112 ). 
I RACE 
i Xv v 
, A!>RICAN 
3 L90 i lL64 
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3 72 -f 1.L48 
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4 05 I o 68 
x" • 17,792 
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freedom 
P • 0,0228 
'0,05 




OCCUPATION INCOME EDUCATION 
Xv V Xv V Xv V 
CLERK LESS THAN l NONE (AND 3 66 I 1 12 R3 000 ILLITERATE) PROf~IONAL 3-L84 1 1 31 3-L33 1 0 22 
3 79 1 38 BE'lWEEN NONE (AND 
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4 10 1 0 62 3 96 1 0 84 h37 1 0 98 
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4 03 I 1 10 R6 - Rl0 000 h80 1 1 44 
SKILLED iiORKER 3 80 I 0 96 JUNIOR 
3 75 1 1 17 BE'lWEEN SECONDARY 
UNSKILLED Rl0 - R15 000 3 76 i 0-L85 
WORKER 3 71 I 1 28 SENIOR 
3 96 I 1 41 BE'lWEEN SECONDARY 
STUDENT R15 - R25 000 3 86 .1 1 10 
4 16 1 1 22 3 85 I 1 27 POST-!4ATRIC 
OTIHER MORE THAN 3 94 I 1 54 
3 41 0 95 R25 000 
4 11 I 1 30 x 2 ,. 28,312 
x2 • 33,409 with 20· 
with 28· x 1 • 28,818 freedOlll 
f reedom wi th 20' P a 0,1022 
P • 0,221 freedom >0,05 
;. 0,05 P • 0,0914 
;. 0,05 




Strongly Disagree (1) 
GENDER AGE 
Xv V Xv I v 
MALE BE'lWEEN 
3 95 1 1 05 16 - 2,5 YEARS 
PIIlALE 3-L93 1 07 
3 77 1 1 09 26 - 35 
3 89 1 1 04 
x 2 • 5,251 36 - 45 
vi th 4· 3 77 1 1 09 
freedom 46 - 60 
P • 0,2625 3-L75 I 1 18 
>0,05 OVER 60 
4 161 0 13 
x2 • 18,754 
vith 16· 
freedom 
P • 0,2816 
>0,05 
Table 111 also shows that 73,34% of the Africans, 70,83% of the 
Indians and 81,67% of the Coloureds agreed. It is interesting to 
I note that strongest agreement came from the Coloured community. 
/ 
African students in Natal have been less radical than their Cape or 
Transvaal counterparts, whilst Indian students have been the least 
in favour of boycotts as a means of symbolic protest or resistance. 
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As could be predicted when occupation was reviewed, students were 
most in favour of statement 59. Also strongly supportive were the 
sales staff and the self-employed. 
Agreement was strongest amongst the highest income group, showing 
this strategy to be most supported by the affluent classes. 
Similarly, agreement was strongest amongst the higher educated and 
disagreement was strongest amongst those with the lowest educational 
qualifications. 
Greater support for nationwide boycotts was exhibited by the men 
rather than the women. 
TABLE 113 
Statement 61': Passive resistance by the communities gives 
rise to significant change. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL , 

















(20,56%) 66 (55,00%) 12 (20,00%) 115 
(28,33%) 13 (10,83%) 16 " (26,67%) 80 
(23,89%) 24 (20,00%) 19 (31,67%) 86 
(20,56%) 7 (5,83%) 6 (10,00%) 50 
3 (Undecided) 
According to Table 113, 40,00% agreed whilst 37,78% disagreed and 





The median at 3, matched by the weighted mean at 2,96 which is closer 
to undecided than agree show indecision within the Black community . / 
on this question. The variance at 1,44 indicates a lack of consensus 
/ 
and a very low positive correlation coefficient was evident (Table "114). 
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INCOME EDUCATION GENDER AGE 
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Strongly Disagree (1) 
According to Table 113, 27,23% of the Africans, 63,33% of the Indians 
and 31, 67% of the Coloureds agreed, and 44,45% of the Africans, 
25,83% of the Indians and 41,67% of the Coloureds disagreed. Hence, 
there was no strong support for passive resistance except within 
the Indian community. Historically, passive resistance has been an 
important component of Indian resistance. 
An association existed between attitude towards statement 61 and 
occupational levels. Strongest agreement was exhibited by the 
unemployed, the ,clerks and the skilled workers. Agreement was not 
significant amongst the students, sales staff and the unskilled 
workers. 
• f 




RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWAR~PASSIVE 
RESISTANCE 
Income Earned A_gree Disagree 
% % -
R3 000 30,77 47,70 
R3 - 6 000 40,45 39,32 
R6 - 10 000 37,04 34,57 
RIO - 15 000 47,37 29,82 
R15 - 25 000 40,48 35,72 
R25 000 53,85 38,46 
Agreement tends to drop and then rise again. Lowest agreement to 
statement 61 came from the lowest income group whilst strongest 
agreement to passive resistance as a strategy came from the highest 
income group. 
Disagreement to passive resistance tends to increase as educational 
qualifications increase. The more educated sector sees little hope 
in attaining change through passive resistance. 
Women, however, were more supportive of passive resistance than men. 
Agreement to statement 61 increases as age increases. 
The most supportive were the older sector of people. It was this 
group that had lived through the passive resistance era of the 1940s 
and 1950s. 
TABLE 116 







(c) Absolute size 
(d) Percent supportive of extraparliamentary 
evolutionary change 
(1) Absolute size (d x a) 
(2) Relative size (d x b) 
" 
African Indian 
2 580 847 552 819 
80,7 17,3 
180 120 
87,22 86 , 67 














2 780 219 
(86,93%) 
Hence, 86,93% of the Black population support extraparliamentary evolutionary strategies as opposed to 85,55% when 
4 
the ratio 3 2 1 is used . 







su.mary of conclusions on extraparliamentary evolutionary strategies 
for change 
The single accumulative score for extraparliamentary evolutionary 
change indicated that 85,55% of the respondents were supportive 
of this type of change whilst 11,67% were unsupportive. 
Early evolutionary theories suggest a progressive, inevitable 
outcome of change due to endogenous changes including population 
size. However, the respondents did not view a population size 
increase of Black people as being an important factor for change. 
Whilst a slightly higher percentage agreed rather than disagreed, 
most remained indecisive. 
A high degree of consensus was exhibited on the question of community 
apathy and the ability to change situations collectively. There 
was higher consensus on the question of information; most believed 
that the mass media should furnish us with all the information 
concerning unrest in the country. 
A higher percentage supported disinvestment than did not. with 
Africans and Coloureds being more favourable towards disinvestment 
and the Indians least agreeable. When occupational groups were 
reviewed. the professionals were seen as the least agreeable 
(followed by the unemployed) whilst strongest agreement came from 
the workers. Interestingly. however. the professionals' support 
for passive resistance was also minimal. 
A significantly higher amount of Africans than Indians and Coloureds 
supported one-person-one-vote, but 30 .00% of the Coloureds were 
undecided on this issue. It is probable that this reflects the fear 
of the "minority groups" in Durban of majority dominance within a 
unitary society. 
The majority supported the call for the unbanning of outlawed 
organisations, people in exile . to return. the release of all those 
in detention and the calli~g of a ~ational Convention. Strongest 
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agreement came from the professionals and self-employed. Agreement 
tended to increase as income increased. Strongest agreement came 
from those over 46 years old - it is probable that agreement is 
significant amongst this group because older respondents lived 
through the period in which the Congress Alliance was activated. 
The call for a National Convention was particularly strong during 
this phase. The majority believed as well that a National Convention 
will solve the country's problems. 
So strong was the belief in negotiation, that a smaller majority 
agreed to a National Convention with just existing legal 
organisations taking part. A larger number of Coloureds disagreed. 
Disagreement with this sort of tllimited National Conventiontl was 
also seen to increase as income increased. 
The majority disagreed with the formation of regional and provincial 
structures as an attempt at a political solution. This shows little 
potential for the KwaNatal Indaba. Level of education did not affect 
the degree of disagreement. A larger percentage also agreed that 
Natal could not separate itself politically from the rest of the 
country. 
Whilst the majority agreed that civic actions are important tactics 
for change, the lev.el of agreement was not significantly strong 
nor the degree of consensus high. There was stronger agreement 
amongst the Indians and the students and the lowest income group. 
There was an extremely high degree of consensus on the question of 
support for the trade unions. Agreement was high when all race 
groups were compared. Agreement was highest amongst the lowest and 
highest income groups. Most agreed as well that trade unions are 
effective ~ Some agreed that political organisations are effective. 
Fewer Indians and ,Coloureds agreed that political organisations 
are effective. 
Most agreed that ~ fourth chamber should be added to the tricameral 
parliament. A larger percentage of Africans than any other group 
/ 
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agreed. Agreement to the formation of a chamber decreased as 
income increased. 
The majority agreed that the nationwide boycotts reflect rejection 
of the South African system. Strongest agreement came from the 
students, the sales staff and the self-employed. Agreement was 
also strongest amongst the highest income group and the lowest 
amongst the lowest income group. 
There was little support amongst Coloureds and Africans for passive 
resistance. 
In .the final analysis, Black (African, Indian and Coloured) support 
for extraparliamentary evolutionary change can be seen as significant. 
A comparison with more radical perceptions of change will be made 
later on to address the second and third working hypotheses 
simultaneously. 
6.3 Extraparliamentary revolutionary strategies for Change 
TABLE 117 
Statement 30: A violent revolution will never take place. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL 
Strongly Agree 9 (5,00%) 8 (6,67%) 1 (1,67%> 18 
% 
5,00 















<37,22%) 30 (25,00%) 20 (33,33%) 117 32,50 
(31,11%) 56 (46,67%) 19 (31,67%) 131 36,39 
(17,78%) 9 (7,50%) 15 (25,00%) 56 15,56 
4 (Disaqree) 
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With reference to Table 117, only 15,56% agreed whilst 51,95% 
disagreed and 32,50% were undecided. 
The majority disagreed, believing that a violent revolution was 
inevitable. The mean at 3,64 was between undecided and disagree 
whilst the median at 4 indicated disagreement. The variance at 
1,07 does not indicate a significant degree of consensus. Yet, an 
extremely high correlation coefficient showed agreement in terms 
of the ranking of attitudes of the different races (Table 118). 
TABLE 118 
STATEMENT 30 
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Strong l y Disagree (5) 
: Table 117 shows that 48,89% of the Africans disagreed whilst 13,89% 
agreed and 37,22% were undecided. Of the other two groups, 20,84% 
of the Indians agreed whilst 54,17% disagreed and 56,67% of the 
Coloureds disagreed whilst 10,00% agreed. A greater number of 
Lhdians and Coloureds believed that a violent revolution would take 
place. This anticipation of inevitable revolution was not strongly 
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shared by the Africans who exhibited a large degree of doubt and 
uncertainty. 
When occupational categories were reviewed, it was found that 
strongest belief in revolution was exhibited by the professionals, 
the clerks and the students. The unemployed, the unskilled workers 
and the skilled workers were less inclined to believe in the 
inevitability of revolution. 
Hence, a distinction was evident between affluent and non-affluent 
categories. 
A similar pattern is evident when income groups are reviewed 
(Table 119): 
TABLE 119 
RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS NON-OCCURRENCE 
OF VIOLENT REVOLUTION 
Income Earned Aaree Disaaree 
% % - -
R3 000 20,00% 44,61% 
R3 - 6 000 20,23% 46,07% 
R6 - 10 000 14,81% 45,68% 
RIO - 15 000 10,53% 63,15% 
R15 - 25 000 11,90% 57,15% 
R25 000 7,69% 76,93% 
Stronger disagreement to statement 30 or belief that revolution 
would take place was evident amongst the higher income groups, 
whilst belief that revolution would never take place increased as 
income decreased. 
Disagreement to statement 30 tended to increase as well, as 
educational qualifications increased. 
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A greater number of men believed that revolution would take place 
than women. 
TABLE 120 
Statement 37: The international world believes that the 
situation in South Africa is explosive, but this is not the 
situation. 
AFRICAN INDIAN 
Strongly Agree 12 (6,67%) 5 (4,17%) 
Agree 39 (21,67%) 45 (37,50%) 
Undecided 47 (26,11%) 9 (7,50%) 
Disagree 61 (33,89%) 50 (41,67%) 
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Table 120 shows that 33,33% agreed with statement 37 whilst 48,33% 
disagreed and 18.33% were undecided. The number of respondents 
(48,33%) that believed that the situation in South Africa is 
explosive is comparable with the number (51.95%) that believe that 
a violent revolution will take place. Hence. it is probable that 
respondents see the current sustained and sporadic unrest as a 
prelude to a more revolutionary situation. A stronger moderate 
correlation coefficient was evident (Table 121). 
Whilst a greater number of people disagreed. hence believing that 
the situation is explosive. the median at 3. matched by the 
weighted mean at 3.22 indicates indecision. The variance at 1.31 
shows a lack of consensus. 
Table 120 also indicates that 28.34% of the Africans agreed whilst 
45.56% disagreed and 41.67% of the Indians agreed whilst 52.50% 
disagr'eed. In comparison. 31.67% of the Coloureds agreed whilst 
51.67% disagreed. Again Indian and Coloured responses were stronger 
on the question of whether or not the situation was explosive. 
An association existed between attitudes towards statement 37 and 
occupation. Stronger belief that the situation in South Africa 
was explosive was exhibited by the self-employed. the professionals 
and the students whilst lowest support for this view was exhibited 
by the sales staff. the unskilled workers and the unemployed. 
Similarly. when different income groups were reviewed it was found 
that disagreement to statement 37 increases as income increases. 
Disagreement to statement 37 increases as educational level 
increases. Some differences between the sexes exist. Significantly 





Statement 38: Unrest in the country is going to spread to 














AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED 
30 (16,67%) 11 (9,17%) 14 (23,33%) 
54 (30,00%) 67 (55,83%) 24 (40,00%) 
58 (32,22%) 11 (9,17%) 6 (10,00%) 
28 (15,56%) 28 (23,33%) 15 (25,00%) 
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According to Table 122 , 55 ,55% of the respondents agreed whilst 
23,61% disagreed and 20,83% were undecided. The median at 4 
indicated agreement whilst the mean at 3,43 was closer to undecided. 
The variance at 1,18 shows a lack of consensus. Similarly, a very 
low positive correlation coefficient was evident (Table 123). 
Table 122 shows that 46,67% of the Af ricans agreed whilst 21,12% 
disagreed and 32,22% were undecided. Indecision here may be due 
to the fact that African areas are already experiencing instability 
largely due not only to active resistance against the State but to 
fighting between the UDF and Inkatha . Agreement to statement 38 
here shows that respondents anticipate an acceleration of unrest . 
Furthermore, 65,00% of the Indians and 63,33% of the Coloureds 
agreed with statement 38 whilst 25,83% and 26,67% disagreed 
respectively . Indian and Coloured views were again stronger 
suggesting that unrest was going to spread to their own areas which 
have been virtually untouched by civil unrest. 
No association existed between attitude towards statement 38 and 
occupation, suggesting a similarity between responses . 
However, agreement to statement 38 tended to increase as income 
increased (Table 124): 
TABLE 124 
RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS SPREADING OF 
UNREST 
Income Earned Aqree Disagree 
% % - -
R3 000 56,92 18,46 R3 - 6 ·000 46 , 07 23 , 59 
R6 - 10 000 47,45 27,16 
R10 - 15 000 63 , 16 28 , 07 I 
R15 - 25 000 66,67 21,43 R25 000 73,07 19 , 23 . 
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A strong association existed between attitude towards statement 38 
and differences in terms of educational qualifications attained. 
Agreement tended to increase as educational qualifications 
increased (with the exception of those with senior certificate 
qualifications) . 
More women than men agreed that unrest was going to spread (there 
was greater consensus amongst women). The greater positive 
response from women here could be seen as contradicting a trend 
that has been exhibited thus far, showing women to be more 
conservativi. However, it could also be seen as in line with 
earlier responses if women's greater belief in the spreading of 
unrest were as a result of fear and paranoia . 
TABLE 125 
Statement 50: Political organisations are more important 















28 (15,56%) 2 (1,67%) 
21 (11,67%) 24 (20 , 00%) 
59 (32,78%) 33 (27 , 50%) 
56 (31,11%) 59 (49,17%) 
16 (8,89%) 2 (1,67%) 
3 (Undecided) 
COLOURED TOTAL 
2 (3,33%) 32 
9 (15,00%) 54 
18 (30,00% ) 110 
25 (41,67%) 140 
6 (10,00%) 24 
According to Table 125, 23,88% agreed whilst 45,55% disagreed and 
30,56% were undecided. The median a t 3 and mean at 3,19 indicates 
indecision. The variance at l,13 does not show consensus. A 
stronger moderate correlation coefficient was discerned (Table 126). 
Table 125 shows that 27,23% of the Africans, 21,67% of the Indians 
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Strongly Agree (1) 
Agree (2) 
Undecided (3) 
Disagree ( 4 ) 
Strong l y Disagree ( 5) 
Africans disagreed as well as 50,84% of the Indians and 51,67% of 
the Coloureds. Indecision was also relatively high - 32,78% of the 
Africans, 27,50% of the Indians and 30,00% of the Coloureds were 
undecided. A positive correlation showed agreement within the 
rankings. A larger number of Africans believed that political 
organisations were more important than trade unions. Fewer Africans 
than Indians and Coloureds disagreed with the statement. This is 
probably because of the long history of resistance led by political 
organisations and of the increasing political role trade unions 
themselves have always had to play. 
Disagreement to statement 50 suggests that respondents are 
recognising, consciously or not, the increasing importance of trade 
unions as forces for change. No longer can political organisations 
be seen as the only forces within a political terrain, but rather 
as organisations whose interests if coupled with those of the trade 
unions can provide a revolutionary impetus. 
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Strongest disagreement to statement 50 came from the unemployed, 
the professionals, the skilled workers and the students. 
The fact that disagreement to statement 50 increased as income 
increased is significant. The wealthiest group was most supportive 
of the view that trade unions were more important than political 
organisations. It would seem that t he lowest income group had the 
greatest sensitivity to the complex interplay between the political 
and trade union forces by remaining largely indecisive. 
No association existed between attitude towards statement 50 and 
educational qualifications. Responses from the different groups 
were similar. 
More men than women disagreed with statement 50. 
Regarding the different age groups, as age increases agreement 

















Armed struggle should not be used to bring 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL 
22 (12,22%) 13 (10,83%) 7 (11,67%) 42 
49 (27,22%) 74 (61,67%) 25 (41,67') 148 
50 (27,78%) 11 (9,17%) 7 (11,67%) 68 
36 (20,00%) 15 (12,50% ) 13 (21,67%) 64 
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Disagree ( 4 ) 
Strongly DiSAgree (5) 
P " 0,31145 
> 0,05 
According to Table 127, 52,18% agreed whilst 28,33% disagr~~d and 
18,89% were undecided. Whilst the median at 2 suggests agreement, 
the weighted mean is closer to undecided than agree at 2,74. The 
variance at 1,41 shows a lack of consensus. Whilst a majority 
agreed with the statement a sizeable proportion disagreed. A small 
percentage, 28,33%, in terms of population size would indicate that 
905 879 people were potentially supporters of armed struggle. A 
very low positive correlation showed limited agreement within the 
rankings of the different race groups. 
Of the Africans, 39,44% agreed whilst 32,78% disagreed, with 27,78% 
remaining undecided, showing Africans to be divided on this issue. 
Of the Indians 72,50% agreed whilst 18,33% disagreed and 9,17% 
remained undecided. Of the Coloureds, 53,34% agreed with 35,00% 
disagreeing. A small percentage, 11,67%, of the Coloureds were 
undecided. 
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An association existed between attitude towards statement 50 and 
occupational categories. 
Strongest rejection of armed struggle was exh i bited by the 
unemployed whilst strongest support for armed struggle was 
exhibited by the sales staff, students and skilled workers. 
Agreement was also strongest amongst the highest income group and 
disagreement was strongest amongst the second and third lowest 
groups. 
No significant differences amongst the higher, senior and junior 
secondary groups are evident. However, agreement towards statement 
53 was lowest amongst the primary school groups with disagreement 
highest. 
More men than women agreed showing men to be more supportive of 
armed struggle. 
Agreement to statement 53 tended to increase as age increased. 
Disagreement was strongest within the youngest sector. African 
male youth from lower income groups are more likely in terms of the 
above to be supportive of armed struggle. 
TABLE 129 
Statement 62: Capitalism is at the root of the countries 
problems. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL 
Strongly Agree 36 (20,00%) 15 (12,-50% ) 10 (16 , 67%) 61 
Agree 51 (28,33%) 63 (52,50%) 15 (25,00%) 129 
Undecided 65 (36,11%) 22 (18,33%) 15 (25,00%) 102 
Disagree 19 (10,56%) 19 (15,83%) 15 (25,00%) 53 
Strongly Disagree 9 (5,00%) 1 (0,83%) 5 (8,33%) 15 , 
Median 4 (Aqree) 
-Xw = 3,46 
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Strongly Disagree ( 1 ) 
According to Table 129, 52,77% of the respondents agreed whilst 
18,89% disagreed. The median at 4 indicates agreement whilst the 
mean at 3,46 is closer to undecided than agree. The variance at 1,13 
shows a lack of consensus. A strong positive correlation coefficient 
showed significant agreement within the rankings . 
Of the Africans, 48,33% agreed whilst 15,56% disagreed and 36,11% 
were undecided. Of the Indians, 65,00% agreed whilst 16,67% 
disagreed. A smaller percentage of the Coloureds, 41,67% agreed 
whilst 33,33% disagreed. A significant number of Indians as opposed 
to Africans and Coloureds believed that the economic system of 
production was at the root of the country's pro'blems. 
When occupation groups were reviewed i t was found that strongest 
agreement was exhibited by the students, the unemployed, the 
I 
unskilled workers and the professionals. 
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The differences in terms of income can be depicted as follows: 
TABLE 131 
RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS CAPITALISM 
AS ROOT PROBLEM 
Income Earned Aqree Disaqree 
% % -
R3 000 49,23 13,85 
R3 - 6 000 55,05 15,73 
R6 - 10 000 49,38 29,63 
R10 - 15 000 59,65 15,79 
R15 - 25 000 45,24 30,95 
R25 000 61,54 11,54 
The Table shows that the highest income group was most strongly in 
agreement whilst the preceding income group was most strongly in 
disagreement. 
Agreement is much higher amongst the lower educated individuals. As 
education increases, agreement drops. 
A slightly higher number of women than men supported statement 62. 
This does not imply a tendency of radicalism but pessimism on the 





Socialism would transform this country into a 
AFRICAN INDIAN 
Strongly Agree 98 (54,44%) 16 (13,33%) 
Agree 54 (30,00%) 53 (44,17%) 
Undecided 18 (10,00%) 28 (23,33%) 
Disagree 3 (1,67%) 22 (18,33%) 
Strongly Disagree 7 (3,89%) 1 (0,83%) 
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According to Tabl e 132 , 68,61% agreed whilst 14,44% disagreed and 
16,94% remained undecided. The medi an at 4 indicates agreement 
whilst the mean at 3,84 is closer to agreement than undecided. 
The variance at 1,23 does not show consensus. This is matched by a 
very low positive correlation coefficient. 
Of the Africans, 84,44% agreed whilst 57,50% of the Indians and 
43,33% of the Coloureds agreed. Within the African sector, the 
variance was 0,97 showing significant consensus. Consensus at 0,93 
was also significant within the Indian ' sector. However, socialism 
was not a simple matter for the Coloureds. 
Whilst a significant number of Indians agreed that capitalism was at 
the root of the country's problems a lesser percentage saw socialism 
as an alternative. A low percentage of Coloureds supported 
socialism whilst a significantly high proportion of Africans supported 
socialism - a number higher than those positively recognising 
capitalism as the root of all the problems. 
An association existed between attitude towards statement 63 and 
differences in terms of occupation. Strongest agreement came from 
the skilled workers, the self-employed and the unskilled workers. 
The unemployed and the professionals were least favourable towards 
statement 63. 
Whilst the highest income group agreed that capitalism was at the 
root of the country's problems, the more prestigious, professional 
class was least in agreement to social ism as an alternative. The 
workers were most strongly in favour of socialism. 




RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS DESIRABILITY 
OF SOCIALISM 
Income Earned Agree Disaqree 
% % --
R3 000 67,69 13,84 
R3 - 6 000 76,40 10,11 
R6 - 10 000 76,55 6,17 
RIO - 15 000 64,91 19,30 
R15 - 25 000 42,86 33,33 
R25 000 69,23 15,39 
As income increases favourability towards socialism tends to 
decrease. 
When educational qualifications were reviewed, it was found that 
there was greater support from the less qualified. A positive 
correlation indicates that the rankings are not conflicting. 
Greater support for socialism was exhibited by the men than the 
women. 
TABLE 135 
Statement 65: Organisations must work towards making the 
country ungovernable so that it can be rapidlY changed. 
AFRICAN INDIAN COLOURED TOTAL 
Strongly Agree 47 (26,11%) 10 (8,33%) 12 (20,00%) 69 
Agree · 42 (23,33%) 31 (25,83%) 9 (15,00%) 82 
Undecided 43 (23,89%) 20 (16,67%) 16 (26,67%) 79 
Disagree 34 (18,89%) 55 (45,83%) 17 (28,33%) 106 
Strongly Disagree 14 (7,78%) 4 (3,33%) 6 (10,00%) 24 
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According to Tables 135 and 136, 41,95% agreed whilst 36,11% 
disagreed. Whilst a larger percentage agreed than disagreed the 
degree of consensus was not evident as indicated by the variance at 
I, 53. The median at 3 and weighted mean at 3,18 show the indecisiveness 
of the population on this question. The lowest positive correlation 
coefficient (0) shows no agreement amongst the rankings. 
Of the Africans, 49,44% agreed whilst 34,16% of the Indians and 
35,00% of the Coloureds also agreed. A smaller percentage, 26,67% 
of the Africans, 49,16% of the Indians and 38,33% of the Coloureds 
disagreed. Whilst a greater proportion of people agreed with 
ungovernability than disagreed, this was mainly as a result of 
greater support amongst the African population. 
An association eXists~ be)ween statement 65 and differences in terms 
of Occupation. Strongest support came from the student, unemployed 
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and sales sectors. The self-employed and clerks were most 
apprehensive. 
The differences in terms of i ncome levels are as follows: 
TABLE 137 
RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS ORGANISATIONS 
MAKING COUNTRY UNGOVERNABLE 
Income Earned Aqree 
% -
R3 000 43,08 
R3 - 6 000 49,44 
R6 - 10 000 43,21 
R10 - 15 000 31,58 
R15 - 25 000· 38,10 
R25 000 38,40 
Support for ungovernability is strongest amongst the lowest income 
groups. 
When educational qualifications were reviewed, the following 
differences were noted: 
Strongest agreement towards ungovernability has come from the 
respondents with junior secondary and post-matric education. 
A larger number of men agreed as opposed to women. 
6.3.1. Summary of conclusions on extraparll'rnent 1 t' - . ary revo u lonary strategies 
for change 
More Coloureds and Indians believed that a revolution was going to 
take place than Africans. Furthermore, a larger number of professionals 
~ 
and students compared to any other occupational group believed that 
a revolution would take place. More men than women were of the view 
that a revolution would occur. 
TABLE 138 
INFERENCE FROII PROPORTIONAL STRATIFIED SAMPLES TO THE POPULATION 
Population Af'rican Indian Coloured Total 
(a) Absolute size 2 580 847 552 819 63 929 3 197 595 
. (b) Relative size 80,7 17,3 2 100 
Proportional/Cluster Sample 
(c) Absolute size 180 120 60 360 
(d) Percent supportive of extraparliamentary (244) revolutionary change 74,44 62,5 58,33 67,78(360) 
(1) Absolute size (d x a) 1 921 183 345 512 37 290 2 303 985 
(2) Relative size (d x b) 60,07% 10,81% 1,16% 72,04% 
Hence, 72,04% of the Black population support extraparliamentary revolutionary strategies as opposed to 67,78% 
when the ratio 3 : 2 : 1 is used. However, the two figures are relatively close, thus showing the reliability 





The international perception that the situation in South Africa is 
explosive was supported. Belief that a crisis is being experienced 
at the moment increased as income and educational qualifications 
increased. Most agreed as well that unrest was going to spread 
further, affecting the areas within which they lived. 
Whilst twice as many people disagreed than agreed with the 
statement suggesting that political organisations were more important 
than trade unions, the average score suggested general indecisiveness 
because of the large amount (30,56%) who chose to remain undecided. 
Greater support for political organisations was exhibited by the 
lower income grouping. Also, older people have less faith in 
political organisations. 
Whilst most agreed that armed struggle should not be used to bring 
about change, a sizeable proportion supported armed struggle. 
Opposition to armed struggle was strongest amongst the Indians and 
Coloureds and the highest income group. 
Most agreed that capitalism was at t he root of the country's problems 
- and an even larger number of respondents agreed that socialism 
would transform this country into a free society. A significantly 
higher number of Indians and a higher number of students · did not 
support capitalism. The highest income group also agreed strongly 
that capitalism was at the root of the country's problems. 
However, a substantially higher number of Africans, as compared to 
Indians and Coloureds saw socialism as an alternative. The majority 
of those supporting socialism supported evolutionary as well as 
revolutionary strategies, showing the possibility of socialism 
being struggled for through non-violent means. 
I 
Ungovernability was also supported by evolutionary and revolutionary 
\. 
strategic adherents. Again, whilst a greater number maintained that 
organisations must work towards making the country u? gOvernable, 
there was also strong disagreement and indeciSion. J 
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It should be noted that the responses to statements 15 and 16, which 
relate to gender discrimination were not individually analysed since 
they do not have a significant bearing on the hypotheses of the 
research. However, the results here were integrated in 7.5. 
Responses to these statements as well as the following were not 
discussed in the preceding pages. Attention will be given to these 
in general terms within the context of the following theoretical 
discussion: Statements 12, 13, 14, 17, 28, 33, 34 and 67. In the 
interest of completeness, tables relating to these statements are 
appended as Addendum B. 
7. Indicators o~ social attitude derived f'rom the theoretical 
framework related to the ~indings 
The following influences on the formulation of attitude, extracted 
from the theories will be supplemented by the findings of the survey. 
All statements tested in the"' survey will be regrouped to address 
these influences. Class factors (differences exhibited by the 
different occupational, income and educational groups) that arise as 
a result of differential access to the distributive system will play 
a fundamental analytical role. 
7.1 Culture 
A statistical analysis of responses towards all statements shows 
that Black attitudes whilst similar in important respects, exhibit 
some finer cultural differences that coincide with race. Composite 
attitudes of the different groups ref lect a shared social reality. 
The more a person's attitudes are shared by comparable others within 
the racially defined areas, the more he/she will regard the attitude 
as having internal validity. 
Within the dominated races, a privileged affluent group emerges and / 
inevitably plays a more assertive role in political emanCipation. 
The culture of this class necessitates that this group will not 
accept structural inability to attain power and fulfil needs. Raci~l 
domination and the need for capitalist advancement are contradictory, 
resulting in the affluent disenfranchised group playing a radical 
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yet ambiguous role. The cultural drift or shifting of ideas of 
this class show an extension of radical attitudes. Yet, in 
practice, their greater support of government created institutions 
show them to be in opposition to other classes. The lower classes 
are less favourable towards government institutions like the 
tricameral system. The fact that the Black upper class concentrates 
Indian and Coloured elements, introduces a source of strain to 
genenU social evolution. 
Hence, the cultural composition of the groups, showing those 
composing the affluent class to possess among other things 
consciousness whilst those of the lower class possessing a greater 
adherence to tradition,manifests itself now in terms of differences 
in social attitude. The need for political power and the rejection 
of the need for cultural preservation is matched by the collaborative 
tendency of the upper class. Whilst race and cultural group are not 
necessarily synonymous, the different races within Natal appear to 
exhibit behavioural patterns and lifestyles that are peculiar to 
themselves. The difference in intensity of African and non-African 
responses show that we must focus on the cultural system to discern 
sources of general societal evolution. 
7.2 Influential contact 
Culture is in a state of constant change; sub-systems are inter-
related in a state of dynamic equilibrium and are continually 
readjusting to the changed states of the other sub-systems. Parts 
of cultural systems were brought into contact when European explorers 
and indigenous tribes traded with various objects. With colonialism 
and the domination of cultures, extreme socio-psychological pressure 
was placed on the 'subjected people (Hagen, 19~ : 411-414). The 
colonizing class :indicated in countless ways contempt for the 
traditional culture of the subjugated people. They regarded the 
individuals of the suborqinated class as inferior simply because they 
~re indigenous people. Alongside popular resistance against 
colonialism and ~n the Sduth African situation internal colonialism, 
was an incorporation of /negative self-images on the part of the people. 
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Although retreatism was the most common reaction of. colonial subjects 
to tensions, the behaviour of individuals who came most directly 
under the pressure of almost complete absence of status respect 
plus almost complete helplessness led to still more extreme ones. 
A significant proportion of the Black working class believed Whites 
to be superior, showing the overwhelming psychological effects of. 
apartheid irrespective of the recogni tion of all classes of the 
material suffering of people under this system. 
Under these circumstances, charismati c leadership or authority is a 
major factor that could cause people to change their attitudes, 
beliefs and perceptions of the existi ng social environment. If 
political leaders have immense powers in modern industrialised 
societies, then South Africa's developing society is an exception. 
In this social vacuum where no credible political leadership is 
entirely visible in South Africa, where petty bourgeois leadership 
-
recedes and surfaces, tensions within a social framework have resulted 
in the directing of conflicts within the disenfranchised group itself. 
Rivalries and factional elitisms are thriving under repression, and 
the absence of leadership is increasing political confusion. 
7.~ Political exposure 
The administrators of the colonial age thought a press of any kind 
was dangerous in the hands of the indigenous people and a nationalist 
press was particularly dangerous. Consequently, colonial governors 
used their power to punish alternative newspapers that adopted a 
critical position in relation to the government. 
The colonial press kept reinforcing the subordinate role of the 
African, confirming in his mind the hopelessness of his political 
future. Tomaselli (1986 : 5) ma-j.ntains, however, that myths change. 
The stories by which a culture explains or makes sense of some 
, 
aspect of reality are dynamic. The r ulipg classes, the hegemonic 
bloc, propagate myths about the other classes and groups precisely 
because they have political control:~ th~y are the myth-makers. They 
• I 
create and modify various myths to sui~ the political exigencies of 
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the moment. Similarly, Lenski's contention that all constitutional 
methods will be implemented to transform the rule of might to the 
rule of right is appropriate here. 
Widespread reluctance to indicate political support was prevalent 
amongst all classes, particularly the working class. The apathy or 
low social consciousness discerned is in keeping with Lenski's 
assertion that the majority are politically apathetic. Yet 
resistance or dissatisfaction with the mass media was significant. 
Language and views expressed in the media and contemporary Black 
political thinking is polarising, reinforcing the views of conflicting 
political camps. The most ardent participants here, are those of the 
affluent groups who expressed definite positions and were rarely 
indecisive. 
Exposure to political and economic truths may increase the particular 
role of the working class and further activate organisations 
facilitating working class struggles. The warring classes of society 
are always the products of the economic conditions of their time, 
but at this point in time the relatively radical political position 
of the affluent Black sectors are still containing the antagonisms 
as between different races and to a lesser extent between classes. 
7.4 Conflicting social interests 
/ 
When the sample elements were examined it was found that the vast 
majority (65,00%) of the population received wages below the living 
wage level (as defined by the unions) whilst a minority (18,06%) 
were seen as receiving wages below the minimum survival wage (as 
defined by the capitalist class). The MLL (Minimum Living Level) 
was calculated at R396,33 per month and the HSL (Household Subsistence 
Level) was calculated at R340,34 per month for 1987. It is this 
calculation that has found supporters largely amongst the capitalist 
( class. The alternative to those measurements calculated by C RIC 
\. (Community, Resource and Information Centre) was a living wage of 
/ R850 per month for 1987 (Cosatu News, 1987 : 15). A conflict of 
interest and a potential basis for future antagonisms are made evident. 
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Whilst differences in position are emerging and will possibly 
deepen over time, contradictions are now being contained as all 
classes recognise the significance of political organisations and 
trade unions and above all bear a similar relationship and attitude 
towards existing political structures. Competitive and group 
interests are curbed by similarity of sentiment towards institutional 
structures. There is no evidence to suggest that antagonisms would 
invert themselves within the Black community and give rise to 
differences in terms of class, race and sex although minor 
differences in terms of attitude persist. The fundamental conflict 
of social interests would exist between the composite attitudes of 
Blacks irrespective of class and the opposing white hegemony. 
7.5 Ezclusion from the socio-political processes 
Partial accommodation is prevalent with the vast majority not 
considering emigration but a significant minority, particularly 
amongst the affluent grouping, considering leaving. 
The role of sex is crucial in the distributive process. A greater 
proportion of women hold the belief that gender discrimination is 
evident. The significantly smaller proportion of men than women 
believing in equality between the sexes shows that the belief in 
the full participation of both sexes cannot be treated as obvious. 
Traditional barriers still exist in a developing industrialising 
country. A greater proportion of those unfavourable towards equality 
between the sexes were African men. Hence, radicalisation in a 
political sphere, does not necessarily alter conservatism about the 
position of women in society. At this point the women's movement 
has subordinated itself to the broader political movements that 
encomp~~s all strata of the excluded populations. 
I 
Exclusions fro~ the socio-political processes has drawn a stronger 
recognition that race laws and a lesser recognition that capitalism 
represents·the/ fundamental contradiction within society. In addition, 
the recogniticn that all classes see united, collective action as a 
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means of overcoming exclusion, indicates that a degree of uniformity 
exists in the values of people - the potential for consensus on 
strategy to overcome exclusion is strong. 
The ambiguous position of the affluent group and the accompanying 
self-interest exhibited can be seen by referring to the call for 
one-person-one-vote. Reluctance to accept one-person-one-vote 
suggests perhaps, a fear of the organisation of the workers as a 
class and the consequences of their political power. 
7.6 Experienced repression 
The anticipation or preparedness for revolution is matched by the 
increasing repression experienced. In this particular repressive 
phase when classes recognise detention and the inability to freely 
voice political opinions as aggravating the political situation, 
organised resistance has been severely suppressed. 
Yet the repression experienced in contemporary South Africa, similar 
though not identical to conditions existent in pre-independent 
African states, exhibits a pattern in terms of the responses of the 
different classes of the disenfranchised group. Experienced 
repression encourages active resistance. The industrial proletariat 
develops and is conditioned by the development of the industrial 
bourgeoisie. Only under its rule does the proletariat raise its 
resistance to a national one. It is only then that it can create 
the modern means of production which become potentially the means of 
revolutionary emancipation (Tucker, 1978 : 588). Yet, the more 
radical the bourgeoisie the more the compromise between the different . 
classes whose interests ar~ in the long term, antagonistic. Given 
Lenski's specific definition of class, that is, " ••• persons ••• who 
stand in a similar position with respect to force ••. " (1966 : 74), 
one broad class can be said to exist. This will diversify itself 







7.7 Collective action 
7.7.1 Collaborative opposition 
If people are to combine successfully to achieve any social 
objective, whether this be participation in rejected parliamentary 
structures or regionally structured alternatives, one thing 
is certoin, some form of collective action has to be adopted. 
Social objectives cannot be implemented or agreed to without 
the support of broader social movements. Faced with the 
alternatives of social inaction under repressive conditions 
and collaborative action by the social movement, the latter 
for most seems to be the lesser of the two evils. When 
opportunities for individual mobility are insufficient, people 
resort to any form of collective action that may further the 
attaining of rewards. 
The increasing radical resistance of sectors of the Black 
population has led to the strengthening of the state machinery 
to an impressive extent. Opposing this, considerable 
favourability towards participation notwithstanding rejection 
of the tricameral structure, exists and therefore must be 
considered. 
7.7.2 Evolutionary resistance 
Reformist agitations and pressure group campaigns do not involve 
the total rejection of societal values and norms. They are 
essentially concerned with minor or partial adjustments within 
an existing framework. Reformists may hold that specific 
policies or laws conflict with other more important values and 
may attempt to persuade the political elite to initiate changes. 
There exists a certain degree of tolerance of peaceful 
disagreement. The exponential rise of extraparliamentary 
groupings suggest but do not clearly indicate the diverse array 
of interconnected commitments to change. 
It is the affluent group that adheres strongly to both radical 
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and passive resistance. Lower support for passive resistance 
among the working classes indicates disillusionment with this 
form of strategy. Hence the potential for the generation of 
a class struggle amongst the disenfranchised Black sector 
exists. 
The economic struggleclocated in the community manifest 
themselves largely as civic issues, whilsttconomic struggles 
at the factory floor are taken up by the trade unions. It is 
these struggles of an economic nature that are supported most 
by the lower income groups. The stratification system in 
existence implies that different immediate interests are 
perceived as urgent by the different strata. 
7.7.3 Revolutionary resistance 
It would be incorrect t9 assume that there is any simple cause and 
effect relationship between severe social distress and alignment to 
radical politics. Whilst stronger support for armed struggle and 
ungovernability was evident among the lower income sector, neither 
the indications nor the internal validity was significant. 
Marx made more than a grudging admission of the potential efficacy 
of long-term reformist and parliamentary strategies in special 
circumstances. Marx, however could not bring himself to regard 
parliamentary reformism as an end in itself, only as an occasionally 
justified means to revolutionary ends (Wilkinson, 1971 : 129). If 
the capitalist system could not as Marx maintained be "humanised and 
reformed on a piecemeal pasis" (Wilkinson, 1971 : 129), then the 
greater support for radical change would be shown by the working 
class. The potential for the development of a genuine revolutionary 
consciousness would be cultivated. 
I 
7.7.4 Mass pressure 
Human beings distinguish themselves from animals as soon as~ they 
begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which ~s ;1 







of subsistence people are directly producing their actual material 
life. 
Production only makes its appearance with the increase of population. 
With the ever increasing population, pressure on the system of 
production ensues just as much as the capitalist class exploits 
the expanding labour force. Black people do not view infrastructural 
pressure as a means towards changing the polity; when class is 
taken into consideration it would seem that workers are more conscious 
of an inevitable change. Marx (Tucker, 1978 : 135) maintains that 
"its goal and its historical action are prefigured in the most clear 
and ineluctable way in its own life situation as well as in the whole 
organisation of contemporary bourgeois society". Increase in 
population was not the answer but increased collective mobilisation. 
7.8 Perceived legitimacy 
The fundamental pressures upon which the South African state rests 
was considered illegitimate, by the majority of all the races and 
all classes. Whilst this perception was not deep rooted it was 
significant. In contrasting the composite Black attitudes with 
those of the ruling class, it indicates the extent to which the 
ideological forms of apartheid have sunk more definitively into the 
minds of the sections of the white community that support the 
system (Cohen, 1986 : 11). 
7.9- Comtitment 
The belief by all groups and classes that the political situation 
would have changed if they had asserted themselves rather than 
remaining apathetic, shows the increasing commitment of the 
population. The ambiguity of commitment, ideology and behaviour of 
individuals arises not simply out of personal psychology but also 
from their structurally dependent position within the political 
economy and the colonial type state, and the contradictory nature of 
the existing order itself (Marks, 1986 : 1). 
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There are no fundamental differences when support by the different 
classes for political organisations and trade unions are assessed. 
Stronger support however was evident among the more affluent 
groupings. Whilst a sense of commitment exists, it is not necessarily 
self-interested given the support for collective group action. 
Marx (Tucker, 1978 : 130-131) draws an important relationship which 
has a bearing on the South African si t uation: Social distress does 
not produce political understanding, social well being does. Thus 
it can be further maintained that the greater commitment cultivated 
by the affluent class will see them seeking the overthrow of a 
particular form of state. The greater understanding of the 
bourgeois, Marx maintains, will lend to the incorporation of this 
radical thinking into the aims and objectives of the workers. By 
pursuing only political aims, their insight into their real aims 
would be falsified, thus their political understanding will deceive 
their social instinct. 
The nature of the South African state, with the coincidence of race 
and class, however, has developed spontaneous and conscious 
resistance on economic and political fronts. 
7 •. 10 Interchange with the environment 
Whilst there was stronger belief amongst the affluent groupings that 
the situation in South Africa was explosive it was from this sector 
that a proportion was considering leaving the country. The call for 
outside pressure to attempt to resolve an internal problem was 
stronger amongst the lower classes and t he regional option was seen 
as more feasible by the higher income groups. 
The fact that processes take place over space, the facts of distance - , 
or closeness, of geographical variation between areas of the 
I ' 
individual character and meaning of specific places and regions _ all 
i· 
these are essential to the operation of social processes themselves. 
Ideologies ar d social processes are being played out in Natal; the 
conf~ict be~ween Inkatha and the UDF has stalled the highlighting of 
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the KwaZulu Natal Indaba and has increased doubts over its historical 
validity. 
The Black population. furthermore. has tremendous potential power. 
They constitute the overwhelming majority of the proletariat of 
Africa's riche~and most developed country. a majority without 
whose labour-power the economy would collapse. with all the 
disastrous consequences such a collapse would have for world 
imperialism (South Africa is the leading producer of gold and 
diamonds in the capitalist world. and one of the major producers 
of uranium). This tremendous potential power is being tested 
through the disinvestment campaign. 
7.11 Consciousness 
A fundamental form of social control undertaken by the apartheid 
state comprises the non-violent and non-coercive. but nonetheless 
powerful. attempts to ~nfluence the Black population in the legitimacy 
of white rule. The obvious ideological necessity for this exercise 
revolves around the gross incongruity between the small number of 
whites who rule or elect those that do and the large number of 
Blacks excluded from these possibilities. In this ideological form. 
apartheid supporters act to displace the major contradiction between 
white rulers and Black ruled, by seeking to persuade the. disenfranchised 
population of the legitimacy of institutional structures. A lack 
of support amongst all classes for the tricameral system of government 
as well as greater support amongst the lower income grouping for 
extraparliamentary organisations show that this attempt has been 
unsuccessful. It also suggests a contradictory tendency where 
members of different classes stand in similar position in some 
instances and in opposition to others. The argument that Blacks are 
not so entitled to rule is reinforced by customs, norms, expectations 
and social practices that are informally conveyed in white attitudes 
and behaviour patterns, generationally transmitted by the family, 
the media and other social institutions. The notion that Blacks 
are unfit to govern also rests on strong caricatures and stereotypes 





by most Blacks and which has been the persist&nt call of the national 
democratic movement within which the ANC has been the dominant 
force, has not been conceded to by the State since it would 
inevitably imply majority rule. Instead the rule of might has 
facilitated SADF raids which despite media and institutional 
justification, are perceived as incorrect by all classes of Black 
people. 
People are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. - real, 
active people as they are conditioned by a definite development of 
their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to 
these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be 
anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of people 
is their actual life-process. 
7.12 Dif'f'usion under dominance 
Whilst the majority of Black people have not internalised state 
ideology and are not supporting state initiatives, significant 
sectors have in some respects, and this perhaps, is increasing 
ambiguity in political thinking and organisation. 
The fact that a large percentage were disillusioned about critics 
and sceptical about majority rule inevitably created through the 
principle of one-person-one-vote9 has fundamental implications for 
the development of united positions. Indians and to a lesser 
extent Coloureds were most supportive of and hence diffused into, 
the existing political structure. The greatest support for banning 
of organisations and the least for the calling of a National 
Convention came from the Indians. The Africans showed little 
evidence of having diffused ruling class ideas unde'r dominance 
indicating that whilst differences in terms of political affiliation 
were exhibited, political understanding and position appeared more 
cohesive than the other races in Natal. 
The question of diffusion can be explained, but in a limited way by 
Marxists. The division of labour simplifies social relationships. 
"7.13 
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Similar relationships to the means of production produces similarity 
of consciousness, as evident amongst the Africans. 
Race and kinship ties may provide a broader explanation for the 
diffuseness of certain groups and their alignment with state 
ideology. Social differentiation and distancing among the races 
leads to ignorance of each other's peculiar socio-political situation. 
Furthermore, no society can successfully dominate a sector of its 
population without the diffusion of its cultural patterns and 
social institutions, nor can any society successfully diffuse all 
or most of its cultural patterns and social institutions without 
some degree of domination. A degree of inculcation of the White 
South African cultural patterns and acceptance of existing 
institution has led to a co-option of a sector of the Black 
population. However the universalistic values accompanying 
increasing westernisation is challenging those particularistically 
inculcated values and norms. 
Alienation 
In a real sense alienation at the industrial level seems to be 
taking place. Most agree that capitalism is at the root of the 
countries problems, whilst more agree that socialism would transform 
this state into a democratic society. An overwhelming number of 
workers, by comparison subscribed to socialism. 
Since social distancing is strong and racial contact limited, African 
workers would appear most favourable towards socialism. Other 
races (Indians and Coloureds) would probably respond to alienation 
through retreating and minimising alignment with the African 
working class. Social alienation ensures that the contact between 
different races is minimal, thereby f acilitating ~~riers at the 
ground. For Marx (Tucker, 1978 : 133) as already maintairyed the 
affluent class and the proletarian c l ass represent one and' the same 
\" 
human self-alienation. But the former feels satisfied and affirmed 
in this sel"f-alienation, Whil~t the latter, however feels /destrOyed 







of an inhuman existence. This process seems to be rapidly taking 
place with the self-seeking nature of people emphasised. 
Social movements speared on by the self-seeking nature of groups 
and individuals will signify the emergence of new influences. 
7.14 Gradual adaptation · 
A developing economy tends to meet the people's needs to some 
extent; so, while remaining assertive in their everyday demands, 
they do not see the necessity of a violent overthrow of the system. 
An adaptation to the specific conditions has taken place and most 
Black people of all race groups would accept an internal agreement 
and steps towards negotiation being arranged within the country 
even though it may exclude outlawed organisations. 
It would seem that alongside the present attempt to reconcile huge 
disparities of power, wealth, opportunity, health and education 
between whites and Blacks is not the subordination of independent 
Black forms of consciousness, but its cultivation. Breakdowns of 
orthodox racial separation increases expectations and facilitates 
demands. Cohen (1986 : 81) maintains that what can be said 
definitively is that with the exception of Bantustan leaders, Black 
demands have not followed the lines of apartheid orthodoxy. The 
subordinate population has largely resisted the ruling class ideology. 
As well as physical resistance, the core of Black demands has 
remained after forty years of apartheid, the institutionalisation 
of equal opportunities for all population groups in a unitary state. 
Marx (Tucker, 1978 : 158) maintains t hat the satisfaction of the 
first need leads to new needs; and t his production of new needs is 
the first historical act. 
With consciousness becoming radicalised in certain sectors and the 
state instead modifying and adapting its structures it would seem 
that the State is being pressurised to change. However, unlike the 
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Marxian contention a revolutionary situation is not inevit~ble. 
Gradual deracialisation and economic concessions may result in the 
sustained control of the South African white elite despite 
internal contradictions. At the same time, cultural diversity is 
not intense when viewed from a political perspective and 
adaptation to conditions is minimal. 
7.15 Deprivation 
: ' 
The impossibility of equal education in a class society is further 
affected by a race differentiated educational system. The majority, 
particularly the affluent class believe strongly that boycotts 
register protest against the educational and political systt::m• 
The strong recognition by all classes of injustices suffered under 
apartheid is not matched by the same degree of frustration at being 
denied political rights. Frustration at being deprived due to 
position in the distributive system is stronger amongst the lower 
classes. 
"Poverty has many dimensions, each of which must be studied 
separately, but which in reality constitute an interrelated network 
of deprivations" (Haralambos, 1980 : 152). In theory, the vicious 
cycle in which poverty breed; poverty , occurs through time, and 
transmits its effects from one generation to another. It can be 
argued that poverty survives in part because it is useful to a 
number of groups in society. 
If deprivation is supposed to be accompanied by a lack of awareness, 
the impoverished class in South Africa is at this point contradicting 
that assumption. Awareness of the extent of deprivation is increasing, 
working alongside increasing class consciousness. 
I 
The relationship to the distributive system has been drawn to 
\. 
emphasise the extent to which the contemporary contradictory nature 
of a7titudes and our society can be described in conflict-structuralist 
ter~s. Whilst there is an overriding favourability towards 
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evolutionary formulae, changing conditions may not necessarily 
follow; the transition or expectations of the transition to a 
more egalitarian socio-economic system may indeed follow more 
strongly than at present. 
8. CONTRAST AND BLENDING OF SUPPORT FOR EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY 
POLITICAL POPULAR ORGANISATIONS AND PROGRESSIVE TRADE UNIONS 
Irrespective of a movement towards the formation of a united front 
bringing political and trade union organisations closer together, 
the way in which both are viewed by the broader population differ 
to some extent. Trade unions are perceived as more effective 
structures and to some extent then, more important than political 
organisations. 
There was extremely strong consensus on the role of trade unions. 
The vast majority agr~ed that they should be afforded support since 
they were the most important organisat~ons through which workers can 
change their economic situation. 
The researcher has already maintained that a very powerful tradition 
of popular or populist politics has emerged in South Africa. The 
role of the great political movements such as the Congress Alliance 
has been to mobilise the population against the minority government. 
In such a Situation, mass mobilisation has been essential in order 
to challenge the legitimacy of the State, both internationally and 
internally. Where a major sector of the population is voteless and 
subjugated by a rac~al minority, then a great alliance of all 
classes arises as a necessary and clear political strategy. Building 
such an alliance has always been a gre~t task. Foster (Fosatu 
publication, 1982) maintains that "politically, most unions and 
their leadership lack confidence as a worker leadership, they see 
their role as part of a wider struggle but are unclear on what is 
-
required for the worker struggle. Generally, the question of building 
an effective worker organisation is not dealt with and political 
energy is spent in establish~ng unity across a wide front". 
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Such a position has led to strategic errors in the past, that may 
now weaken, if not destroy worker organisation in the future. All 
the great and successful popular movements have had as their aim 
the overthrow of, most often, colonial regimes. However, these 
movements cannot and have not in themselves been able to deal with 
the particular and fundamental problem of workers. Their task is 
to remove regimes that are regarded as illegitimate and 
unacceptable by the majority (MacShane et al, 198~ : 128). 
Given the above realisation as well as the fact that the leading 
role of the workers has been continuously emphasised as well as the 
fact that respondents view the role of workers as much more 
potentially significant, it is essential that workers strive to 
build their own effective organisations even whilst they are part of 
the wider alliance. This organisation is necessary to protect and 
further worker interests and to ensure that the popular movement 
is not hijacked by elements who may in the end have no option but 
to turn against their worker supporters. 
In response to the two questions posed in Chapter Three, the 
following are the generalised results: . 
8.1 Whilst the trade union movement has been seen as the most 
potent force for change by all classes, particularly the 
affluent classes, workers themselves experience a considerable 
amount of ambivalence here. It would seem that the merging of 
economic and political issues has developed a stronger 
association between union and community struggles, for workers. 
Hence, attempts to develop artificial distances between the 
two will negate the grassroots experiences of workers. 
8.2 Whilst the existing progressive political organisations are not 
I 
being viewed as the most significant organisations for change, 
their role is still crucial. There is a F loser overt alliance 
between the Black bourgeoisie and th: Bl ~ck workers. However, . / 
the fact that Black workers subscribed in the final analysis to 
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socialism to a much greater extent shows that a fundamental 
conflict of interest may emerge within this context. The 
fact that the Black trade unions espouse socialism to a 
greater extent than the popular political organisations shows 
that these particular conflicting interests are being 
collectively organised. 
9. FINAL VlRIFICATION OF WORKING HYPOTHESES 
When the data analysed in the preceding sections are related as 
a whole to the sample, and the sample is inferred to the total 
population, the following results are obtained: 
It can be concluded that the second working hypothesis is disproved. 
Africans do not prefer revol~tionary strategies rather than 
extraparliamentary evolutionary strategies. Whilst there is strong 
support for revolutionary strategies, support for evolutionary 
strategies is stronger. Both the qualitative examination of 
individual statements and the quantitative inferences verify this. 
It can also be concluded that the t hird working hypothesis is proved. 
Indians and Coloureds do prefer extraparliamentary evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary strategies for change. Both the 
qualititative examination of individual statements and the 
quantitative inferences verify this. 
It can therefore, be conclude? that the first hypothesis is proved. 
It seems from the research that Black Urban communities prefer 









DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF CONCLUSION 
INTRAPARLIAMENTARY CHANGE 
Existing parliamentary structures 
not accepted Specific attit 
are affected t 
Social structures undermined race/class pos 
of the indivic 
Legislation concerning race, detentions The strength ( 
and organisations not accepted attitude is fl 
ffected by gE 
SADF initiatives not supported 
Support for Commissions of Inauirv RACE/ 
CLASS DISTRIBUTIVE 
EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY CHANGE SYSTEM 
Collaborative views supporting state 
initiatives and ethnic fragmentation 
not evident SEX . 
/ 
r Anticipation of participation in future modified national structure evident Stronger tendency towards non-collaboration whilst remaining within the country 
Trade union action most sianificant 
Economic measures increasingly important 
Limited national, not regional political 
structures accepted 
REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE 
Belief that unrest was spreading eyident 
Armed struggle not accepted II 





















FINAL CONSIDERATIONS AND SUMMARY 
Major results o~ the research 
Responses to intraparliamentary strategies ~or change 
Existing parliaaentary structures accepted 
Most disagreed with the statement that no changes need to 
be made. 
Most believed that the tricameral parliament has not increased 
the unity of Indians and Coloureds. 
Most believed that the tricameral parliament has not increased 
the unity of Blacks. 
Most did not accept the tricameral parliament. 
Most believed that consultations with Bantustan leaders will 
resolve problems. 
Existing social structures accepted 
Most people believed that capitalism did not have to be 
overcome. 
Most believed that capitalism was at the root of the country's 
problems. 
Most agreed that socialism would transform this country into 
a democratic society. 
Legislation accepted 
Most agreed that race laws need to change .• 
Most agreed that detentions only worsen the country's 
problems. 
Most disagreed that the government needs to ban/outlaw 
radical organisations. 
Military de~ence o~ eXisting structures 
• 
Most rejected SADF raids on ANC bases. 
1.1.5 
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Most agreed that SADF raids are increasing the regions 
instabili ty. 
Coamissions of inquiry 
Most believed that commissions of inquiry can bring about 
changes. 






Most did not support state initiatives. 
Most believed that critics of the government understand the 
complexities of the South African situation. 
Most did not believe that independence would result in the 
socio-economic development of the Bantus~ans. 
Collaborative opposition 
Most agreed that Blacks should enter parliament to change 
things from within. 
Most did not support the resolving of socio-political issues 
at a regional level. 
Most agreed that a fourth chamber should be added to the 
tricameral parliament. 
Non-collaboration 
Most had no intention to leave the country. 
Most agreed to collective action to change their situation. 
Most agreed that organisations working outside of ~arliament 








Trade union action 
Most believed that trade unions are the most important 
organisations for workers. 
Most believed that trade unions are more important than 
political organisations. 
Most believed in the effectiveness of trade unions. 
Economic measures 
Most believed that disinvestment is an important instrument 
for the dismantling of apartheid. 
Most believed that the long-term effects of disinvestment 
would be negative. 
Li.ited political structures 
Most agreed that a limited National Convention should be 
held. 
Most agreed that Natal could not separate itself politically 
from the rest of the country. 
- -
Responses to extraparliamen~ revolutionary -strategies for change 
Conflict based change 
Most agreed that unrest was going to spread to other areas. 
Most did not support armed struggle to bring about change. 
Most agreed that, organisations must work towards making 
the country ungovernable so that it can be rapidly changed. 
Conclusions 
I 
The preceding results and discussion in Chapter 5, show , the 
extent to which strong ambiguities, uncertainty and apathy 
exist amongst the people of different races, classe~, s~x 
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and age groups. Whilst all groups oppose the nature of the 
existing South African system, race and to some extent sex 
plays a furldamental role in the defining of the methods that 
should be adopted in attempting to initiate change. African 
people show a grea~tendency towards revolutionary strategies 
than other groups. This shows the difficulty that necessarily 
emerges in attempting to draw broad non-racial strategic 
alliances. Whilst class and age do not playa fundamental 
role in the defining of socio-political attitudes, some 
crucial differences do surface - the affluent groupings tend 
to exhibit a greater resentment towards political exclusion 
whilst the working classes show greater difficulties in 
accepting the contemporary economic order. This in itself has 
been creating tensions within the Bl ack extraparliamentary 
organisations and will have consequences for a future society. 
The fact ' that women are more conservative and apathetic than 
men whilst recognising that they are discriminated against, 
exemplifies the extent to which women's issues have been 
subordinated to political issues in this country. Age, does 
not playa significant role in affecting political attitudes, 
though it does affect the extent of political participation. 
Evolutionist strategies are preferred to more radical as well 
as state supportive strategies. Thi s in itself is not 
absolute. Changing conditions may necessitate changes in 
consciousness. However, the consciousness of certain sectors 
will remain relatively stable. Indi ans and Coloureds, women 
and midd!e class individuals that show the greatest apathy 
and consistency will remain relatively unchanged in attitude. 
The African, male, upper class and working class sectors will 
show the greatest variation in attitude: Whilst these 
sectors are becoming increasingly radicalised, t hey would 
possibly show a willingness towards participation in 
parliamentary structures if basic demands S4ch as those 
related to the ' calling of a National Convention ~ with the 
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participation of all excluded forces; are met. 
At a methodological level it was found that an integrated 
theoretical and statistical approach was indeed the only 
way in which reliable attitudinal research could in fact be 
attained. Finally, it was only through the usage of 
comparative statistics that the contradictions and 
ambiguities were discernable. 
3. RecOlllllendations 
Making socio-political recommendations for change in South 
Africa often becomes a passionate issue tending towards the 
support of the proposals of particul ar political fronts. 
The three recommendations offered, thus, will be brief and 
deliberately open to varying definitions. 
3.1 Internal resistance and extraparliamentary consolidation 
Towards negotiation 
In April 1987, Obery and Van Niekerk (Work In Progress, No. 47, 
1987 : 8-14) maintained that if the far right had established 
party unity at the same time as the moderates regrouped' and 
consolidated, the 1987 election could have been a disaster 
for the NP. If the combined right had won 35-40 seats with 
the moderates winning the same number, an overall National 
Party majority could have been prevented. Further, moderate 
coalition to the left could have been instrumental in 
pressurising the government, towards negotiations with 
credible Black leadership, including the ANC. 
At the same time it should be noted that there is a growing 
division between "conservative reformers" and "radical 
reformers" in the NP. Swilling (Work In Progress, No. 50, 
1987 j: 17) maintained that the radical reformers pioneered 
key-policy shifts : the inclusion of Africans in the 
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Regional Services Councils (RSC's), scrapping of pass laws, 
dropping of the law against mixed mar riages, as well as some 
political interference laws. Dr Wimpie de Klerk (Daily News, 
January 13 1988 : 15) maintained that the radical reformers 
have a greater sense of urgency, and talk guardedly of a 
massive "leap of reform" to enable a move towards real 
negotiations with Black leaders. 
Hence, notwithstanding the predominance of the conservative 
reformers and militarists in parliament at present there are 
pressure groupings that would support the transition towards 
negotiation. Whilst it is significant that alliances 
cutting across parties and races are occurring to the left 
of the government, without the allied support of the 
extraparliamentary organisations the long term significance 
of such pressure would be minimal. Both the ANC and the 
internal extraparliamentary organisations such as the UDF 
maintain that a "climate for negotiation" can only be created 
if all political prisoners and detainees are released, exiles 
allowed to return to South Africa unconditionally, repressive 
laws dismantled, organisations unbanned and the right to free 
association guaranteed. Like most earlier anti-colonial 
struggles, this one is almost certain to end through talks. 
Hence, the recommendation of the researcher is that 
extraparliamentary organisations explore the extent to which 
coalitions with intraparliamentary organisations and pressure 
groups could take place to pressurise existing government to 
move towards the creation of the "climate for negotiation". 
The fact that there is a high degree of consensus exhibited 
by the mass of the Black people on this issue, reiterates 
its urgency. 
Because of the eXisting repression, extrapar1iamentary 
organisations, which have the greatest mass appeal and mass 
base, have become Virtually ineffective and recently 
effectively banned: T? e extent to which it can consolidate 
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and develop its mass base will dictate the strategies it 
could and should adopt to increase resistance and facilitate 
social change. Tom Lodge (Work In Progress, No. 50, 1987 : 6) 
maintains that : "Once predominantly Black democratic 
organisations begin co-operating across the lines which 
strategically divide parliamentary from extraparliamentary 
forces, then sooner or later a fundamental question must be 
asked about the boycottist question .•. the strategic issues 
which confront the progress of democratic opposition to 
apartheid are complex. The categories which are required to 
discuss them are analytical and dispassionate, not moral and 
emotive". 
The unprecedented restrictions on the extraparliamentary 
organisations believed to have been implemented in order to 
appease the far right White groupings will seriously affect 
the future of Black democratic organisations. The 
organisations effectively banned will not be able to function 
at any level except the administrative. This does not prevent 
alternative structures from being created to continue with 
the building of alliances and mass work. 
3.2 Maintaining organisational clarity : The independence of 
trade unions and women's organisations 
In all nationalist struggles, the tendency for oppressed 
sectors such as the workers and women to be further subordinated 
by the democratic political organisations has been very strong. 
Whilst there is the need for the development of strong • 
alliances, there is also a need for the interests of workers 
and women to be furthered outside of these alliances. The 
independence of the trade union movement and the women's 
movement will necessitate the taking up of the particular 
and real struggles of workers and women after a transition 
to democracy. A class-blind and sex-blind approach has 









independence and liberation in most African countries. Hence, 
the recommendation here is not just that the organisations 
maintain relative autonomy but that they constantly define 
clearly their specific role within the changing political 
dynamics. 
Role o~ academics Social involvement and relevant research 
Almost all early and later evolutionary theorists have urged 
a greater development of knowledge to guide change. The 
recommendation that academics play a greater role in 
facilitating change is thus being made . Not only is there 
an urgency for social scientists to cultivate greater 
insight into the nature of communiti es and the forces 
advocating inevitable change in South Africa, but to play 
a guiding and integral role in democratic, mass-based 
organisations. 
In a society where the scientific, t he social, the personal 
and political constantly merge into each other, the call 
for neutrality may alienate the researcher's work from 
concrete application and humanitarian relevance . Until 
such time when scientific neutrality cannot be interpreted 
as latent support for the status quo, academics should 
develop political positions which direct the chosen fields 
of study, maintaining in the course of their work, scientific 
objective methodology. The creation of educational programmes, 
communication projects and social awareness seminars 
generating critical thinking within educational institutions 
would speed the process towards the qualitative building of 
non-racialism. 
Future research possibilities 
The present research has not negated previous results, but 
shows shifts in attitudes amongst certain sectors and within 
273. 
certain areas. Indecision in certain areas, indicating 
either apathy or fear needs to be further investigated. 
Hence, there will always be room for further empirical 
studies based in the Natal region, testing particularly 
organisational affiliation and perceptions of the future 
society. Research conducted once the conflict between 
Inkatha and the UDF has subsided, to test perceptions of 
that struggle, may be of long-term socio-political 
significance. 
4.2 Stratifying the Black population and developing a particular 
research design to adequately test the needs of all interest 
categories (e.g., professionals or t he 16-25 year age group) 
would lead to the addressing of the particular fears, 
desires and needs of the various cat egories and show the 
extent to which groups would play a role in accommodation 
and change. 
4.3 The devising of alternative and comparative research 
methodology in order to continuously investigate the changing 
perceptions and attitudes of people (Black and White) towards 
strategies for change under state of emergency conditions. 
4.4 Investigation of the relationship between race and class 
position and the support for militarist strategies with 
the use of varied research techniques. 
4.5 Historical documentation or empirical study focusing on 
the struggle between the moderate and militarist forces 
within the white political field, and its effects upon 
the white population. 
4.6 The strategies and tactics of the NSMS (National Security 





4.7 The African working class and the possibility of socialism in 
a post-apartheid society. 
4.8 The social position of women in post-independent African 
states, the existing position of the women's issue in 
democratic organisations and the consequences for a 
post-apartheid society. 
5. Su.nary 
The present study was conducted in order to establish the 
extent to .which Blacks in general are favourable towards 
state strategies, extraparliamentary evolutionary and 
revolutionary strategies, and the socio-political 
significance thereof. 
An interview schedule was constructed aft~r the examination 
of various models, historical data and theories. The pilot 
study, which preceded the actual study, exposed ambiguities 
and misunderstandings which necessitated the adjusting of the 
questionnaire. 
A proportional stratified sample accommodating a multistage 
plan was used to allow for the testing of race, class, sex 
and age groups. A sample of 360 respondents was used. This 
was greater than the required number but was necessary to 
test the population stratified in terms of the ratio 3: 2: 1-
Area profiles were integrated into the fieldwork stage. 
The raw data was processed by an IBM computer. Frequencies, 
percentages, the qualitative examination of open ~nded 
questions, weighted scores and extrapolated generalisations, 
weighted means, median, variance as well as chi-square and 
Spearman Rho were used, in some instances comparatively. 
Overall, it became evident that the eXisting parliamentary 
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structures, legislation and SADF ini t iatives were not 
accepted. Social structures were seriously undermined but 
there was considerable support for commissions of inquiry. 
Generally, there was negligible support for intraparliamentary 
change. 
Collaborative views supporting state initiatives and ethnic 
fragmentation was not evident but there was anticipation of 
participation in future modified parliamentary structures. 
There was a stronger tendency for people to want to remain 
in the country whilst utilising all available democratic 
national structures. Trade union action was seen as most 
significant and economic measures were seen to be becoming 
increasingly important. Extraparliamentary evolutionary 
strategies were seen as most favourable by Africans, 
Indians and Coloureds. 
Armed struggle was not accepted by the majority but there 
was some support for ungovernability. There was also the 
belief that unrest was going to spread to encompass a 
wider area. Whilst there was greater support for 
revolutionary strategies than state initiatives, these were 
less than the support for extraparliamentary evolutionary 
strategies. 
Race, class and sex as well as age affected the above 
perceptions in varying degrees. African people, men, the 
upper and lowest income groups were often the most 
, politicized categories. 
The following recommendations were made: 
1. That extraparliamentary organisations should explor~ the 
ex'tent to which coalitions with intraparliamentary 
organisations and pressure groups could take place to 
pressurise the government to move/ towards negotiation. 
/ 
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2. That trade unions and women's organisations should 
retain their autonomy even whilst allying themselves 
with broader political movements. 
3. That academics involve themselves with mass based 
organisations, create the structures at educational 
institutions to facilitate non-racialism and to link 
their research to socially relevant issues. 
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DEPARTEMENT SOSIOLOGIE 
STUDY OF ATTITUDES OF URBAN BLACK (AFRICAN. INDIAN AND COLOURED) 
COMMUNITIES IN SELECTED AREAS OF DURBAN TOWARDS STRATEGIES FOR 
SOCIAL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
This study is being undertaken for postgraduate research purposes 
at the University of Durban-Westville. Since the study is being 
conducted for academic, scientific purposes your answers in this 
interview schedule will remain confidential. 
All that you need to do is to state exactly what you feel about 
people of other communities as well as the different strategies 
for social change in South Africa. There are no right or wrong 
answers. 
As the study involves eight (8) areas besides your own, an attempt 
will be made to use the findings towards the resolving of existent 
problems. 
Your cooperation will be highly appreciated. 
Yours sincerely 
.. ~.~~ ........ . 
K. NAIDOO 






2. Residential Area 
CLERMONT UMLAZI LAMONTVILLE RESERVOIR HILLS OVERPORT CHATSWORTH 
01 02 03 04 05 06 
GREENWOOD PARK NEWLANDS EAST WENTWORTH 
07 08 09 
3. Age 
16 - 25 26 - 35 36 - 45 46 - 60 OVER 60 




5. Marital Status 
MARRIED SINGLE DIVORCED SEPARATED COHABITATION WIDOWED 
01 02 03 04 05 06 
6. Educational Qualifications 
NONE (AND NONE (AND PRIMARY JUNIOR SENIOR 
NONE-LITERATE) LITERATE) SCHOOL SECONDARY SECONDARY 
01 02 03 04 05 
/ 
HIGHER THAN STANDARD 10 06 
/ 
SPECIFY 
/ OTHER 07 
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7. Occupation 
PROFESSIONAL CLERICAL SALES & RELATED SKILLED \\IORKER 
01 02 03 04 
UNSKILLED \\IORKER SELF-EMPLOYED STUDENT OTHER: 
05 06 07 08 
8. Family Income per Annum 
LESS THAN BET\\IEEN BET\\IEEN BETWEEN BETWEEN OVER 
R3000 R3-6000 R6-10000 R10-15000 R15-25000 R25000 
01 02 03 04 05 06 
9. Which of the following organisations or types of orgqnisations have you 
heard of and to which do you belong? 
ORGANIZATION HEARD OF BELONG TO 
UDF (UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT) 
NIC (NATAL INDIAN CONGRESS) 
AZAPO (AZANIAN PEOPLES' ORGANISATION) 
NATIONAL FORUM 
INKATHA 
NPP (NATIONAL PEOPLES' PARTY) 
SOLIDARITY 
LABOUR PARTY 
UCC (UNITED COMMITTEE OF CONCERN) 
UWUSA (UNITED \\IORKERS UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
COSATU (CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS) 
















Name 5 organisations that you believe are working to improve the lives 
of Black (Indian, African, Coloured) people in South Africa? 
11. Is there any person that you consider to be most capable of leading 
this country? 
YES NO SPECIFY: 
01 02 
12. I am considering leaving the country because of the social situation 
YES NO GIVE REASON: 
01 02 
13. -Blacks have suffered injustices under apartheid 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 04 03 0-2 01 
14. Whites in South Africa are biologically superior to Blacks 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
, 
01 02 03 04 05 
15. Gender discrimination does not exist in this country 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
01 02 03 04 05 
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16. Which statement would you agree with: 
1. Women need to be controlled 01 
2. When women are liberated, nobody respects them 02 
3. Women and men should be equal 03 
17. Which statement would you agree with: 
1. Race laws in this country need to be changed 
2. Capitalism needs to be overcome 
3. No changes here need to be made 
18. 'The reform programme initiated by the government should be supported 
' since it is moving us in the right direction 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 




19. No matter which white government comes into power nothing will change 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
01 02 03 04 05 
20. People cannot talk freely about their problems as they may get into 
trouble 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
01 02 03 04 05 
21. Detentions only worsen the country's problems 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 







The fact that the Black population is increasing at a faster rate than 
the White population only means that white minority rule will soon be 
over 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 04 03 0·2 01 
23 . I think we could have changed our situation a long time ago if people 
were less apathetic 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 0.4 03 0·2 01 
24 . If people with the same problems were to come together as a group, they 
would be able to change their situation 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 0.4 03 0-2 01 
25. The government is entrenching rather than dismantling apartheid 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
01 02 03 04 05 
26. The mass media should furnish us with all the information concerning 
unrest in the country 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 04 03 02 01 
, 
27. At the moment the mass media covers news events adequately 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONG~Y DISAGREE . 




28. I believe that important changes in South Africa will take place 
gradually and peacefully 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 04 03 02 01 
29. The tricameral parliament is not supported by people in my community 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
01 02 03 04 05 
30. A violent revolution will never take place 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE , 
01 02 03 04 05 
31. People who criticise the government don't understand the complexities 
of the South Afric'an situation 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED ' DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
0.5 0:4 03 02 01 
32. The tricameral parliament has increased the unity of Indians and 
Coloureds 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 04 03 02 01 
33 . The tricameral parliament has increased the unity of Indians, Coloureds 
as well as Africans 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE .. UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 OJ4 03 0'2 01 
/ 
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34. Black (Indian, Coloured and African) people must enter parliament to 
change things from within 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 04 03 02 01 
35. SADF raids on ANC bases should be conducted to enable the state to 
continue with its reform programme 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
C5 04 03 02 01 
36. SADF raids in neighbouring .states are increasing the regions instability 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
01 02 03 04 05 
37 ~ The international world believes that the situation in South Africa is 
explosive, but this is not · the situation 
. 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
01 02 03 04 05 
38. Unrest in the country is going to spread to other areas, such as our 
own 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 04 03 0.2 0·1 
39.- Disinvestment by international companies is an important way through 
which racial discrimination can be overcome 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 









STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
C5 04 03 02 01 
41. One person, one vote would transform this country into a democratic 
society 
.-
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
<:6. 03 03 02 01 
~ 
42. The country now needs the unbanning of outlawed organisations , people in 
exile to return, the release of those in detention and the calling of a 
National Convention 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
CO 0' 4 03 02 OJ. 
43 . A National Convention will not solve the. country I s problems 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
. . 
01 02 03 04 05 
• 
44 . The government needs to ban/outlaw organisations that are calling for 
rapid change 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
0 :5 <» 03 CTl .. . Ql. 
45. A National Convention should be called only with existing, legal 
organisations taking part 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
01 02 03 04 05 
46. 
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The State should attempt to solve problems at a provincial or regional 
level ego develop a political structure for Natal to solve its problems 
by itself 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
01 02 03 04 05 
47 . Natal cannot separate itself politically from the rest of the country 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE 'UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 04 03 0,2 01 
48. Civic actions, such as refusing to pay high rents, are important ways 
of changing our immediate situation 
, 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
oS 04 03 02 O~ 
49. The trade unions should be supported by workers since these are the most 
important organisations through which workers can change their economic 
situation 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 04 03 02 01 
50. Political organisations are more important than trade unions 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
01 02 03 04 05 
51 . Political organisations are not effective 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
01 02 03 04 05 
52. Trade unions are not effective 
/ 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 







53. Armed struggle should not be used to bring about change 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STORNGLY DISAGREE 
01 02 03 04 05 
54. Granting independence to all the Bantustans would result in the 
development of the people in those areas 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 04 03 0.2 0 1 
55. The Group Areas Act serves the important function of allowing people to 
develop their own culture within their own communities 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 04 03 C2 0·1 
-
56. Constant consultations between Bantustan-,leaders and the government 
would resolve problems existent in these areas 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 04 03 02 0,1 
57. A fourth chamber for Africans should be added to the tricameral 
parliament 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
01 02 03 04 05 
58. The government should hold talks only with organisations that reject 
violence 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 04 03 02 °1 
59. The nation-wide boycotts at schools and universities show students' 
rejection of the SA educational and political system 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 04 03 02 01 
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60. I feel frustrated because I don't have political rights 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
01 02 03 04 05 
61 . Passive resistance by the communities gives rise to significant change 
STRONGLY AGREE . AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE . STRONGLY DISAGREE 
05 04 03 0·2 0:1 
62. Capitalism is at the root of the country's problems 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
0·5 0'4 03 0·2 0:1 
63. Socialism would transform this country into a free society 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
d5 04 03 02 01 
64. Political organisations working outside of parliament should be supported 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDEDICED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
01 02 03 04 05 
65. Organisations must work towards making the country ungovernable so that 
it can be rapidly changed 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
o 5 04 03 02 01 
66. Commissions of inquiry that ~stablish causes of problems, can be used 
as a means for bringing about change~ 
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE 
, 
05 04 03 I 02 01 
\ 
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67. I communicate with members of other Black race groups 
OFTEN SELDOM NOT AT ALL 
01 02 03 
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DEPAAT!MENT SOSIOLOGIE 
LONA NGUMSEBENZI WOKUCWANINGA NGEMIZWA NANGEMIBONO YABANTU 
ABAMNYAMA (AMA-AFRICA. AMANDIYA NAMAKHALADI) BEMIPHAKATHI 
ESEMADOLOBHENI ~SETHEKWINI NGENJONGO YOKULETHA USHIITSHO 
E-NINGIZIMU AFRICA 
Lomsebenzi wenziwa ngenhloso yocwaningo lukasomaghuzu (postgraduate) 
eYunivesithi yase Durban-Westville. Njengoba lomsebenzi wenzelwe 
ubuchwephese kwisayensi kwezemfundo, iZimpendulo zakho kulemibuzo 
zohlala ziyimfihlo. 
Konke okufanele ukwenze ukuba nje usho ukuthi uzwa noma ubona 
kanjani mayelana nabanye abantu kanye neminye imiphalathi 
ngezindlela ezahlukene zokuletha ushintsho e-ningizimu Africa. 
Kakukho zimpendulo eziyizo nokungesiyizo. 
Njengoba lomsebenzi ughutshwa nakwezinye izindawo ngaphandle 
kwalena yakho, imiphumela iyosentshenziselwa ekuxazululeni 
lezizinkinga ezikhona. 
Ubambiswano lwakho luyobongeka kakhulu. 
Yimina Ozithobayo 
, 
r.:~ itt!!jY.; . · . · · · · .. · . 
UMFU E UZWINI LEZOBUCHWEPHESHE (M.A. DEGREE). 






1. Inamba r r \ 
Imininingwane 
2. Indawo ohlala kuyo 
CLERMONT UMLAZI LAMONTVILLE RESERVOIR HILLS OVERPORT CHATSWORTH 
01 02 03 04 . 05 06 
GREENWOOD PARK NEWLANDS EAST WENTWORTH 
07 08 09 
3. Iminyaka 
16 - 25 26 - 35 36 - 45 46 - 60 OVER 60 




5. Okuganwa/Ukugana (Marital Status) . 
USHADILE AWUSHADIl..E UBUYE EMSHADWENI NIHLUKENE NIKIPITILE UMFELWA 
01 02 






UDLULILE EBANGENI LESHUMI 
UFUNDELE INI 
OKUNYE 
03 04 05 06 
ISIKOLE ESIPHAKATHI ESIKHULU 
ESINCANE NENDAWO 




7. Umsebenz i 
UMSEBENZI \ UWUMA UINUMDAYI UQEQESHELINE AKAQEQESHIWE 
UWUFUNuE LE I BHALANE SI UMSEBENZI 
01 02 03 04 05 
UZIQASHILE UMFUNDI OKUNYE 
06 07 08 
8. Ima1i Oyiho1ayo Ngonyaka 
NGAPHANSI PHAKATHI PHAKATHI PHAKATHI PHAKATHI NGAPHEZU 
KUKA R3000 KUKA KUKA KUKA KUKA KUKA 
R3-6000 R6-10000 R10-15000 R15-25000 R25000 
01 02 03 04 05 06 
9. Iziphi Izinhlangano Kwezilandelayo Ozaziyo Noyijoyinile? 
INHLANGANO OZAZIYO OKUYo"' 
UDF (UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT) 
NIC (NATAL INDIAN CONGRESS) 
AZAPO (AZANIAN PEOPLES ORGANISATION) 
NATIONAL FORUM 
INKATHA 
NPP (NATIONAL PEOPLES' PARTY) 
SOLIDARITY 
LABOUR PARTY 
UCC (UNITED COMMITTEE OF CONCERN) 
UWUSA (UNITED WORKERS UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA) 
COSATU (CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS) 




I WOMENS ORGANISATIONS 
RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS 
CIVIC ORGANISATI ONS 





10. Yisho izinhlangano ezinhlanu okholelwa ukuthi ziSe~enza uku:huthukiSa 






11. Ukhona umuntu omthatha ngokuthi uyena ongahola lelizwe 
YES NO lMUPHI 
01 02 
12. Kuyakufike1a ukushiya lelizwe ngenxa yesimo senhlalo 
YES NO YISHO ISIZATHU 
01 02 
13 . Abamnyama bayahlupheka ngaphansi kwesimo sobandlululo 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
14. Abamhlophe eS.A . badalwa babangaphezulu kwabamnyama ngokwemvelo 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KHALE 
01 02 03 
15. Ubandlululo ngobulili kulelizwe kalukho 
. 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE 






















16. Ikuphi ovumelana nakho kulokhu: 
1. Abesifazane badinga ukuphathwa 01 
2. Uma abesifazane bekhulul ekile abahlonishwamuntu 02 
3. Abesifazane nabesilisa kufanele balingane 03 
17. Yikuphi ovumelana nakho lapha : 
Imithetho ebandlulula ngezinhlangakuleli kufanele ishintshwe 01 
2. Ubungxiwankulu kumele kuqedwe (Capitalism) 
3. Alukho ushintsho oludingekile 
18 . Uhlelo loshintsho olulethwa nguhulumeni kumelwe luxhaswe ngoba lusisa 
empumelelweni 
I NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 05 04 03 02 01 
19. Akukho shintsho oloba khona noma kungathatha muphi uhulumeni omhlope 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
01 02 03 04 05 
20 . Abantu bayesaba ukukhuluma bakhululeke ngezinkinga zabo ngoba bangase 
bangene ezinkingeni 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
01 02 03 04 05 
21. Ukuboshwa kwabantu emajele kwenza isimo sibe sibi kakhulu 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
01 02 03 04 05 
02 
22 . Ukwahda kwabamnyama ngokushesha uma kuqhathaniswa nokungandi kwabamhlophe 
kusho ukuthi umbuso wedlanzana labamhlophe ungase uphele 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
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23. Ngicabanga ukuthi ukuba abantu bayazisukumela izinkinga zabo ngabe 
isimo kade sashintsha. 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
24 . Uma abantu abanezinkinga ezifanayo bengahlangana babe ndawonye 
bengasishintsha isimo sezinkinga zabo. 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
25. Uhulumeni kaluyeki ubandlululo kunalokho uyaluqinisa 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
01 02 03 04 05 
26. Amaphephandaba, ama T.V. nama Radio kufanele kusinike konke okwenzenkayo 
ngezibhelu 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
27. Okwamanje ama T.V . , Radio namaphephandaba kusasinika konke okwenzeka 
layo 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMP AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
28. Ngikholwa ukuthi uguquko eNingizimu Afrika luzoza kahle nango kuthula 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
- 05 - 04 03 02 01 
29. Unxantathu wePhalamende alusekelwa abantu bomphakathi wami (Phalamende 
yamaNdiya Amakhaladi Nabamhlophe) 
I 
~ / 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
01 02 03 04 05 
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30. Udlame alunakwenzeka 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
01 02 03 04 05 
31 . Abantu ababeka izici uhulumeni waseS.A . abazi izinkinga ezibheke is . A. 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
32 . Unxantathu wephalamende ubukhuphulile ubunye bamaNdiya namakhaladi 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
33. Unxantathu wephalamende ubukhuphulile ubunye phakathi kwamandiya 
amakhaladi narnaAfrica 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
34. Abamnyama (Ndiya, Kaladi, Africa) kufanele bangene ePhalamende ukuze 
balethe ushintsho ngaphakathi ..• 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
35. Ukuhlasela kwarnabutho ezokuphepha aseNingizimu Africa ehlasela ezizindeni 
ze ANC kufanele kuqhubeke ukuze uhulumeni aqhuQeke nohlelo Iwakhe 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
05. 04 03 02 01 
36. Ukuhlasela kwamabutho ezokuphepha asening1z1mu Africa emazweni 
angomakhelwane kwandisa ukungabikho kokuthula 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
01 02 03 04 05 
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37. Umhlaba wonke ukholelwa ukuthi isimo eningizimu Africa sesingaphezu 
kwamandla kodwa lokhu akulona iginiso 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
01 02 03 04 05 
38.' Isimo senxushunxushu emhlabeni wonke sizokwandela nasemazweni amanye 
njengalo leli lethu 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
39. Ukungaxhaswa ngezimali kwalelizwe yizinkampani zamazwe angophandle 
kubalulekile ukuze kuqedwe ubandlululo ngezinhlanga kuleli 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
40. Imiphumela yokungaxhaswa ngezimali kwaleli amanye amazwe iyogcina imihle 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
41. Ukuvota komuntu ngamunye evotela umuntu ngamunye kungenza ukuba lelizwe 
libuseke ngentando yeningi 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
42. Okudingwa yilelizwe manje ukukhululwa kweziboshwa zepolitiki, uku 
buyiswa kwabantu abasekudingisweni Nokuvulwa kwezinhlangano ezivaliwe 
ukuze kube nokhukhulela Ngoqo woboniswano 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
43. Ukhukhulela Ngoqo woboniswano ungeke uzixazulule izinkinga Zaleli 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
\ 
01 02 03 04 05 
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44. Uhulumeni udinga ukuzivala izinhl angano ezifuna inguquko ngokushesha 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
45. Ukhukhuleia ngoqo kufanele ubizwe besekuthi zonke izinghlangano 
ezikhona ngokusemthethweni zibambe iqhaza 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
01 02 03 04 05 
46. Uhulumeni kufanel e axazulule izinkinga ngokwehlukana kwezindawo 
njengokuthi iNa tal ixazulu Ie ezayo yodwa 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
01 02 03 04 05 
47 . INatal ngeke izehlukanise nomhlaba wonke kwezepolitiki 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
48. Izenzo zomuphakathi Njengokungakhokhi irenti ephezulu zibalulekile 
ekushintsheni isimo samanje 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
49. Izinyunyana zimelwe ukuxhaswa abasebenzi njengobakuyizona ezibaluleke 
kakhulu ukuze isimo sabasebenzi kwezomnotho sishintshe 
50. 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 :.02 01 
/ 
IZinhlangano zezepolitiki zibaluleke kakhulu kunezinyo~yana 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
01 
, 
02 03 04 05 
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51. Izinh1angano zezepolitiki kazenzi umsebenzi obonakalayo 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
01 02 03 , 04 05 
, 
52. Izinyunyana kazenzi umsebenzi obonakalayo 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
01 02 03 04 05 
53. Umzabalazo wezikhali ungeze wasetshenziselwa ukuletha uguquo 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA A\llUBONI KAHLE A\llUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
01 02 03 04 05 
54. ukunika omazimele geqe kuzonazonke" izabelo kuletha ukuthuthuka kwabantu 
balezozabelo 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE A\llUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
55. Umthetho wokuhlukaniswa kwezinhlanga kwenza ukuba abantu bakhule 
kumasiko abo kumiphakathi yabo 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA A\llUBONI KAHLE A\llUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
56. Ukuxoxisana phakathi kukahulumeni nabaholi bezabelo kungaxazulula 
izinkinga ezikhona kulezizindawo 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE A\llUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
57. Ingosi yesine efaka amaAfrica kumelwe ifakwe kunxantathu wephalamende / 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE A\llUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
" 01 02 03 04 05 / 
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58 . Uhulumeni kufanele abe nezingxoxo nezinhlangano ezingahambisani nodlame 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI. ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
59 . Ukudutshwa kwezikhole namaNyuvesi kuzwe lonke kukhombisa ukwaliwa 
kwalemfundo nesimo salelizwe kweze politiki 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
60 . Ngizizwa ngisenkingeni eyinqaba ngoba anginawo amalungelo kwezepolitiki 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
01 02 03 04 05 
61 . Ukuzabalaza ngokuthula kwemiphakathi kuletha uguquko 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
'~ 
62 . Ubungxiwankulu kusezimpandeni zezinkinga zezwe 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE 'AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
63. Inkambiso engaphansi kukahulumeni okhethwe iningi ungaletha umphakathi 
okhululekile 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
64 . Izinhlangano zezepoiitiki ezingabambisani nohulumeni kumelwe zisekelwe 
I 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
01 02 / 03 04 05 
, 
301. 
65. Izinhlangano kufanele zenze isimo esingabuseki ukuze kube noshintsho 
olusheshayo 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGIVUMI KAKHULU 
05 04 03 02 01 
66 • . Amakhomishane acwaninga ngezizathu ezidala izinkinga angasetshenziselwa 
uguquko 
NGIYAVUMA KAKHULU UYAVUMA AWUBONI KAHLE AWUVUMI ANGlVUMI KAKHULU 
05 : 04 03 02 01 
67. Ngiyaxhumana namalunga eminye imiphakathi emnyama 
KANING~ KAMBALWA ANGIXHUMANI NHLOBO 
01 02 03 -
LUYABONGEKA UBAMBISWANO LWAKHO 
302. 
ADDENDUM B 
FURTHER SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
TABLE 139 
Statement 12 
Africans Y 18,52% 
N 81,48% 
I 













Various reaSons for wanting to leave the country were offered by the broader 
population . The most common were the following:-
(1) Economic reasons: greater job opportunities were seen to exist 
in some other countries. 
(2) Political reasons: violence in the country was seen to potentially 
accelerate. People were looking for a more stable environment. 
(3) Educational reasons: the need to study further was seen as another 
reason . Families were also considering leaving to find alternative 







RACE AND FURTHER SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
--
RESPONDENTS S 3 S 4 S15 S16 S17 S28 
RACE N , Xw V Xw V Xw V Xw V Xw V Xw V 
AFRICAN 180 50 00 1 32 o 51 4 23 1-,12 3,72 1 55 2,30 o 76 1,46 o 31 3 18 1,06 
INDIAN I 120 33-,33 1,66 0,70 3 30 1 18 3,46 1 42 2,81 o 30 1,35 o 42 3 02 1, 29 
COLOURED i 120 16 67 1 ,6 3 0,94 4 06 1 ,42 3 33 1 74 2,83 o 30 1,30 o 21 3 21 1,93 
XW=4, SO Xw-3,897 Xw-3 57 Xw,.2 56 Xw",l,405 Xw .. 2,86 
V .. 0~66 V-l,641 Val 543 V-O 619 V-O 347 V-l,12 . 
xl -27 ,248 xa -76 ,398 r -54,334 x3 .. 50,715 r -28,6 x" -48 , 39 
with 8° with 8° wi th 8° wi th 4° wi th 4° wi th 8° 
freedom freedom freedom freedom freedom freedom 
P .. 0,006 paO ,OOOl paO,OOOl P=O,OOOl paO,OOOl p ... O,OOOl 
,0 05 "-0 05 '::0 05 "-0 ,05 "-0 05 "'0 05 
r~ .. 0,7625 r. -0 ,60 r~ .0,30 r~ -1.00 rs .. 1,00 rs -0,70 
" 
S33 S34 
Xw V Xw V 
3 86 1 16 1 58 o 82 
3 75 1 07 2 27 0,96 
4 03 1,01 2 01 1 20 
Xw=2,14 Xw-4,ll 
V .. l,lll v=l 018 
x3=34,37 1i' '"'64,12 
wi th 8° wi th 8° 
freedom freedom 
p .. O,OOOl PaO,OOOl 
~0 ,O5 "O,OS 
r~ =0,90 r~ .. 0,90 
S67 J 
Xw V 
1 59 o 411 
1 64 o 41 




wi th 4° 
freedom 
p .. O,OOOl 
"0 05 




OCCUPATION AND FURTHER SOCIo-POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
OCCU- RESPONDENTS S 3 S14 S15 S16 S11 S28 
PATION N I % Xw V Xw V Xw V Xw V Xw V Xw V 
I CLERK I 42 I II 67 1 50 o 82 3,85 1 77 3,19 1 , 59 2 , 11 0,41 1 21 o 28 3,16 1,05 
! PROFESS-
I !ONAL 54 15 00 1,29 o 25 4 35 1 16 3 77 1,5 2 , 61 0 , 38 1 44 0 , 28 3_L 59 1 14 
SALES 19 5 , 28 1,26 o 51 3,18 1 68 3 5 1 27 2 42 0,78 1 31 o 15 2 13 o 95 
SE:.F-
UoIPLOYED 28 7 78 1 39 o 46 3 96 1 34 3 , 53 1,48 2,20 0,98 1 32 0 , 22 3,25 0 , 97 
SKI LLED 
WORKER 83 23 06 1 51 0 , 86 3 , 11 1 73 3,46 1 13 2 38 0 , 78 1 43 o 26 2 97 1 03 
~SKILLED 
WORKER 29 8 06 1 48 0 , 61 3 , 19 1 16 3,65 1 28 2 21 0,·88 1 51 o 39 2 80 1 01 
STUDENT 66 18,33 1 36 0 , 48 4 , 06 1 16 4,01 1 10 2 77 0,14 1 42 o 28 3 37 1 18 
OTHER UN-
EMPLOYED 39 10 83 2 10 0 , 11 3 11 1,12 3 , 11 1 36 2,84 0 , 42 1 46 0 , 30 2 71 1 05 
Xw-4 50 Xw-3,891 Xw-3,57 Xw=2 , 56 Xw=l,405 Xw-2 86 
V=O,66 V- 1,641 V .. 1 543 V=0,619 V=0,347 Val 12 
x· -65 , 83 x~-51, 94 xl a48, 266 x~ . 46 , 685 r-28,481 x2 .. 55 ,06 
with 280 with 2~' wi th 280 with 14e. with 14() with 28" 
freedom freedom freedom freedom freedom freedom 
p .. O, OOOl P-0 , 003 Pa O,010 P=O,OOl . P .. 0,0126 P .. 0,0011 
£. 0,05 L O, 05 L 0,05 ~0,05 LO , 05 40 , 05 
S33 SH 
Xw V Xw V 
3,97 1 10 2 07 1 26 
4 14 o 97 2 01 1 42 
3 94 1 16 1 51 o 511 
4 07 o 71 1 78 o 97 
3 69 1 11 1,85 o 88 
3 86 o 68 1 51 o 74 
3,9 1 18 1 90 1,13 
3 , 3 1 21 2 05 o 61 
Xw=2 14 Xw=4 11 
V=l 111 V=l 018 
x-t .. 54 , 06 
with 28° 
x-t-43,39 
with 28 0 
freedom freedom 
P=0 , 002 P=O ,Oll 
" 0,0; "O,OS 
567 
Xw V 
1 57 o H 
1 53 ~~ 
1,52 o 411 
1 78 o 68 
1 51 o 48 
1 65 o 51 
1 57 o 31 











INCOME AND PURTHER SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
I RESPONDENTSI S13 S1.4 S15 S16 S17 S28 
INCOME , N , Xw V Xw V Xw V Xw - V Xw V Xw V 
I LESS THAN 
R3 000 65 18 06 1 41 o 47 3 76 1 69 3 13 1 71 2 40 o 79 1,27 o 24 3 00 1 17 
BE~EEN 
R3- 6 000, 89 I 24 72 1,57 0,88 3 69 1 87 3,69 1 24 2 34 o 76 1 50 o 42 3 04 1 09 
BE~EEN I 
R6-10 000 81 22 5 I 1,551 0 70 3 80 1 72 3 71 1 30 2,50 o 63 1,40 0,37 3,08 o 96 
BETWEEN 
R10-15000 57 15 83 1 43 0,80 4 00 1 16 3,60 1 84 2 82 o 46 1 42 o 38 3 33 o 75 
BE~EEN 
R15-25000 42 11 67 1 45 0,54 4 19 1 26 3,30 1 67 2 83 o 52 1 40 o )0 3 02 1 32 
OVER 
R25 000 26 7 22 1 38 0,24 4 39 1 20 4 00 1 73 2 69 o 45 1 30 0.23 3 69 1 07 
Xw-4,5 Xw-3 897 Xw-3 57 Xw-2 56 Xw=l 405 Xw=2 86 
V-O,66 V-1 641 V-l 543 V"O 619 V .. 0,347 V-l 12 . 
x.l-14,66 ~ -37 ,5i r-46,17 xa -29,368 xa "2,236 ~ -48,64 
with 200 with 20 wi th 200 wi th 100 with 10° with 20" 
freedom freedom freedom freedom freedom freedom 
P=0,7955 P .. 0,0099 Pa O,0008 P=0,0144 P:;0,6611 P=0,0003 
" > 0 05 .£.0,05 ~ 0,05 .:: 0,05 >0,05 LO,05 
--, 
'- -- - ---
S3) S34 
Xw V Xw V 
) 80 1 17 1 67 1 06 
3 65 1 11 1 110 1 05 
3 71 1 19 1 79 o 63 
4 01 o 96 2 00 1 08 
4 02 1,13 2 11 o 88 
4 46 o 49 2.30 1 82 
Xw=2 14 XW=4,11 
V=l 111 V=1,018 
x:l=35,82 xa -34,47 
with 20" wi th 20" 
freedom freedom 
P=0,0161 P:;I),0231 
, O,OS ,0 oS 
S67 
Xw V 
1 66 o 54 
, 
1,7 j o 47 
1,53 o )~ 
1 42 I) 32 
1 61 I) 5 4 












EDUCATION AND FURTHER SOCIa-POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
---
Ie RESPONDENTS S13 S14 S .5 516 S17 5 28 533 
0CIGIt'PClf I N % Xw V Xw v Xw v Xw v Xw v Xw v Xw v 
NONE( &IL-! 
4'r;.ERATE) 3 0 83 1 33 0 23 3,33 0,24 3 33 0,24 1 67 1 00 1 33 0 25 3 00 0,67 4 00 0 67 
NONE (& 
LITERA'!'E) 8 2 22 100000 4 25 0,19 3,87 1 38 1 37 0 49 1 12 0 52 3,13 1,11 3,87 1 51 
PRIMAR'x' 
SCHOOL 25 6,94 1 36 o 32 3 20 0,85 3 48 1 45 2 08 o 96 1 72 o 67 3 16 o 68 3,48 1 29 
JUNIOR 
SECONDARY! 77 21 39 1,72 0,78 3 67 1,45 3,33 1 37 2 42 0,68 1 44 o 37 2 97 1 11 3,7 1 12 
SENIOR ! 
SECONDARY! 189 52 5 1 47 o 76 3 94 1 28 3,50 1 59 2,71 0,46 1,34 o 53 3,15 1 23 3,93 1 30 
pos'r 
\ MATRIC 58 16 11 1,36 o 37 4 30 1 12 4 08 1 63 2,63 0,57 1,44 o 33 3L 29 1 14 3 94 1 12 
Xw-4 5 Xw-3 897 Xw-3 57 Xw=2 56 Xw=l 405 XW=2 86 Xw=2,14 
V-O 66 Val 641 Val 543 V-O 619 V-O 347 V-l 12 Val 111 
x~-24 ,43 x1 -54,46 x~-40,468 x~ .. 56 ,238 x'a.-22,68 )@ -16,964 x~-28, 335 
with 20· with 20r. wi th 20· wi th 10 0 with 10 0 wi th 20· with 20° 
freedom freedom freedom freedom freedom freedom freedom 
P=O ,2241 P-O,OOOl P-0,0044 P=O,OOOl P-0,09l1 P-0,6553 P=0,1017 




1 33 0 23 
1,80 o 88 
1 88 1 01 
1 93 1 06 








s.~ Xw v 
2 00 0L~7 
1750691 
1 92 o 56
1 
1 80 o 5l 
1 51 o 37 












GENDER AND FURTHER SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
I RESPONDENTS S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S28 
GENDER N % Xw V Xw V Xw V Xw V Xw V Xw V 
MALE 180 50 1,46 o 78 4,08 1 39 3 55 1 43 2 36 o 77 1.L45 OL34 3, 19 1 52 
FEMALE 180 50 1 , 52 0,5 4 3,7 1 86 3 , 59 1 62 2., 75 o 39 1 35 o 34 3 07 1 04 
Xw=4 50 Xw-3 897 Xw:a3 57 Xw:a2 ,.56 Xw=l,405 Xw=2 86 
V-O,66 V",1,641 V-l 543 v-O 619 V-O 347 V .. l 12 
x~-10 , 372 xl- -14 , 15 x2 .3,647 x·-24,13 x·"5 , 899 xOl -4,571 
wi th 4° wi th 4° wi th 4 0 wi th 2· with 2° wi th 4· 
freedom freedom freedom freedom freedom freedom 
P-0,0346 Pa O, 006 P-O,4558 P=O , OOOl Pa O,1166 P-0,3342 
~~- . . L<: O, 05 > 0,05 ~ 0 , 05 > 0,05 > 0 , 05 
S33 S34 
Xw V Xw V 
3 95 1 07 1 95 1 28 
3 75 1 15 1 82 o 75 
Xw=2 14 Xw=4 11 
V-l 111 Val 018 
r=4 ,345 x3.=9,559 
wi th 4 0 wi th 4 0 
freedom fr~edom 
P=0 , 3614 P.0 , 048 
,. 0,05 .(.0,05 
S67 
Xw V 
1 61 0,4 5 
1 56 o 44 
xw= l 588 
V=O 437 
xOl =0, 92 2 
with 2 0 
fr eedom 
P=O,6 307 
.,..o, of __ 
tv o 
'-l 
TABLE l.4.5 . 
AG~ AND PURTHER SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
RESPONDENTS 513 S14 515 516 517 S28 
AGE N , Xw V Xw V Xw V Xw V Xw V Xw V 
BETWEEN 
1 6 - 25 145 40 28 1 53 o 76 3,97 1,18 3 64 1 45 2,71 o 41 1 37 0,31 3.25 1 19 
26 - 35 84 23 33 1 34 o 46 3, .. 90 1 21 3 42 1,38 2,50 0,70 1 33 0,27 ],02 1 20 
36 - 45 61 16 94 l,S9 o 87 3,89 1 22 3 45 1 82 2 55 0,69 1 50 o 46 3,19 1 03 
46 - 60 I 64 17,78 1 5 o 56 3 91 1 38 3 71 1 11 2.06 OL89 1 ... 43 o 35 2 9 1 03 
OVER 60 6 1 67 1 5 o 25 3,33 1,24 3 50 1,25 2 83 0,17 1,67 o 57 300 o 67 
. Xw .. 4 50 Xw-3 897 Xw-3 57 Xw=2 56 'Xwa 1 405 Xw-2 86 
V-O 66 V-l,641 V-l,543 V-O,619 V-O 347 V-1,12 
xl. -10 ,399 x;a -22,35 x~-18,14 x'"-41,473 x3 -10,596 x'-13,106 
with 16- with 16- with 16- wi th 8- wi th 8- with 16-
freedom freedom freedom freedom freedom freedom 
P .. 0,845 P .. 0,132 P-O,3156 P=O,OOOl P-O,563 Pa O,665 
> 0,05 >0,05 >0 05 ~O..LOL .. ~~05 >0 05 
533 534 
Xw V Xw V 
3 84 1 03 1 95 1 12 
3 80 1 23 1 98 1,40 
3._85 1 35 1 83 o 97 
3 92 1 02 1 68 o 67 
3 83 0,-82 1 67 o 24 
Xw-2,14 Xw=4 11 
V-1,111 VW1 018 
x" -12,017 xa -9,825 
with 16- with 16-
freedom freedom 
P-o.7428 P-O,8756 
> 0 OS >0 05 
567 - I 




1 57 0.4 5' 
1 39 o 35 
1,78 o 511 
2 16 o 1 § 
Xw-1 588 
V",O 437 
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